

The
Catholic University Bulletin.

126728

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THE PUBLIC AND THE LABOR QUESTION.

It is worthy of note that, while the Labor Question is one of the most complex and pressing problems of modern society, the public as such seems to take little active interest in it. Employer and laborer are looked upon much as an audience in the theater looks upon actors on the stage. If there are strikes, lockouts and injunctions, if trade unions sustain a lively agitation in favor of working men, the public is concerned passively. Building operations may be suspended, trains may be hindered from carrying freight, factories may be closed down and the public may suffer some inconvenience. But the thought is forcing itself into consciousness that there is a deeper relation resulting from ethical and economic laws; that the relation may not be ignored in the present order of things without fatal consequences. A well-defined movement in economic thinking and another in practical social effort reveal the presence of this thought.

The most concrete and conspicuous facts in economic life are production, distribution and exchange of commodities. They are tangible processes, producing effects that can be measured. Essentially social, they cause concentration of capital, the construction of buildings and machinery, and the concentration of great numbers of working men. Economic science has confined itself chiefly to this field of investigation. Specialists have created a body of knowledge concerning the production, distribution and exchange of commodities which is at once a tribute to their genius, a revelation

of many far-reaching laws and a real contribution to human history. The other great fact of the economic process—consumption—has not heretofore been accorded the attention that it deserves. Though it and it alone can explain all economic activity, it has not received more than passing notice. Long since, Bastiat recognized its importance as the key to all industrial activity, and recently Schönberg's great *Handbuch* admits that consumption might be taken as the underlying force in economic science since the attraction of consumption is the strongest psychological factor known to economics. However, up to recent years, little had been done. Lately there is a decided recognition of this neglect and we have promise of valuable thinking in the near future.

The public is the consumer. The millions who use goods manufactured and sold, who create demand for useful things, who purchase them and use them, are the consumers. When consumption does not enjoy proper recognition, the consuming public does not appear to be a party to the problems of industry. But the moment that one considers the whole economic process—production, distribution, exchange and consumption—consumers are seen to be organically related to producers; the public is organically related to employer and laborer; is a party in every situation, and hence is concerned vitally in the labor question. The relation is ethical as well as economic. While economics practically excluded consumption—except as related to the definition of value—the chief ethical questions raised were those of the relation of employer and employed. The moment that the process of consumption is admitted, new ethical relations, new conceptions of obligation and right enter and they may not be ignored.

The wants which the consumer manifests, the demands which he creates, must be sanctioned by the moral law. In satisfying the wants which are thus sanctioned, he must observe the moral law in manner, time and place. Again, in satisfying wants, the consumer is determined, to an extent, by his social relations. The parent, the child or the official has social relations which are ethically sanctioned, and they control him to a certain degree. This suggests a multitude of questions on which we

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may not now touch. One, however, merits notice. Has the consumer as such any moral obligations toward society at large, toward employers, toward laborers? Is his economic relation the basis of moral obligation? Many are seeking the answer in renewed study; others answer in the affirmative without reflection; others, inspired by the possibilities that lie in the mere suggestion, are attempting to organize social effort which supposes the affirmative.¹ It is my purpose to describe the situation to the readers of the BULLETIN. Believing firmly in the moral power of the consumer for social betterment, I hope that it may be of service to acquaint our readers with the thought and the effort referred to. This may be done without technical economic terms or subtle analysis of social relations. Currently throughout the article references are given where readers who may be interested will find fuller development and possibly more enthusiasm if not more sympathy. Until our economists give us further instruction on the problems involved we must content ourselves with the more or less superficial consideration of the larger thought alone.

A fact of elementary importance in industrial life, as simple as it is elementary, is that everything is made to be used. Whatever is produced, is produced because of an actual or anticipated demand. No owner of a hat factory, shoe factory or stove foundry will continue to make a style of hat, shoe or stove after the demand has ceased. No retailer offers to his customers buttons or laces or cloth which they do not like and will not purchase. The millions enter our stores and they purchase what they want. If they do not like the style or price of what is offered they will not buy unless forced by necessity. Inasmuch as the freedom of choice of the buyer is sometimes limited by his need or by the accident of monopoly, the seller may for the time control the situation. But this is accidental. The retailer, the jobber, the wholesaler and manufacturer study popular taste with astonishing keenness and accuracy. They may try to control or direct popular demand, they may

¹ An interesting article on the moral aspect of consumption may be found in the International Journal of Ethics, Vol. X. General works in Economics, Bastiat's Harmonies of Political Economy and the writings of Professor Patten will be found useful.

awaken desire which the purchaser had not felt, they may advertise, misrepresent, entice, but all this declares the more loudly the supremacy of the consumer or purchaser, and the eager desire of the producer and the seller to please him. Some great stores discharge a clerk who fails to report when an article, not in stock, has been asked for three times. Manufacturers send out skilled men to discover tendencies in popular taste before manufacturing a season's goods. No great business can be conducted without foreknowledge of demand. Naturally, many wants are stable. There are no styles in tea, coffee, sugar, flour or spices. However when we consider wants which are not determined as these are we find the range for choice and taste much wider. Here the power of the consumer appears most clearly. Bargain counters, reductions in prices, clearance sales, reveal to us that commodities have "grown old" in a business sense. Other attractions having ceased, they are sold through the charm of cheapness which nearly always pleases the public.

Consumers then give concrete direction to industry. With Ruskin, we may say that the manner and issue of consumption are the real tests of production. "Demand or consumption says to the producer, 'Make that for me.' The producer obeys."¹ Nevertheless, circumstances have taken away much of the consumer's power and he has surrendered it only too willingly. Merchants practically direct industry. They are in touch with demand. When customers express a wish it is of course complied with carefully. But wishes are generally anticipated, and the merchant selects his stock, guided beforehand by this anticipation. Then again, the attractions which are displayed to such advantage in our stores, suggest wants to the customer. Workingmen in Europe have complained of the extravagance forced on them in great stores by the attractiveness of display and facility of payment by installment. Thus the consumer is not only educated away from the knowledge of his power as consumer, but his wants seem often to appear and disappear at the behest of the merchant. The power of the gentleman or lady who has clothing made to order

¹ Bastiat, *Harmonies*, p. 335.

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by a tailor is not more real than might be the power of any consumer if all consumers so willed. There was a time in the old gilds when industry was practically directed by consumers. The act of consumption is only in a limited way social ; it is and must remain individual. It has not impressed itself on society in its true significance, and thus consumers are not aware of the commanding influence which they might exert in industrial life. The remarkable eagerness of producers to follow demand is further seen in the risks which they will incur in attempting to produce anything for which demand exists ; thus, illicit distilling or the manufacture of explosives.

Within the limitations suggested, the consuming public controls what is produced. This is an economic relation. The further question now forces itself upon us, *can* the public control as well the conditions in which production takes place? The question is one for economic science. *Ought* the public to control the conditions of production? This question is one for ethics. If the public should control these conditions and does not, is it not morally responsible for the existence of the labor question? Are we not wrong and unscientific in blaming employers indiscriminately? The labor question, as a practical problem, reduces itself to the matter of wages, of hours and conditions of work. The conditions concern chiefly, life, health and morals. In the present order of society, employers regard themselves, not as servants of the public but as individuals seeking profit and individual power. When employers compete, there results a downward tendency in wages, a desire to lengthen the hours of labor and a reluctance to expend money for any purposes which are not immediately productive, hence the neglect of the demands of decency, justice, humanity and health. There are, of course, forces at work in the contrary direction. Factory laws and trade unions have that effect. The extremes to which the tendency may develop are seen in the great evils of our sweating system, which escapes factory inspection and labor organization.¹

¹ It must be admitted that laborers often prefer degradation and filth to cleanliness. A striking illustration may be found in Vol. VII of the Report of the Industrial Commission, p. 34.

It seems evident that consumers might control the conditions of production as well as its object if they willed. Were all consumers to agree to patronize only such factories and stores as presented conditions which met public approval it is certain that all demands, consistent with business survival, would be complied with. Were we to demand that all goods made in prisons by convicts be marked and then to agree not to purchase them, they would vanish from the market. Were we to patronize no stores where girls under 14 years of age worked 12 hours a day, none such would be found. Employers know that it is good business policy to please the public and they are eager to do so.

It is difficult to define the moral responsibility that results from social and economic relations. We may see clearly a great moral social truth without seeing how it is to be worked out in actual life. Instances abound. It is undoubtedly a hardship on many poor girls that their more fortunate sisters compete with them and reduce wages. Thus, well-to-do women up through the country in New York and New England do an immense amount of sewing on clothing and underwear for large city stores at rates on which no one could live. For them this is an accessory, and consequently they are not particular about compensation. Such a course, however, affects the wages of poor girls in cities who have no means of support other than these. Similarly, the manager of a department store in Chicago stated recently that his store does not hire girls who have to support themselves entirely.¹ They can thus force them to accept low wages. The department store is rapidly exterminating retail stores by the force of concentration, and superior methods. We have here typical social questions—problems of our social relations—in which it is extremely difficult to locate moral right, responsibility or guilt. Infinite study is necessary, painstaking analysis and careful collective efforts are needed before we will be able to answer in detail such pressing ethical questions of our social life, though the general truth be beyond dispute.

When we approach the problem of the relation of the public

¹ Before the Industrial Commission. Report vii-701.

to the labor question we must therefore be cautious and moderate. We talk and write about the immorality of competition, the trickery and vileness of commercialism; the deception in business, known, tolerated and watched for. There is some great cause for this. It seems not excessive to say that the public is largely to blame for the condition. When consumers do not appear actively in the economic process, economic solidarity is broken up, the practical influence of ethics on economics is destroyed, and the industrial struggle is forced down to a low plane. The public has failed to know, to seek out and encourage the honest and noble spirits in industry, it has failed to ally itself with those employers who wished to honor the claims of their laborers as regards sanitation, life, humanity, justice and morals, and in so failing has, to a great extent, allied itself with the baser spirits and made our present conditions possible. Many an honest merchant has gone down to ruin while customers were allured to places where cheaper or more flashy goods were sold; cheap because labor was robbed in production. When people buy sweat-shop clothing they ally themselves with the sweat-shop system, with its cruelty, indecency, robbery and disease, and they fail to encourage the factory manufacture of clothing where law protects the laborer and conditions are infinitely better. It is in this sense that Sydney Webb could say of England that the whole nation is the sweater. "The mass of struggling men and women, whose sufferings have lately been laid bare, are oppressed and defrauded in every relation of life; by the man who sells or gives out the material on which they labor; by the shopkeeper who sells them provisions on credit or forces them under the truck system; by the landlord who exacts for the four walls of a bedroom or for the unpaved and undrained back yard, the double rent of workshop and dwelling; and, lastly, *by every man, woman and child who consumes the product of their labor.*"¹ The sweating system became possible when people ceased to care where and how clothing was made.

This indifference is found generally in the whole industrial hierarchy. The purchaser deals with the merchant; he with

¹ Problems of Modern Industry, p. 142.

the jobbers, possibly; these in turn with wholesaler and manufacturer, and probably no one in the series has cared. A prominent proprietor of a store in New York once told a committee in all sincerity that he handled no sweatshop clothing. Later the same committee found bales of it marked with the gentleman's store address, ready for delivery. All of the abuses of long hours, unsanitary factories, excessive and unreasonable fines, company stores, danger to life from machinery, danger to morals, which have characterized the modern history of the laborer, have been possible because the public has not cared, did not know how to care, about the condition in which the work was done. In the course of extensive questioning among men and women of high intelligence, good education and much travel, I have not found more than two in ten who had the faintest realization of their relation as consumers to laborers, or of their power to aid even remotely in the solution of the labor question. When the reasons of my questions were explained, they awakened no ethical response, and while they brought some information that proved to be interesting, they gave those to whom the questions were addressed no momentum in the direction of social effort or study. There is no psychological bond between consumer and producer; no sense of solidarity, though the solidarity is as real as human society itself. We have slipped into the state of mind wherein no sense of specific responsibility as consumer exists. And yet "Responsibility rests with the initiative. Now, where is the initiative? In demand." "If the human race is to be improved it must be improved by the morality of the consumer." "It is incumbent on the man who manifests the desire or makes the demand for the commodity to weigh the consequences, whether useful or hurtful, and to answer before God and man for the good or bad direction which he imposes upon industry."¹

We may say that consumers determine what is produced, that they can fix the conditions of production; that their enlightened ethical sense should control every act of purchase with a view to the protection of laborers. But there are facts

¹ Bastiat, *Harmonies*, p. 338.

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to be considered. The organization of industry is so intricate, means of transportation are so perfect, and localization of industry is so common that the consumer is, as a rule, hopelessly separated from the entire work of production. The shoes worn in Wisconsin are made in Massachusetts, carried by rail through many States before reaching the purchaser. The laborers who made the machinery and others who tanned the leather, and others who operated trains were coproducers in making the shoe. It is self-evident that this series of workers escapes the ken of the single purchaser in a Western town. Then again business has become largely impersonal. The moral effect of personal relations between producer, seller and consumer is destroyed. Retailers allege as a reason that department stores destroy retail business, that the retailer knows his customers personally and is honest with them, while the department store does not know its customers and it may and will deceive them readily. As a rule we expect adulteration, misrepresentation, deception whenever and wherever we buy. With this general elimination of personality in business and the consequent loss of the ethical sense, the separation of consumer is complete and he lives and dies without any thought of making industry personal. The psychological effect is to suppress every sentiment of responsibility. This is the case often, even among laborers, who, of all men, should best understand and fulfill the ethical responsibility of the consumer.

Another circumstance is this: Our industrial organization has forced upon us the principle of cheapness. We seek bargains—the most in goods for the least in money. Considerations of moral obligation, of the conditions of labor are forced aside and our thinking is reduced to the study of quality, quantity and price.¹ There are many exceptions, for some do not seek cheapness. Even when high prices are paid one is not sure of the conditions of labor. An inspector in Chicago once found \$75.00 suits of clothes being made in a sweat shop for a merchant in Montana. Cheapness is in itself a good thing when produced without sacrifice. But the public seeks cheapness without regard to its history, and thus makes possible all

¹ A defence of this condition may be found in the North American Review, Vol. 165, in the article, Another View of the Union Label.

of the industrial evils to which this desire of cheapness gives rise.

In our brief survey we have seen that consumers control the entire direction of production, and that they might control as well, if they so willed, the conditions of production and thus materially assist in the reform work for which there is such pressing need. Some of the circumstances which may help us to understand why the public fails to realize its power were hinted at. Many more of a deeper nature might be suggested, but the scope of this paper does not require it. Some of the writers who are giving attention to the thought of consumers' responsibility seem to be reckless in asserting that this is a definite moral obligation. Much care and some preparation are required before society will learn any lesson in ethics. It does not like responsibility. In this case the social conscience as yet admits no moral social responsibility in the consumer. Many individual consumers do feel such an obligation and they guide their conduct by it, but it is not yet a social force. I think that the day will come when society will admit this responsibility, and I hope it may come soon. But it is not yet here. Teaching is necessary, as are patience and practical organization. The most hopeful aspect of the situation is that the thought is building up its own institutions. In them it has promise of life and vigor. Laying aside the question of the moral *responsibility* of the consumer, we may at least place suggestions on the plane of *opportunity*. The consumer has an exceptional opportunity to aid in social betterment. Should he not do so, eagerly, hopefully?

When we have brought the question down to the level of opportunity we are met, possibly, by the observation that the consumer has not even the opportunity of helping laborers. It seems impossible for us to know when, where and how goods are made. Personal examination is impossible, detailed investigation impracticable; hence the opportunity is lacking. Could we but distinguish between goods, made where the demands of health, decency, humanity and justice are complied with and those made in conditions which outrage humanity and seem to ignore justice, we might as consumers take an effective rôle in social reform.

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One very important practical solution of this difficulty is offered by labor unions. They have devised union labels, which are usually attached, after the manner of a trade-mark, to union-made goods. The unions assure consumers that where the label is found the articles have been made in conditions which satisfy the laborers and are presumably worthy of approval. When mention is made of the labor union, possibly the prejudices of many are aroused. Strike, lockout and bloodshed, walking delegate and tyranny present themselves and put an end to all sympathy with our discussion. The ethical responsibility and social opportunity of the consumer is one thing and the labor union is another. Nevertheless it is worth while to look into the relations of the two.

Labor unions are a fact. They stand for the concrete, organized, effective effort that has been made to protect decency, humanity and justice in the industrial war. The principles on which they rest and the basic facts from which they reason are unassailable. If we but look into the degradation and oppression from which they have to an extent redeemed laborers; if we but look into the history of factory and labor laws whose enactment, due to labor unions, is the noblest achievement of the modern nations; if we but look into the widespread system of sweatshops, where humanity is forgotten, justice ignored and force enthroned, where the laborers are not organized and labor laws do not reach; if we look at the many-sided improvements that unions have brought into the laborer's life and then remember that employers themselves in considerable numbers favor unions, admire their work and desire laborers to join them;¹ if we do all this, we may possibly arrive at a point where the whole meaning and power of the unions will become apparent. Neither they themselves nor their best friends deny that mistakes are made often, but that is now beside the question. That they err by excess at times in formulating their principles is natural when we remember that they are making a philosophy, actually exploring a field that is still new.²

¹ See Report of Industrial Commission, Vol. VII, pp. 16, 661, 843.

² The plausible manner in which the case against the unions may be presented is seen in the following from the North American Review, Vol. 165, p. 438: "What the public, then, is called upon to do is to support the unions against the scabs—

The labor unions represent the cause of labor in the industrial war. They have created a standard on which they base demands concerning wages, hours and conditions of labor. Where the unions are established, in factory, mine or foundry, so-called "union conditions" obtain, conditions with which laborers are satisfied. Employers, in granting these demands, make concessions. Laborers, in turn, aim to compensate them by placing the union label on the factory product, by advertising and commanding it in labor journals and by asking the friends of organized labor to purchase only such goods as bear the union label. The consumer or purchaser who asks for union-made goods exercises his moral power and acquits himself of his duty in as far as union conditions represent the demands of decency, honesty, justice and health. "The union label on the garment is a guarantee that that garment was made in a factory—was not made in the homes of the worker; that it was not made by children; that it was the product of adult labor; that it was not made under the sweatshop system; that the wages paid were comparatively fair to those prevailing in the trade, and the hours of labor were comparatively fair and reasonable." The advantages of the label are "better sanitary conditions in the establishment than are usual in the trade. . . . The label is not granted to employers unless such an improved sanitary condition obtains. The employés are all members of the union; the wages are usually higher, the hours of labor are usually lower than obtains in the trade where workingmen are unorganized."¹

When the public purchases union-made goods it leagues itself with employers and laborers, and thus in a manner rec-

that is, free, independent workmen; to back the authors of strikes and boycotts representing less than one-tenth of all workmen, against the other nine-tenths of those who are willing to work as honestly and as faithfully as the best, for wages which employers are able and willing to pay."

¹ Report of Industrial Commission. Testimony of Mr. Gompers, Vol. VII. pp. 630, 628. The classical illustration of the use of the label is found in the clothing trade. Sweatshops reveal the worst possibilities of our industrial system, in danger to health, morals and humanity. As a rule they escape inspection by law since they are not factories. The chief factory inspector of New York stated before the Industrial Commission that he knew of but one house in 500 in New York that did not deal in sweatshop goods. (Report, Vol. VII, p. 32.) Sometimes customers ask if sweatshop goods are sold. The answer is invariably, No. But proprietors refuse to state that in writing. Instances are known where goods were purchased on the condition that a signed statement be sent. They were never delivered. (American Journal of Sociology, Vol. V, p. 291.)

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ognizes the economic and ethical solidarity which exists but is ignored in modern life.¹

We have brought the discussion down from the general thought of the consumer's moral power to the particular institution known as the Trade Union Label. The label is an expression of the general thought. But it is not the only one nor is it itself perfect. There are employers who do not deal with union labor nor use a union label, who, however, treat their laborers with great consideration. When this is the case and it is known, consumers who deal with them surely use their moral power to good advantage. Factories sometimes employ no union label—for instance, in making clothes—but use instead a factory label, which, properly protected, gives assurance that garments were made, not in sweatshops, but in factories, and thus in conditions required by factory laws. Consumers do no wrong in relying on that assurance, assuming that the laws are adequate and inspection is efficient. Unions naturally prefer that their labels be employed. We cannot blame them for so wishing, for they can see no adequate means of reform other than their own organization.

The label is not perfect. It is the epitome of trade-union philosophy. As such it has the weakness as well as the strength of that philosophy. It may not always guarantee sanitary conditions in the factory; it may not always be proof of skilled workmanship and superior quality. Labor unions or their representatives may at times have sold for money the right to

¹ Cigarmakers introduced the label in 1880; 37 national and international unions have adopted labels. The Garment Makers' Label is used in 45 establishments in the United States. There are probably 150 union label leagues in the United States whose aim is to encourage the use of the label. Possibly 100 associations of ladies exist in the country for the same purpose. Many cities require the union label on city printing. Aside from trade labels the American Federation of Labor has a general label which is used in the absence of any other. Unions copyright the label and thus protect themselves against imitations. It is an unwritten law that all members of unions shall purchase only union goods when possible to get them. The Knights of Labor watch the members very carefully in order to encourage purchases of "fair goods." Further information may be found in Bulletin of the Department of Labor, No. 15; North American Review, Vol. 165; leaflets of the Social Reform Club of New York; in labor papers generally.

It is interesting to note that in some cases where union labor is employed the label is not used. Some in the so-called higher classes dislike labor unions. In the absence of a label their prejudice is not aroused. The chief unions which have adopted the label are those of printers, bakers, woodworkers, harnessmakers, iron molders, broom-makers, coopers, photographers, shoemakers, custom tailors, mattress makers, brewers, horseshoers, cigarmakers, hatters, garment makers.

use the label, when such use implied treason to the union and the workers. Labels, even when copyrighted, may have been counterfeited, and in this way the value of their guarantee may have been materially affected. Making allowance for these limitations, the label remains a practical, powerful institution which enables the consumer to moralize his decisions as consumer and thus use his power for social betterment.

Going back farther, from the defects of the label to the excesses of the unions, there is need of thought. Most of the mistakes of the unions are due to their weakness, not to their strength. As they grow strong they become conservative. The workers have been in a difficult position. They are the weakest element in the process of production. Employers seek profit and they must seek it selfishly. A set of intricate relations developed between laborer and employer, for which society has no understanding and the State has no specific principles. Two individuals who disagree about the ownership of a piece of land have law and procedure by which to reach a peaceful agreement, while ten thousand laborers who may disagree with employers about hours of labor or conditions of labor or wages, have no specific law and no procedure by which to reach a settlement. We have blame for laborers, then, when they strike, but none for employers when they resort to injunctions. We have national anxiety as to whether the Constitution follows the flag or soldiers coming from the Philippines shall pay duty on diamond rings, but we are not concerned about the safety of the miners who dig our coal, or the welfare of the children of workingmen, or the standard of life of half the nation. We are eager for a great canal to connect two mighty oceans and forgetful of the chasm between our social classes; zealous in civilizing Filipinos and slothful in humanizing industry. We condemn the labor union for violence toward the non-union man or "scab," while we hang a deserter from our army and force free men to enter it. We condemn the walking delegate while we send representatives in all directions; we frown down the boycott and by a protective tariff boycott whole nations; we condemn sympathetic strikes and proceed to war with Spain out of sympathy with Cuba.¹ We have no sympathy

¹ Points developed in American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 4, p. 448. Trade Unions and Public Duty, by Jane Adams.

with laborers who quarrel with employers over wages, and we forget the flood of immigration, which threatens to reduce wages and the standard of life among them. We have little sympathy with unions and forget that they have undertaken, unaided, work which the nation, its scholars, its churches and legislatures should perform. When we take all these things into consideration we may be less severe in condemning unions, less fearful of sanctioning what we call their tyranny, their selfishness and their excesses. Then, possibly, the union label may speak to us its message.

We return to the general thought, that consumers have power over the conditions of labor ; that there is moral responsibility or opportunity among consumers to improve those conditions. This sense of responsibility has created another institution known as the Consumers' League. The condition of saleswomen and young girls in our great retail stores as regards wages, hours of work, fines for being late, regulations about standing, even when not busy, and similar details of work, had become such that it appealed to customers with great force. Health and morals were cruelly sacrificed, and wages, low at best, were materially reduced by fines which employers appropriated. The extent and degree to which the savagery of business condemned these unfortunates to physical and moral ruin, the extent to which the process still goes on is not known to the public generally ; and often, when known, it awakens the sentiment of pity rather than of responsibility. The Consumers' League rests on the sense of responsibility of the purchaser for the condition of those who serve him. The movement originated in England, but established itself in New York in 1890. The method of work is simple. The Leagues have agreed on the following standard of a fair house :

Wages.—A fair house is one in which equal pay is given for work of equal value, irrespective of sex. In the departments where women only are employed, in which the minimum wages are \$6 per week for experienced adult workers and fall in few instances below \$8.

In which wages are paid by the week.

In which fines, if imposed, are paid into a fund for the benefit of the employees.

In which the minimum wages of cash girls are \$2 per week, with the same conditions regarding weekly payments and fines.

Hours.—A fair house is one in which the hours from 8 A. M. to 6 P. M. (with three-quarters of an hour for lunch) constitute the working day, and a general half-holiday is given on one day of each week during at least two summer months.

In which a vacation of not less than one week is given with pay during the summer season.

In which all overtime is compensated for.

Physical Conditions.—A fair house is one in which work, lunch, and retiring rooms are apart from each other, and conform in all respects to the present sanitary laws.

In which the present law regarding the providing of seats for sales-women is observed, and the use of seats permitted.

Other Conditions.—A fair house is one in which humane and considerate behavior toward employees is the rule.

In which fidelity and length of service meet with the consideration which is their due.

In which no children under fourteen years of age are employed.

Whenever proprietors of our great stores agree to these conditions their names are placed on what is known as the White List and the members of the League use all available means to influence friends and the public to patronize such houses. By shopping early in the day customers enable proprietors to give shorter hours to salesgirls; by making purchases early in the season the rush of the later season is avoided and overwork is not necessary. Leagues have been formed in cities in New York, Illinois, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania. They are now federated into a National League. They carry on simultaneously the work of education and of investigation. In both kinds of work much has been accomplished.¹

The leagues are broader in their conception of their mission than are the labor unions. The former are not like the unions in scope and origin. The league seeks fair conditions,

¹ Information as to the details of their work, results, methods and principles may be found in reports, leaflets, etc., issued by the leagues: in the Consumers' League by John Graham Brooks; North American Review, Vol. 166, article on The Consumers' Label; publications of the Christian Social Union, No. 46; in the American Journal of Sociology, Vol. V, Aim and Principles of the Consumers' League, by Florence Kelley, Vol. VI; The Work and Problems of the Consumers' League, by F. L. McVey.

while the union seeks union conditions. Nevertheless both express the same vital thought concerning the moral and economic power of the consumer, and both promise to be factors of much importance in the development of that thought.

There is sometimes misunderstanding between the two forces, but there can be no antagonism if both are faithful to their single final purpose. Both meet the same objection: namely, that the public has no right to dictate to a man how he shall conduct his business. It is impertinent in a labor union or a consumers' league to do so. The day is past when that objection had force. We have come to believe that a "private business is a public trust." Health inspection and sanitary laws, factory inspection and factory laws, Interstate Commerce Commission and railroad laws all reveal to us that society regards neither personal habits nor factories nor railroads as matters of mere private concern. It is not unreasonable to hope, then, that the society may soon realize that the health, morals and welfare of its working millions merit more care than labor laws promise and inspection laws guarantee. The power to grant the protection needed seems to lie with the consumer. Through him religion might do its noblest social work; in him education may find its highest possibilities. Economic forces may bid defiance to religion and its restraint; they may banish it and its gospel beyond the economic world and refuse to give it honor; they may proudly convert intellectual forces into willing defenders of their tyranny, but they cringe before the consumer like a whipped lion before its tamer. His power is entire, his wish is law, his nod a command. With economics commencing to realize this, with ethics awakening to its importance, with practical effort turning toward it, may we not hope that all the social forces which make for better things—religion, strongest, truest, safest among them—may soon find the fullest opportunity of effective reform through the power of the consumer. Bastiat spoke well when he said, "If the human race is to be improved it must be improved by the morality of the consumer."

WILLIAM J. KERBY.

THE FIRST PUBLICATION OF THE *ÆNEID*.

Although the great Latin Epic, the *Æneid* of Vergil, like the work of Vergil's predecessor, Lucretius, remained unfinished at its author's death ; still, the poem itself, immediately upon its publication by Varius and Tucca, was received by all classes at Rome with an enthusiasm which marked it not merely for success, but which at once sounded the note of its enduring supremacy in the world of Latin letters. We are told that within a decade of the author's death—that is, within eight years after its first appearance, the *Æneid* had already become a text-book in the Roman schools. Nor was its fame a passing one. The impression which the poem created was as lasting as it had been immediate. No poet of antiquity, no uninspired writer of any age, if we except Aristotle, has had a larger influence in the world of thought and letters than Vergil ; and this influence, though less direct than that exercised by Aristotle, is all the more wonderful in that it comes not from a teacher but from a poet.

Horace said of Vergil that nature never produced a fairer soul. Propertius too, even before the appearance of the poem, uttered his bold prophecy, that the coming *Æneid* would surpass even the *Iliad*. Ovid, a greater poet, and a critic of clearer insight, speaks of the "Exiled *Æneas*" as the most illustrious production of Latin letters. The *Æneid* was the text-book which taught Seneca, Petronius and Juvenal what perfection had lain latent in their native tongue. No poet of Rome, after the publication of the great Roman masterpiece, ever dared to neglect its rhythm, its syntax or its vocabulary. Ovid, and after him Lucan, Silius, Valerius Flaccus, Statius, found their highest praise in reproducing fitfully the perfection of the master's faultless lines. Nor was his excellence acknowledged only by the poets. Tacitus conned the verses of the *Æneid* until his own style was so colored with the Vergilian diction that a reminiscence of Vergil, lurking in a damaged passage of the "Annals" or the "Histories," will often suggest the

proper emendation of the text; and oftener still will solve the question when choice is to be made between rival readings. The very stones of antiquity cry out and tell us in what estimation Vergil and his poems were held. Scratched on the baths of Titus have been found the words "tantae molis erat," and on a wall in Pompeii is scribbled "conticuere omnes." Thus, for the Roman world, Vergil became what Homer had been to Greece, "the poet." And from his own time until the present century his fame has not grown less with the passing ages. In the decay of art and letters which marked the third century a mystic element was associated with the renown in which his name was held. The Christians of these earlier centuries regarded him as a poet apart, if not sacred. In the exquisite purity of his sentiment, his deeply religious feeling, his tenderness and almost Christian "yearning after the farther shore," as well as in the supposed prophecy of the fourth Eclogue, they recognized what seemed the themes of inspiration; they heard again the olden tones borne along in the melody of a matchless rhythm. St. Augustine speaks of Vergil as the "fairest bloom of Pagan art," and in the famous passage in the Confessions,¹ when he refers to his early love for Vergil, he shows us what it cost him to make his great renunciation and to undo the haunting charm of the Vergilian art. We catch glimpses of Vergil's presence throughout the literature of the later Middle Ages;² and later still we see Dante taking Vergil by the hand, to be led by him from the modern to the ancient world. "Or se'tu quel Virgilio?" These are the words of awe and veneration with which Dante, in the "Divina Commedia," greets his immortal predecessor in Italian poetry.

Nor has the modern world of letters withheld its measure of praise; in the words of Bacon, it hails the Mantuan bard

¹ Confess. 1—XII. "Quid miserius misero, non miserante se ipsum, et flente Didonis mortem quae fiebat amando *Æneam*, non flente autem mortem meam quae fiebat non amando te? Deus lumen cordis mei, non te amabam, et haec non flebam, sed flebam Didonem extinctam, ferroque extrema secutam, sequens ipse extrema condita tua reliquo te!"

² A well-known legend of the Middle Ages relates how St. Paul, coming to the tomb of Vergil, exclaimed, "What a man I had made of you had I met you in life!"

"Quem te, inquit, reddidisse
Si te vivum invenissem
Poetarum maxime!"

as "the royalest and chastest poet that to the memory of man is known." And so, without multiplying these words of commendation, which no age has denied to Rome's greatest poet, it may be said in summary, that from the day on which the *Æneid* issued from the hands of its first editors down to the present century, Vergil has been recognized as the type of perfection in poetry. Before the year 1500, ninety editions of his works had been published, and so many since the revival of letters that there are said to be as many editions as the years that have passed since his death.

But now, while the praise bestowed upon the poems of Vergil, and especially upon the *Æneid*, has been lavish and spoken with unanimity by those in every age best qualified to judge of excellence in letters, still there are in modern, as there were in ancient times,¹ some few who questioned the poet's literary merit. The Niebuhrs of the present century have their prototypes in the "Vergilii obtrectatores" of Vergil's own age. Critics there were then whose writings perished with them, whose names hardly survive, and who, like the Bernhardys of our own time, perused the poet's works to find fault, who neglected all the transcending graces of the *Æneid*, but were alert to note each minutest blemish; critics who gladly spent their labor in pointing out the venial defects of the unfinished masterpiece; who veiled their ancient envy under appeals to Homer, to tradition, to Lucretius and to the older Latin poets as the standards of excellence; critics, in a word, who, as far as we can learn from the fragmentary evidence preserved in Servius and Macrobius, set up the same norms, made the same ill judged and fatal contrasts, used the same methods and formulated the same censures, which, for a brief time, and in a limited circle, have found repetition during the present century.

In our own day however, apart from the sweeping condemnation already mentioned,² the scientific development of

¹ For a full discussion of Vergil and his ancient critics, see Conington's Introduction, pp. xxix-liii, where names of the critics and the extant fragments of their works have all been collected. See also H. Nettleship's "Vergil," pp. 77 to 87.

² The hostile criticism of the *Æneid* which the present century has witnessed may be said to date from the time of the appearance of Niebuhr's "Röm. Geschichte," 2 vols. (1811-1832). See also Teuffel's "Geschichte d. Röm. Literatur," 228, 5, where the *Æneid* is pronounced "flat, lifeless, and oppressively dull." Bernhardy denied Vergil any creative power, and Mommsen, in his Roman History, classed the

philological criticism, legitimately applied, has passed Vergil and his works through all its searching processes, and he emerges from the trial, having gained rather than lost; for in the ordeal, the vagueness of indiscriminate praise and the injustice of inconsiderate censure, have both been taken away and his fame remains in fair and final judgment.¹

Now that just criticism has enhanced rather than diminished our appreciation of the *Æneid*, it may be interesting to institute a short inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the publication of the great Latin Epic. Of course, nothing more than the note of a high probability can attach to some of the conclusions reached by such an investigation, for the reason that the sources which have come down to us, and which it is necessary to cite, are often merely detached phrases from lost works, preserved in quotations at second or third hand; other authorities again, are scanty and fragmentary; and still others, especially the longer accounts, are interpolated and consequently contradictory. Notwithstanding, however, the damaged condition of the ancient testimony it is still possible to eliminate the later interpolations and so to group and interpret the trustworthy accounts, as to derive a fairly complete report of the essential particulars relative to the matter under discussion; that is, the names of the editors to whom Augustus entrusted the work, the methods they employed in preparing the text, and, finally, the probable date of the poem's first appearance.

While the poem was in course of composition, Augustus, Maecenas, Horace, a number of writers, poets and orators, were kept more or less well informed in regard to the progress of

Æneid with epics like the "Henriad" and the "Messiad." French scholars, on the contrary, have given the *Æneid* the enthusiastic support of their learning, and rank Vergil, in the words of Saint Beuve, as the "poet of all the Latin races." Scaliger placed him above Homer and Theocritus, and Voltaire said; "If Homer is the creator of Vergil, Vergil is certainly the finest of his works." English scholars have been almost as enthusiastic as the French, and a splendid contribution to the fame of Vergil is to be found in Tennyson's ode to the Bard of Mantua.

¹ See Mackall's "Latin Literature" (New York, 1890), pp. 99 ff. See also Tyrrell, "Latin Poetry" (Boston, 1900), pp. 128 ff., and Nageotte, "Histoire de la Littérature latine, pp. 321 ff.

the work.¹ According to the Donatus Life of Vergil,² the latter had read his Georgics to Augustus at Atella in the year 29 B. C. During the ten succeeding years, that is, from 29 B. C. until his death, the poet was busy at work on the *Æneid*. Three years after the commencement of the poem (26 B. C.) Propertius was already acquainted with some parts or part of the work.³ This interest, already widespread in the year 26 B. C., continued to increase during the next eight years of the poet's life. And thus, though no part of the work was thoroughly corrected at the time of his death, yet the poem itself had all the publicity which the select court circle could give it, for such passages as had been heard from time to time had raised public expectation to a very high pitch.

We are indebted to the Suetonian Life of Vergil, as well as to the *Vita* prefixed to the Servian commentary, for the statement that Augustus committed the actual publication of the poem to Vergil's two most intimate friends, L. Rufus Varius and Tucca. The work produced at once a profound and universal impression. It was acknowledged to be the greatest achievement of the Latin poetic genius.⁴

The "Ars Amatoria" appeared in the year immediately preceding the birth of Christ, and the "Remedia Amoris" in the year following—that is, about a decade and a half after the publication of the *Æneid*. Seneca's Memoirs, too, are authority for the statement that the poem enjoyed a wide popularity, and that lines from it were current in the first decade after its appearance.⁵

¹ Comparetti "Vergil in the Middle Ages," Chap. 1. And for the names of Vergil's friends, see Ribbeck's Pref. to his edition of Vergil in the Teubner text, pp. 34 seq.

² Reifferscheid's "Suetonius" pp. 61 seq.

³ Cf. Propertius 3, 34.

"Qui nunc *Æneae* Troiani suscitat arma
Jactaque Lavinis moenia litoribus
Cedite Romani scriptores, cedite Grai
Nescio quid maius nascitur Iliade."

⁴ Cf. Ovid *Ars Amatoria*, III, 387.

"Et profugum Aeneam altaque primordia Romae
Quo nullum Latio clarius extat opus."

And the Rem. *Amoris*, 395.

"Tantum se nobis eligi debere fatentur
Quantum Vergilio nobile dedit Epos."

⁵ For similar contemporaneous testimony see Wölfflin, *Philol.*, XXVI, 130. See also Zingerle "Ovidius u. s. Verhältn. zu d., Röm. Dichtern, Vol. I", pp. 48, 113. And Sabidini, "Critical Studies in the *Æneid*, pp. 184, 173.

The Vita Vergilii, on which we mainly rely for the facts relative to our investigation, and which, until quite recently, was attributed to Aelius Donatus, exists in two forms, interpolated and uninterpolated.¹ In its latter form it has been edited several times²; and it is proven almost to a certainty, by evidence internal and external, that this Vita, in its uninterpolated form, is the remnant of a lost Vita Vergilii, which goes back to Suetonius, Rome's most painstaking biographer. The arguments, proving the Suetonian authorship of the Vita in question, are too detailed to be rehearsed here.³ Otto Ribbeck, perhaps the most meritorious of modern Vergilian scholars,⁴ is of the opinion that the first part of this Suetonian Vita was derived by Suetonius, through Asconius Pedianus, from Varius himself, who was the principal editor of the *Æneid*, and that Varius was the chief authority, if not indeed the only one, used by Suetonius in his Vita Vergilii.⁵ Again, Ribbeck has a theory, which, if true, goes far indeed toward showing the still higher value attaching to this Suetonian (Donatus) Vita in general, and its statements in reference to the publication of the *Æneid* in particular. He is of the opinion⁶ that the first editor of the *Æneid*, Varius, besides his other writings, composed an opusculum, "De Ingenio Moribusque Vergilii." He cites Quintilian X, 3, 8, where it is said that "Varius is the authority for the statement that Vergil composed but a very few verses each day," and he adds that Favorinus⁷ probably had this work of Varius in mind when he wrote that "the friends and companions of Vergil have handed down to posterity what was known 'de ingenio moribusque

¹ See Conington's Introduction to Vergil, pp. XVII, seq., and Teuffel, "Latin Literature," 408, 4. See Nettleship, "Vergil," pp. 20, seq.

² Notably by Reifferscheid and Hagen; cf. also Nettleship, "Ancient Lives of Vergil," pp. 15, seq., where the texts of the various Vergilian Vitae have been collected and edited with a commentary and critical apparatus.

³ See Conington's Introduction, p. XVI, and Nettleship's "Ancient Lives," where the arguments are given in full.

⁴ Cf. Ribbeck's Prolegomena to Vergil, pp. 92, seq.

⁵ This opinion of Ribbeck does not meet Nettleship's approbation. The latter thinks that Varius was only one of many authorities used by Suetonius. Cf. "Ancient Lives," p. 32.

⁶ It is only fair to state that this opinion is found in Weichert, "De Vita et Carminibus Varii," pp. 67, seq.

⁷ Cited by Gellius, "Atticae Noctes," XVII, 10. Melissus, a freedman of Horace, also wrote, in all probability, on this subject. See Ribbeck Prolegg. pp. 100, seq.

(Vergili)’ and these friends and companions report the story that Vergil licked his verses into shape after the manner of a bear licking its cub (*more et ritu ursino*)”. Weichert, also, in the work already mentioned, thinks that the often repeated story of Vergil’s testamentary wish to have the unfinished *Æneid* burned (which story is also cited by Gellius and the Suetonian Donatus Vita), probably goes back to the “*opusculum*” of Varius. Finally, we have in this Suetonian Vita an important item of information regarding Vergil’s method of work, told apparently in Varius’ own words.¹ Hence, if the inferences of Ribbeck,² Spalding³, Weichert,⁴ and Wagner⁵ be valid, and little can be said against them, we have in our Suetonian (Donatus) Vita, not only the testimony of Varius touching the three facts already mentioned, but we have the further information that Varius actually composed an *opusculum* containing personal memoirs of Vergil⁶. Now, such a work, written by Varius himself, an independent author of undoubted literary ability and taste, with all the knowledge and consequent authority which his intimate friendship with Vergil guaranteed, would, of course, prove the most formidable document available against the latter’s “*obtrectatores*.” Hence there is little room to doubt that this work of Varius was the one most often cited by Vergil’s friends against the “*obtrectatores*,” and hence, too, it is certain that the *opusculum* of Varius was used by Asconius Pedianus⁷, who was one of Vergil’s most zealous defenders, and who, as we know positively from independent sources, did write against the “*obtrectatores*” of Vergil. Further, Asconius Pedianus was born nearly twenty years after Vergil’s death,⁸ consequently he

¹ See Reiffersch, p. 59, “*Cum Georgica scriberet, traditur quotidie meditatos mane plurimos versus dictare solitus ac per totum diem retractando ad paucissimos redigere.*”

² Ribbeck, *Prolegg*, pp. 89, 90.

³ Spalding’s *Quintilian*, pp. 142 and 143.

⁴ Weichert, *De Vita et Carmínibus Varii*, pp. 74, ff.

⁵ Heyne Wagner. Note to *Æneid* V, 871.

⁶ The date of the *opusculum* is placed by Weichert, loc. cit., soon after Vergil’s death.

⁷ See Middleton and Mills “*Companion to Latin Authors*,” p. 77. See also Nettleship, “*Vergil*,” p. 84. The title of Asconius’ work was “*Liber contra obtrectatores Vergili*.” See Teuffel, 295, 2; 225, 3; 228, 6. Cf. especially Kiessling “*Conjectanea Specalia*,” pp. 5, seq.

⁸ Ribbeck *Prolegg*, p. 100.

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could not have received from Vergil himself the latter's retort to the charge that he had borrowed many of his lines from Homer, in which answer Asconius reports Vergil as challenging his critics themselves to borrow from Homer if they are able, and adding that "it were easier to steal the club from Hercules than to take a line from Homer."¹ Hence the inference is inevitable, since Asconius never saw Vergil, that he used the writings of his predecessors, Vergil's contemporaries, and principally, perhaps entirely, the authoritative work, the opusculum of Vergil's intimate friend, heir and literary executor, Varius.

Now, as we know Suetonius² to have been most careful and accurate in the selection of his authorities, it can be said with safety that Asconius himself was Suetonius' principal source³ for the latter's statement in regard to the publication of the *Æneid*, found in the *Donatus Vita*. And therefore the account found in that biography, that Augustus ordered Varius and Tucca to prepare the *Æneid* for publication, may be assumed as trustworthy.⁴ For, as we have seen, that account is universally attributed to Suetonius. From Suetonius it is traced back through Asconius Pedianus to Varius himself, to Melissus perhaps, and to other contemporaries of Vergil, composing that cultured circle of poets, orators and writers, which Augustus had gathered around him, and among whom, after Vergil, Varius was the most prominent figure.⁵

The next point in our inquiry is the question of method. Had the editors, Varius and Tucca, a free hand in preparing the poem for publication? Could they expunge what seemed superfluous lines or fill out unfinished verses? The importance

¹ *Ibid.* pp. 89, seq.

² Suetonius used original documents, as far as they were available. In his *Lives of the Caesars* he constantly refers to the "Monumentum Ancyranum," the *Acta Populi*, the *Acta Senatus* and autograph documents of the emperors themselves. Cf. *Suet. Augustus*, 87 and *Nero* 52.

³ For Asconius as an authority of Suetonius see Nissen, *Rhein. Mus.* 41, 496, and Becker *ibid.* 37, 643. See also, for other literature, Teuffel, 987. 11.

⁴ For the statement see Reifferscheid, *Suet.*, p. 63. "Ceterum eidem Vario ac simul Tuccae scripta sua sub ea condicione legavit. (Vergilius.) . . . Edidit autem, auctore Augusto, Varius."

⁵ Cf. Ribbeck *Prolegg.* pp. 89 seq., and Mommsen, *Philol.* I, 180. See also Vahlen, *Berlin Lect.* 1877 and 1878. Collateral proof in regard to Varius editing the *Æneid* is to be found in the lines of Sulpicius *Carthaginensis*, Reif, p. 63. And in the epigram attributed to Phocas. Add to this the direct statement of Suetonius, cited by St. Jerome, *Eusebius' Chronicle*; Eusebius to the 190th Olympiad. See also Weichert's "Varius," pp. 75 seq.

of this question will be evident at once. We know that up to the time of the appearance of the capital MSS., now in our possession, more than one tradition in regard to the Vergilian text was current; traces of which variations are visible in the citations of Vergi, by the earlier grammarians, and especially in the conflicting reports of the capital MSS., and likewise in the early commentary of Servius. Hence, on our solution of this question of method followed by Varius and Tucca, will depend largely the view we take in regard to the spuriousness or genuinity of several disputed passages in our received version of the *Aeneid*.¹

No detailed statement of the plan followed by Varius and Tucca has come down to us, and here again we shall have to rely mainly on the fragmentary utterances of the *Donatus Life*. These are to be found in Reifferscheid's *Suetonius*, p. 63, and are as follows:² "Vergil made Lucius Varius and Plotius Tucca his heirs, and these two, after the poet's death, at the command of Caesar, emended the *Aeneid*." Here we meet with the statement that the editors had at least some discretionary power of emendation. How far it extended it is difficult to say. That it was not absolute, however, is certain; for although the poem came into their hands with no part finished,³ yet the following restriction had been placed upon their work by Vergil himself, namely, that they were to edit nothing which the poet himself would not publish.⁴ And, on the other hand, the fact that the *Aeneid* was in a very unfinished state when delivered over to them; the further fact that two years elapsed, during which period they were busy with the work of emendation and getting the poem into shape for publication;⁵ and the final statement of the *Suetonian Vita* "Edidit autem Varius sed summatim emendata;" all lead us to suppose that the emendatory powers of the editors must have been considerable.

¹ See Conington's *Introduction*, pp. CI, seq., and Nettleship's "Vergil," p. 87, seq. The opening lines, *Ille ego*, &c., as well as the longer *Helen* passage *Aen.* II, 567 to 588, are found in no capital MS.

² "Heredes fecit (Vergilius). . . . L. Varium et Plotium Tuccam, qui eius *Aeneida* post obitum iussu Caesaris emendarunt."

³ See the *Donatus Vita*.

⁴ "Scripta sua sub ea condicione legavit (eidem *Vero* et *Tuccae*) ne quid ederent quod non a se editum esset."

⁵ "Edidit autem Varius, sed summatim emendata." Thilo in his introduction, p. 16, interprets "summatim" as meaning cursorily, slightly, or the like. Cf. *Suet. August.* *Vita* 85.

The only limitation placed upon them seems to have regarded lines and passages not emanating directly from Vergil himself. The poem when given to the world was to contain nothing that was not Vergil's. The editors might cancel repetitions, but they were distinctly enjoined to add nothing new, not even to complete the unfinished verses which they found.¹ As to the cancelling powers delegated to the editors, the short *Vita*, prefixed to the commentary of Servius, tells us that Varius and Tucca were authorized to delete passages or lines deemed superfluous.² And thus another item is added to our scanty information. The editors might cancel, but only what they held to be superfluous.

Now it is easy to conceive that the editors, Varius and Tucca, acting with the discretionary power conferred upon them, may have deemed the variant passages (such as the Helen episode) preserved in the early commentaries, as superfluous, and so have excluded them, notwithstanding their Vergilian authorship, from their official exemplar; and as a consequence of that editorial suppression, such passages are not authenticated in our received version of the Vergilian text, which goes back through the capital MSS. to the official edition of Varius and Tucca. Of course, the sources for the text at the disposal of the grammarians and commentators must have been unofficial copies of Vergilian MSS.; that is, texts such as had been left by Vergil, and which were uncorrected by his editors. For, as we know, there are readings in the ancient commentators widely at variance with the Archetype of our best capital MSS.³ Besides, as a matter of fact, there are faint rumors in the first few centuries after the poet's death of the existence of certain MSS. which apparently had never

¹ "Edidit autem . . . ut qui versus etiam imperfectos, sicut erant reliqueret." Add to this the collateral testimony from Suetonius, quoted by St. Jerome, "Varius et Tucca . . . Aeneidum postea libros emendarunt sub ea lege, ut nihil adderent."

² "Augustus vero ne tantum opus periret, Tuccam et Varium bac lege iussit emendare ut superflua demerent."

³ See Conington's *Introd.*, pp. cv. seq.

come under the correcting hand of Varius or his associate, Tucca.¹

We come now to the last point in this outline of the publication of the *Æneid*; namely, the date of its appearance.² It is likely that we shall never know exactly how much time Varius and Tucca required for their work of correction and editing. Still, assuming that they began at once after the death of their friend, we can say with considerable probability that the two following years were spent correcting and preparing the poem for its publication, thus fixing the date in the year 17 B. C.

We know on unimpeachable testimony that the fame of the *Æneid* had gone forth long before its author's death, and we have already cited the verses which Propertius composed, at least seven or eight years before the poem appeared. Now, Horace was Vergil's ancient friend; the latter had introduced him to Maecenas, who in turn obtained the favor of Augustus for him and made him a member of the literary circle which frequented the court.³ Hence, we are safe in assuming that Horace ought to have enjoyed a larger measure of Vergil's confidence than Propertius, and there is little doubt but that Horace was kept much better informed with regard to the progress of the *Æneid* than Propertius. He was certainly numbered among those whom Vergil habitually consulted with reference to certain passages, while the work was in course of composition.⁴ But now we are met with a remarkable fact. Although Horace certainly enjoyed at least as close a friendship with Vergil as Propertius, or any of the writers who make frequent allusions to the *Æneid* before its actual publication, still, strange to relate, Horace makes no reference whatever, either directly or indirectly, to the great work of his friend before the latter's death. There is no trace of even a passing

¹Gellius III, 23, mentions a MS. containing the second *Æneid*, which was believed to have been written by Vergil himself. Still another account of an unofficial MS. of Vergil is to be found in Gellius XIII, 21, 3, where Probus is quoted as saying that he had seen a MS. "corrected by Vergil's own hand."

²See Middleton and Mills, p. 159, where a summary, as in the present article, is given of Brissier's theory: See Rev. de Pujol, VIII, 2.

³In the Satires I, 5, 3, 2, Horace calls Vergil "his dearest friend." Cf. also Odes I, 3.

⁴Cf. Reifferscheid, p. 61, "Recitavit . . . ut ea fere de quibus ambigebat, quo magis judicium hominum experiretur."

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allusion to the *Æneid* in the works of Horace published before the year of Vergil's death, 19 B. C. Even the very subject which had made the *Æneid* so popular, the *Æneas* legend, has not the slightest influence on Horace, nor is any reference to it found in any of his works prior to the publication of the third book of the *Odes*. Indeed, in this very third book of his *Odes* Horace takes occasion to refer to the supposed Trojan origin of the Romans, and he shows himself actually on the point of repudiating such an origin altogether.¹ Juno, (the implacable enemy of the Trojans according to the Vergilian account) lends her influence to exalt Rome, on the express condition only, that the Romans never again thinking of raising fallen Ilium. The favor of the goddess is assured as long as Troy remains in ruins. This is certainly at variance with the spirit and letter of the *Æneid*, the burden of which is the expression of tenderest sympathy for fallen Troy and its exiled people. Moreover, though Troy is mentioned in this *Ode*, the Trojan hero, *Æneas*, is not, though no more fitting place can be imagined. Nor is the hero of the *Æneid* referred to anywhere in the first three books of the *Odes*, or in the *Epodes*. In his earlier patriotic pieces, Horace often speaks of Rome and its origin; but what is most singular, is the fact that he never goes farther back than Romulus. The latter's birth and death are favorite themes with him, but never once does he allude to the Vergilian account of the parent city Troy, or the Trojan origin of the Romans.² To show forcibly the divergent views of the two poets, it will be sufficient to expose their different treatment of the same topic. Both relate the manner in which the gods punished the ancient sins of their people. Horace³ makes that punishment consist in the death of Remus. Vergil, on the contrary, carries the punishment back to the Trojan war, and makes the destruction of Troy the penalty.⁴ And this difference of attitude

¹Cf. *Odes* 3,17 ff.

²Cf. *Epodes*, 7, 19, 16, 12; *Odes* I, 2, 17: III, 3, 5: III, 3, 9.

³C. *Epodes* III, 17:

“Ut immerentis fluxit in terram
Remi sacer nepotibus cruo.”

And Vergil, *Georgics*, I 502:

“Laomedontea lulumus periuria Troiae.”

⁴ For the dates of Horace's *Odes* see Reifferschield “Annales Horatii.” Breslau, 1870.

and treatment is in evidence throughout the first three books of the Odes and in the Epodes. Now, without protracting further this discussion, if it be true that the Odes of the first three books were published about the year 22 B. C.,¹ Vergil had already labored on the *Æneid* ten years, and the poem must have been almost completed. For it was two years before this time that Augustus had asked to hear some selections from it. Horace, nevertheless, in his first three books of Odes, observes the deepest reticence about the masterpiece of his most intimate friend. He never once makes the least allusion to the subject, character, or any of the contents of the poem; he never speaks of any of the episodes recounted in the *Æneid*; nor does he even name any of the principal personages whose adventures are told in the poem. Whatever may be the reason for this strange silence, while other less intimate friends were repeating lines from the *Æneid* and extolling it to the skies, while Propertius could tell of its subject-matter and compare it with the *Iliad*, Horace is as silent before Vergil's death as though the *Æneid* had never existed.

But two years pass, and a marked change is visible in the writings of Horace. In the spring of the year 17 B. C., Rome prepares to celebrate the "Ludi Saeculares," Vergil has been dead two years; during the interval Varius and Tucca have been at work on the *Æneid*; Horace is the laureate for the celebration, for he has been appointed by Augustus (under whose auspices the *Æneid* is being prepared for publication) to compose the Festal Chant for the games. And now in this hymn, the *Carmen Saeculare*, for the first time, in the writings of Horace we find no less than two distinct allusions to events recounted in the *Æneid*.² Two entire strophes of the poem are taken up with the description of the landing of the Trojan vessels on the shores of Italy. *Æneas*, the "castus *Æneas*," like the "pius *Æneas*" of the Vergilian poem, is represented as in the *Æneid*, escaping the flames of burning Troy. Augustus is no longer the incarnation of Mercury, and the successor of Romulus. He is now a Trojan, the grandson of

¹ Cf. H. Besser JJ. 133, 692, and M. Messina, "Carmen Saeculare Horatii." See also Büchler's *Collectanea*, Bonn 1878: and the same author in *Rhein. Mus.* 37, 226.

² Cf. *Carmen Saeculare*, V. 36 seq.

Anchises and Venus. And the noble sentiments attributed to him in this poem are, without the shadow of a doubt, a description borrowed directly from the *Æneid*.¹

From the appearance of the *Carmen Saeculare* onward, Vergilian reminiscences multiply in the works of Horace. In the fourth book of the *Odes*, the references to the *Æneid* are frequent. To select a few out of many: *Æneas* brings his household gods into Italy and founds the Roman nation.² Venus asks and obtains from Jupiter the promise that *Æneas* will found a city in Latium, destined to far higher glory than ancient Troy. In the fourth book also Horace applies the well known Vergilian epithet to *Æneas*, and calls him "pius *Æneas*."³ Finally in the last Ode of the same book, Horace pictures the Romans with their wives and children as having prayed to the gods and then celebrating Troy and the son of Venus.⁴

Now, from all this two conclusions seem deducible: First, that the year of the "Ludi Saeculares" was the date chosen by Augustus to celebrate not only the glories of his house, the Julian gens, but also as a fitting opportunity for giving to the world the greatest glory of the whole Roman nation; namely, the *Æneid*. For we cannot but think that these two events, the *Ludi Saeculares* and the first appearance of the *Æneid*, both fraught with immense significance and both alike glorious to the Roman people and Rome's Emperor, did not happen upon the same date fortuitously; but on the contrary, the inference is almost inevitable that Augustus, who had inspired the *Carmen Saeculare* and had saved the *Æneid* from the flames, deliberately signalized the date of the splendid celebration, by giving to the world at the same time the great Roman Epic, in order to make forever memorable,

¹ Cf. *Carmen Saec.* 52 ff.

"Bellante prior, iacentem
Levis in hostem."

With Vergil, *Aen.* VI, 833.

"Parcere subiectis et debellare superbos."

² Cf. *Odes* IV, 52 ff. and *Aen.* I, 67, and again *Odes* IV, 6, 21.

³ *Odes* IV, 7, 15.

⁴ *Odes* IV, 15, 30.

"Troiamque et Anchisen et Almae
Progeniem Veneris canemus."

the first appearance of that poem, which he knew well would for all time to come shed lustre upon his own reign and glory upon Rome. And now if this conclusion be allowed, it will follow that the date of the official appearance of the *Æneid* was the spring of the year 17 B. C., for that was the year in which the *Ludi Saeculares* were celebrated, and in which the *Carmen Saeculare* was chanted. It will follow also that Varius and Tucca were engaged for the greater part of two entire years in their editorial work, for we know that Vergil died at Brundisium in September of the year 19 B. C.

JOHN D. MAGUIRE.

THE LANGUAGE OF EVOLUTION—II.

In a previous issue,¹ the general influence of language on thought and the special influence of the language of "Natural Selection" were discussed at length. The present article extends the discussion to the phrases, "race experience" and "heredity." It endeavors to show that the facts of man's mental and moral life cannot reasonably be explained on any theory of "mental inheritance" which would reduce them to a set of ancestral habits accidentally acquired at first, and afterward solidified by repetition into persistent uniformities of thought, belief, and action. No real explanation can ever be reached through any such idea of mechanical development. Under pain of begging the whole question at issue, the mental, moral, social, and religious ideals of men must be admitted as the primitive, natural, irreducible endowment of the human individual; they cannot be exhibited as an outgrowth of earlier animal "experiences."

The philosophy of the Unconscious, it may be remarked by way of introduction, has gradually supplanted during the last six decades the old world-view of final causes and intentional design. The tendency of scientific inquiry, no less than the drift of the comparative methods now in vogue, has been in the main to widen rather than to narrow the sphere of the unintentional in nature. The manifest instances of purpose-like adaptation of organ to function and of part to organism, so long looked upon as indications of an original divine plan, are now usually interpreted as effects of a slow, unconscious action of environment, which brings about in due course that "eternal fitness" of things once mistaken for evidence of creative foresight. "This world was not planned by a highest reason, although it has the highest reason for its goal," is the way Strauss² expresses the new faith.

The last word of science concerning the universe is, therefore, said when it is affirmed to be a vast structure, all the

¹ October, 1901.

² *Der Alte und der Neue Glaube*, p. 143.

parts of which mutually condition and produce each other in a uniform series of actions which are linked together in an endless chain of cause and effect; or when it is represented as a self-enclosed system, permeated to the last detail by an energy that changes continually in the mode of its manifestation, though never in its total sum; and regulated throughout by a law of adjustment to the whole so rigorously enforcing obedience to its sole behest—"upward and onward ever"—as to make extinction the slow but sure fate overtaking every laggard.

It must be confessed that this complete inversion of the old world-view, which took place when evolution placed reason at the end and not at the beginning of things, opened up a way of approaching the traditional problems of human thought that has led to many startling, not to say revolutionizing, conclusions. The constructive imagination which, to quote Professor Shaler, "has given us all the greater revelations of science and literature,"¹ came quickly forward into the place of prominence as the faculty to which man must confidently appeal if he would understand his true place in nature. The method of proceeding was as inspiring as it was simple: man had only to put into some far-removed and indefinite antecedent all that he desired to draw out of it later, to explain himself fully with all his present belongings. By centering all needed assumptions in some primitive "mind-stuff,"² all the actualities of things might be conveniently exegeted out of this prime potential without recourse to the "carpenter theory of an intelligent God acting from design."

The absorbing point of view thus became retrospective. Future organized life, so it seemed, had been anticipated in the symmetric structure of crystals; free-will in the magnet's attraction for iron filings; the source and motive of unselfish moral-action in that mutual helpfulness of part to part and of parts to whole displayed by organic beings, and commonly

¹ "The Individual," p. 187.

² "Mind-stuff is the reality which we perceive as matter."—Clifford, *Lectures and Essays*, p. 284.

known as "solidarity ;" the promise of cultivated reason in the generic sense-images of savage life as manifested in language and in crude methods of numbering; finally, "race experience" and "heredity" grew to be considered as most potent formulas for working out the whole sum of man's present knowledge and aspirations.

It was not long before romantic literature—the medium through which the abstract ideas of the few are made intelligible to the many—began to reflect in a popular form the views that were current in scientific circles; not long before Realism in fiction and Fatalism in philosophy began again to run their wonted course together. Men read a melancholy lesson out of Nature, wrote prose-poems on the "sadness of science," and resurrected the half-forgotten world-views of the ancient Greeks. The past appeared dark, forbidding, pessimistic; the only ray of Messianic hope which it held out being the hint of better things to come when man shall have succeeded in making a servant of that inherited lower self within him that is still his worshipful master.

The past ten years have witnessed a change of attitude. "Natural Selection" has been so modified and amended as to have lost much of its sweeping significance even with its most ardent devotees. Ribot, who wrote¹ so confidently in the eighties about the transmission of acquired mental characters expresses himself² with much hesitation at the century's close. It has been felt that the attempt to conceive the universe as a physical mechanism is offset by the fact that man, who cannot be eliminated from the equation, forms purposes, acts for an end, and implicitly accepts the faith that a reason greater than his is back of the world's unfolding. There seems to be little left of that intense disposition—so prevalent twenty years ago—to make religion a closed department of ancient science, a sort of museum of mistaken views about nature, and to regard ethics merely as a branch of Natural History. It looks as if the philosophy of chance had already reached the high-water mark and begun to ebb.

¹ "Heredity," 1889.

² "Evolution of General Ideas," 1897. Eng. Tr., p. 218, 1899.

A striking instance of this change of view may be seen in Professor John Fiske's last writings. He abandoned the doctrine which forbids any positive assertion to be made about God's nature, and championed the counter-tenet—that man has a conscious right to believe in the directive influence of the Eternal and Unseen throughout all history.¹ The tendency of the mind to rest in a preconception and to force it upon the varied detail of things, whether it fit well or ill, is not so overpowering as formerly. The baffled speculator has calmly reviewed his own futile attempt to dictate to Nature, criticized his own criticisms, and abandoned extremes for the golden mean. The idea of final causes is slowly creeping back again into the very minds which sought to dislodge it. And we may, therefore, regard as not altogether untimely a survey of three great attempts to carry out the Darwinian preconception in detail along the respective lines of race experience, heredity, and solidarity, our chief interest lying in an endeavor to determine how far the mental bias produced by a highly realistic set of phrases is responsible for that appearance of real proof which these three ideas are wont to wear.

One cannot fail to be impressed, at first sight, with the solemnity of the idea of *race experience* and the smoothness with which it runs its appointed course of explanation. A tiny cellular mass of living protoplasm, starting with its small capital of unorganized matter, acquires function after function as it passes along successively from parent to offspring through untold myriads of individuals, adding constantly to its store of experience what it wins from each; until to-day in the brain of the babe and the adult it has become a veritable storehouse of the habits acquired and transmitted by the long since vanished units of the race. Upon these remains of ancestral knowledge we constantly, though unwittingly, draw; they constitute a fund of blurred impressions, a sort of indistinct mental residue which is the source of what is now known as "automatic thought."

To this store of ancestral experience is to be referred the aptitude for abstracting and generalizing now the fixed habit

¹"The Everlasting Reality of Religion." See also Professor Royce's article "John Fiske as a Thinker," *The Harvard Graduates' Magazine*, Sept., 1901.

of the mind, seen especially in that apparatus of first principles whereby we seek to interpret the reality of things about us and to make them amenable to our intelligence as a system of rational order and law. A "spontaneous variation" from a knowledge of dumb and unrelated facts to an insight, dim at first, into their mutual relationship and connection occurred with someone far back in the past, became fixed and communicable by dint of repetition, growing by slow accumulation in the course of generations to its present universality as an acquired mental character.¹

An appeal to the experience of the race is thus made to account for all the higher working principles of thought, such as causality, identity, and belief in the uniformity of Nature, which transcend the experience of the individual. These, together with the mental habits of abstracting and generalizing, are only the sum of ancestral variations that have hardened into instinctive attitudes of mind and become a second nature. Man's present mental constitution is an acquisition, a legacy, and not the primitive endowment of the individual's nature. Man thinks in grooves which his remote progenitors sunk and deepened for him. A child of the past, he cannot solve the mysteries of his being and his knowing by looking inward, but only by looking back.

But is this stimulus of man's total experience really within us ready to produce ideas on occasion? Professor Shaler imagines it is, and adduces in evidence the pathological states of dreaming, temptation, and insanity, as well as those vague impressions that seem to rise spontaneously, as it were, within us, when "the normal activity of the mind is slowed down," such are his words, so as to shut out the ordinary influence of environment and to allow automatic thought to come into play.²

Surely these facts of our half-awake, dreaming, or disordered selves are not to be taken for serious proofs of thought-transmission. To marshal these abnormal facts as

¹ The term "character" is used throughout this article in the sense of "disposition for action," *i. e.*, habit of acting contracted from frequent repetition of the same acts.

² *The Individual*, p. 89.

actual instances of such transmission is a pure begging of the question, as good an example of the wish being father to the thought as could possibly be desired: it assumes the proposition to be proved. Our inability to refer certain subconscious states of mind to any definite or particular stimulus, so far from establishing the thesis of stored-up experience, proves rather our own ignorance as to the origination of the states in question. As a matter of logic, an interpretation of facts to be legitimate must be disjunctively set forth—that is, shown to be the only interpretation the facts will bear. No mere reference of the unknown to the unknown, of one mystery to another; no mere contrast of the vagueness of "day-dreaming" with the vividness of externally stimulated thought will ever establish anything but our proneness to resort to guess-work whenever we are thwarted in our efforts to analyze the facts of our mental life; unless it also point out the ever-present danger in "slowing down our mental activity" for any purpose whatsoever.

A little reflection will go to show that the verbal force of the explanation of knowledge by race experience lies in the word "race," which suggests a series or genealogical line as a something continuous and apart from individuals. It seems to furnish us with the desired unity through the continuous transmission to offspring of the same cellular life. The long line of ancestors to whom we owe our bodily structure and physical traits hints at a like indebtedness to them for the higher spiritual self as well, and makes it easy to imagine the parental descent of mind along with that of brain. The imagination thus accepts without further inquiry a parallel that neither reason nor research can establish.

As it is a fact not worth pausing again to explain at length that the race is nothing aside from individuals,¹ it becomes at once necessary to discuss the problem, in terms of the individual, and not in terms of the race, by asking the straightforward question: Can an individual transmit his experience?²

¹ CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY BULLETIN, p. 261, July, 1901.

² "Experience" is, perhaps, the vaguest term in modern philosophy. It is used to denote the results of habits and dispositions, whether on body or on mind. When said of mind, it generally means the events of the mental life before reflection has

Without anticipating here in detail what will be more fully discussed in this and in another article under the head of "Heredity"—since race experience and heredity are notions that stand or fall together—we may simply state that an answer to this question must cover two points,—one of fact, the other of conceivability.

The fact that the oldest and most assured beliefs, or rather what looks like them, appear early in the minds of children is sometimes hailed as evidence that these beliefs are ancestral remains, the time being too short to account for their origin in the individual unless the latter be regarded as reabsorbing the impressions of his forebears. But this proves too much. On the same line of thought we should expect to find fully-developed faculties in the child-mind together with a stereotyped form of speech and instinct, since, if time be the worker of all changes, it ought to have brought about these effects as well as the others referred to its influence.

But, unfortunately for the selectionist, length of time in which a belief in the existence of outer reality or in hobgoblins may grow is not the question at stake: that is rather the continuity of these beliefs, the uninterrupted preservation of them. The child may personify the doll, and the savage see a living counterpart of himself in some graven image. Yet the very attenuated resemblance which the mind detects between these two psychological facts, when it suppresses the differences that mark off one from the other, will hardly justify our saying that an early savage instinct is still persistent in the child. To speak with accuracy, it is not "experience" that survives, but the things of which we have experience; it is not views or theories that survive, but the facts about which

begun. Thus instincts, beliefs, spontaneous judgments, and persuasions not due to critical and reflex thought, but anticipative of it, are all made indefinite by being called "experience." To employ an analogy, experience signifies the "raw materials" of human knowledge as distinct from "the finished products." Reality as the rustic thinks it, or the proverbial man of "common sense" views it, are illustrations. When said of living organisms, "experience" denotes an aptitude to act in the same way, or to repeat a function over again that has once been found to be agreeable and pleasant. It is only by keeping the term indefinite that the selectionist can succeed in making out a good case for his identification of animal and rational experience. He accomplishes by means of loose phrases elastic in significance an apparent unification of distinct and divergent facts. Ambiguity saves him; precision would effectually estop him from constructing his philosophy of the indefinite.

we theorize. It is an easy matter to convert a slender analogy into an instance of continuity when it is the very fact of continuity itself that is on trial.

We may, indeed, single out what is common to the respective experiences of many individuals, but we may not convert this abstract ratio of resemblance, in which the experiences of successive individuals agree, into a physical bond of continuity, and then speak of "experience" as an early form of thought or belief forever reappearing mechanically in the consciousness of men. Experience is not an entity to be detached from the subjects which have experience; and the occurrence of similar experiences in many individuals is quite another thing from the recurrence of one and the same experience in all. Proofs of inherited thought must not be drawn from metaphors.

It is often said, in this same connection, that the individual repeats and recapitulates the experience of the race. The embryo, it is true, repeats the animal series almost stage by stage in the course of its development. The child comes slowly to maturity, advancing from the sense-knowledge of a world of objects to the reflex knowledge of himself as a thinking and willing subject, distinct from the objects which he knows and seeks, until finally he learns to regard himself as a living centre of many relations—cognitive, religious, social, and moral—and to consider his fellows as similarly situate as himself. The question, therefore, suggests itself: is the prenatal and post-natal development of the child the key and clue to the history of man's growth to his present physical and mental stature, nay, a recapitulation of this growth under our very eyes?

There is, indeed, a parallel to this development in the history of the race, since man shows signs of having progressed with marked slowness from a confused knowledge of what he was to a finer sense of discrimination between the cognitive, moral, social, and religious tendencies of the complex nature that was his from the beginning. On purely a priori grounds evolution demands a first man whose consciousness is only of objects, that is, a man as yet without intelligence or will. The documents of history are all against such an assumption, and prehistoric documents do not afford any reliable evidence in

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favor of it.¹ Man was rational and volitive from the beginning, or he never could have become such by any process of selective development. Neither, to borrow a homely phrase of Carlyle's, could "intellect and moral emotion be put into him by an entity which had none of its own." In a sense, therefore, man's development in knowledge of himself, of the universe, and of his moral duties is supremely true, and the march of civilization no idle figure of speech.

But can the analogy between the human embryo's development and that of the animal series be pressed still further so as to identify both and make rational life a pure outcome of previous organic or material conditions? It must be confessed that it is temptingly easy to enlarge this analogy of the swiftly developing embryo into a slowly developing world and human race; to sink all the actual differences between rational and organic life in some primitive substance of a highly potential and all-embracing nature, whence they will duly emerge by a process of "selective" growth; and to construe the universe as a huge organism, or bundle of unfolding uniformities, each individual bundle repeating and recapitulating all that has gone before, and adding to it. We thus reach a basal unity for the world-ground and seem to settle once for all the "dread dualism" of Mind versus Matter by excogitating a common source and origin in which all life is one.

On the warrant of some such vague monistic speculation—which conveniently begs the whole question at issue by making mind either a phase, or one of the many potentialities, of matter—we may readily imagine that a protoplasmic something, in the race as in the child, after passing like the chambered nautilus from shell to shell, gradually turns introspective and becomes self-conscious. The race will thus have supreme significance for the individual's life. The past will suggest itself as the mysterious source of habits and dispositions that still abide with us. The individual's mental as well as organic life will at once appear as preformed in ancestral experience and fixed by heredity. A few flings at the idea of "special

¹ *Les Origines.* J. Guibert. Pp. 303-383. 2d Ed. Paris.

creation" as an undue interference with the mechanism which provides at the start, by hypothesis, the animal and rational life that is now manifested in the child's development, will serve to make sacred and intangible this simple doctrine that all life is one, however varied its manifestations.

But if we take the pains to look a little more closely into any such idea of development, and to study the facts of the world directly in terms of the individuals that exist, and not indirectly in the light of comparisons and analogies, we will find that the idea owes its whole strength to the fact that it assumes at the beginning all that is necessary to carry it through to the end; containing logically all the particulars, it seems to imply them really as well. But can an individual be, live, move, act, think, much less vary, develop, change into something else without reference to the supreme productive Cause, which is in the world, though not of it, and directly active in each individual's being, action, and development?

The Monist and the Selectionist speak of "outside interference," "miraculous intervention," and the theory of "a carpenter improving upon a piece of work which he has botched" as the only alternatives left for the thinker who rejects the idea of a homogeneous first-something bursting with the promise of all that is to be. There is a gross confusion here. These would be alternatives for the Deist but not for the Christian Theist. The Christian world-view never contemplated "second causes" as substitutes for divine action, "wound up to go a certain length" and "soon needy of repair again," and "of an additional push" from some external cause. This a travesty, and not an alternative. Second causes are particular causes ever acting in virtue of the constantly received influence of the Universal Cause. They are real efficient causes, it is true, but they are not self-explaining or self-sufficing sources either of their own being or action. The sun could not move the planet on which we live except through an intrinsic activity of its own communicated to it and constantly aroused in it by the Universal Cause.

And if, proceeding on this line of thought, we say that the Universal Cause produces and energizes all individuals variously; or that He increased the generative powers of certain

organic individuals in such a way that the reproductive process—now employed only in preserving and maintaining individuals of a kind—was formerly employed to bring about variations and new species in the vegetal and lower animal world, would not the Selectionist find in this view a truer and more solid ground for a scheme of development than his “Deus ex machina” which grinds out mechanically the fictitious grist which he, the Selectionist, brings to the mill? And if, according as matter was disposed and organized under divine direction, new forms, such as that of life, were employed to carry on the work of organization still further through the ages, to secure what had gone before, and to give things a power to transcend their previous dead selves and to rise still higher in development, would this be “miraculous interference?”

And if, to-day in the human embryo, consciousness and rational life may be said to be in germ, is not this a proof that the thinking principle which eventually manifests itself in the child, begins by exercising the functions of nutrition, growth, organization, and feeling, rather than a proof that thought and volition are successive outcomes of material antecedents? The source and origin of all life is one, but it is not matter. You cannot get rid of dualism by making matter somehow precontain Mind. The continuity of things is not broken by admitting a continuous Evolver. You cannot suppress the ideas of creation and providence by falsifying their import in the interest of a Monistic abstraction. The individual repeats the animal series because that which last appears in the child’s development was first at work in discharging other functions as preliminaries to its own manifestation. Reason shows itself at the end, but that does not prove that it was not also at the beginning of the child’s unfolding. Race experience, whatever meaning it may have in biology, cannot be made the source of man’s mental habits, unless we deny all idea of a Producer who fits all individuals with energies to realize appointed ends. To deny this is, as we shall see, to make a philosophy of the world impossible.

But apart from all this, we cannot reconstruct a race experience. If we knew in detail what is actually taking place at each successive stage of the child’s development, we might be

justified in comparing the results with the development of the animal series, or the race. Yet such information is well nigh inaccessible, and even if obtained, would still leave the thesis of transmitted experience as badly off as ever. How distinguish between mental behavior due to special surroundings, to imitation, to instruction, or to brain defects, and that due to the so-called race experience? What warrant have we for attributing certain functions to the influence of the past? Universal characters, it is answered, common to all child-minds.

But is there anything more in such universal characters than facts of similarity and difference which we would most naturally expect from minds that are not passive recipients, but active assimilators of environing influences more or less the same? To exhibit the resemblances as persistent ancestral habits and the differences as new departures, is to resort to metaphor. To reach a real solution of all such facts, we must seek the grounds of these relations of resemblance in the world-plan which produces individuals according to a common measure of likeness; vital units that unfold from within by virtue of their own peculiarly finalized natures, and not mere passive recapitulators of what has gone before. It does, indeed, seem strange that men should give objective existence to abstractions while practically refusing to give it to the individual active selves of the cosmos. Language makes a thoroughfare where thought meets with an impasse. Even granting the biological doctrine of descent, the facts adduced in favor of race experience, as we have already seen, and shall see more fully, admit of an entirely other, and far less hypothetical, interpretation.

But if we turn to reason and attempt with its aid to conceive how experience could be transmitted we find ourselves still further enmeshed in difficulty. On none of the three great world-views—the Christian, the Evolutionist, the Pantheist—will the conception proceed. If we accept the Christian view of the creation of each individual soul by the omnipresent God whenever and wherever the appointed conditions call for it; if we frankly appeal from Nature at a point where it is unable, of itself, to rise to expectations, it is clear that in a

soul not generated by the parents there can be no continuity between its experience and that of its predecessors in bodily frames.

On the other hand, if we embrace the Pantheist's conception of physical and psychical phenomena as the attributes of "one substance with two sets of properties, two sides, the physical and the mental, a sort of double-faced unity," it is clear again that the word "transmission" would be a misnomer when applied to experience. For where there are no individuals, but only conscious phases of one universal substance, there can only be a *succession* of manifestations.

If, finally, we should adopt the view—which is the old Traducianism restated by materialists generally, and by pantheists occasionally—that the thinking and vivifying principle in man is begotten of the parents along with the organic structure, we are no nearer a solution. The race is a plurality, not a unity; and hence there can be conceived no one experience in all, but only the individual experiences of many. Humanity, as Holmes once said, never paid taxes. It is only of individuals that such a relation as experience can be affirmed. And until we can prove by direct analysis that experience is a passive inheritance and not an inalienable product of the individual's activity, the thesis of race experience is without support. Nay, more: if we say, to parry this objection and to blunt its edge, that the mind is active in working over the secreted brain-impressions, this is tantamount to saying that the individual has no knowledge but that which he himself produces. The thesis of race experience is therefore abandoned in the answer to the objection. However we view the question of transmitted experience, whether from the point of view of facts, or from that of conceivability, race experience is rather a suggestive metaphor than an explanation of anything in our mental life.

An effort is often made to break through all these barriers by an appeal to the fact and law of *heredity*, and this brings us to consider our second topic. What has thus far been said concerning race experience may be viewed in the light of a preliminary skirmish to develop the general situation and to

introduce us to the actual war that is being waged among biologists themselves as to the real nature and influence of heredity.

The hypothesis of mental evolution, it should be noted, occupies very much the same place in psychology as the theory of descent in biology, and is opposed to the idea of special creation. The object is to extend the facts of organic heredity to "adjacent cases" of acquired mental characters, by applying the principles of "Selection," "Variation," and "Adaptation" to minds and thoughts as well as to organized structures, in the hope of finding a future evolution theory that will be psycho-physical and not so one-sidedly biological as the present theory is. As the problem of heredity is, first of all, a problem in organic life before becoming a problem in the life of the mind, it is necessary to understand the biological doctrine of heredity before proceeding to discuss the question of inherited mental experience. So many elements of speculation, however, have been intruded into the facts of the case that a brief historical review will serve as a good corrective.

In the first decade of the nineteenth century,¹ Lamarck, the Father of organic evolution, advocated two points of doctrine that are worthy of note in the light of subsequent events: the perfectly adapted structures discernible in animals are due to the slow development, *by use*, of the several animal organs; all the modifications that the individual acquires during life *by the use or disuse of organs* are transmitted to the offspring as a sort of net profit or loss in organic development. Darwin saw in this broadly stated doctrine of "use with heredity" a tendency to "breed true to stock," opposite to and restrictive of that tendency to vary, which he had singled out as the prime factor in organic evolution.

The last decade of the nineteenth century, however, has questioned Lamarck's contention and Darwin's point of view. It is now generally denied that the "accidental characters"² acquired by parents are directly transmitted to offspring in

¹ *Philosophie Zoologique*, 1809.

² Dispositions for action.

the reproductive process.¹ "Natural Selection," acting upon variations—which were more likely to occur than "breeding true to stock" in early and unstable organisms—would have eventually, it is said, brought about the same results as those supposed to have been secured through birth-inheritance directly. Thus, by regarding variation as the normal tendency in organic development, with a certain amount of "selection" to limit and restrict it, the preservation of species, races, and ancestral traits could be explained without recourse to Lamarck's doctrine of "use combined with heredity," concerning which there exists such bitter controversy among biologists.

The present scientific tendency, therefore, is to recognize some principle of "selection,"² rather than any principle of "transmission" as the controlling factor in preserving to posterity the permanent gains made by organisms, races and individuals in the course of their development. This change of attitude is due, in no small measure, to the ineffectual attempts of biologists to work out an acceptable explanation of the hereditary transmission of "characters" on any theory of cell life. The cell, it should be observed, is a mass, of microscopic dimensions, generally surrounded by protoplasm and enclosed within a cell-wall or membrane. Composed of distinct elements which seem to represent a reduced type of individuality, the cell, in the higher animals, passes successively through the complex functions of nutrition, growth and reproduction. When the biologist, therefore, in accord with his scientific method of procedure, transfers his investigation from the organism as a whole to the cell or vital unit from which all

¹A prominent school of biologists holds that there are no clear cases of transmission in this way, the arguments in favor of it being, they say, largely presumptive and inspired by the requirements of the theory of evolution. Obviously it is a matter of much difficulty to segregate the effects of the general influence of environment on the organism as a whole—such as the deteriorating results of alcoholic habits, poor food, etc.—from the slight variations, in organs or parts of organisms, due to use, abuse, or excessive stimulation. How the parts of parental organisms thus affected and modified could so react on the germ cells—Weissmann's view—as to cause these latter to convey such modifications to offspring is in itself a greater difficulty than the facts of heredity which it has been excogitated to explain. Some other way must be found to account for the persistent re-appearance of acquired characters. Lamarck's doctrine has lost caste with biologists accordingly.

² *Mind and Body*, p. 196. Bain.

organic life springs, it is manifest that the function of reproduction is the one directly concerned in heredity, and the question at once arises with him, How is it so concerned?

One theory had it that the germ-plasm, or substance which forms the physical basis of heredity, is made up of small particles drawn from all parts of the organism. Accordingly, the germ-plasm is a miniature reproduction of the parental organism itself, destined to become life-size in due course. But this view was soon discredited by another—that of “germinal selection”—which is now the bone of contention among rival schools of biologists. Weissmann, its author, distinguished between body cells, which have to do with the mass of the individual body only, and germ-cells, whose sole function is to perpetuate the species. By this distinction all the modifications acquired by the body-cells remain the exclusive possession of the individual acquiring them, and their transmission was made theoretically impossible.

But, as the general fact of persisting species, races, and acquired characters—in other words, “heredity,” could not be denied, Weissmann, to explain it, was forced to fall back upon the mysterious hypothesis that the germ-plasm had been one and the same uninterruptedly from the very first beginning of life. The continuity of the germ-plasm in all individuals, he argued, would account for the persistence of types. The rise of variations and of individual differences might easily be explained by supposing that the body-cells exerted a constant influence upon the germ-cells through the internal environment which they mutually created for one another. He thus extended the theory of “selective” influence beyond parts of organisms, to the very germs themselves, which he conceived of as fighting for the mastery within, even as individuals fight for the mastery without. Though the germ-cells alone could be inherited by offspring, they nevertheless bore with them the modifying effects of their contact with the body-cells in that internal field of competition where fitness to survive is worked out beforehand.

This ingenious attempt of Weissmann to give the furthest possible application to the idea of “the struggle for existence” has not proven acceptable to many biologists. It has

been felt that a theory such as this which makes variations appear when and where they are wanted is not a welcome amendment to "natural selection," which allows organisms a larger margin for oscillation under *external* conditions. Moreover, the doctrine of the identity of the germ-plasm throughout all the modifications which it has successively undergone in myriads of individuals, cannot be empirically established. Nay, more: this entire piece of speculation is rightly regarded by biologists as only a subtle reassertion, in a round-about way, of Lamarck's doctrine of "use with heredity," since it only pushes the difficulty back from the organism to the cell, without at all solving it. Clearly beyond the power either of the microscope to reveal, or of reason to verify, this last word of the philosophy of chance leaves the question of how the effects of past experience are handed on to posterity as much an enigma as ever.¹ To adopt military parlance, this advance upon an extreme position was repulsed.

These efforts of Weissmann and others to make "natural selection" the sole and supreme factor in all development, whether organic or mental, and to disassociate it wholly from Lamarck's doctrine of inherited characters are known as Neo-Darwinism. Nowadays, however, biologists try to frame a conception of development that will hold independently of this bitterly mooted point and proceed equally well on either the Darwinian or neo-Darwinian assumption. Natural selection, it is said, acts directly upon individual organisms and upon different reactions of the same organism. The organism tends to repeat and retain useful and pleasant stimulations, and to select the pleasure-giving movement in preference to the one that is accompanied by pain, whenever the same external conditions present themselves. Thence arise habits and newer and still newer accommodations which break up the habits formed and cause the organism to expand and reach out to new stimulations.

Thus, by viewing contracted habits as capable of varying to any desired extent, there is plenty of room in the theory for past "experiences" to persist in species, races, and individuals no less than for new variations to occur "spontaneously"

¹ See Note 3, p. 49.

on the occasion of a change in the surrounding conditions. Random movement in quest of what is agreeable, causes some actions at first to be associated with pleasure and others with pain. Memory preserves the association of pleasure, incites the organism to repeat the associated action, and to become more and more adapted to its performance by dint of repetition. Spontaneity, choice, habit, adaptation, and accommodation, if the same external conditions be presupposed, will explain how the past is still present with us whether we recognize its presence or not. Memory thus reduces to a form of mental habit; character to a disposition for action; the brain is simply an early function increased and enlarged to its present complexity; and mind sums up the experience of the past through the organic and nervous apparatus handed down to it from dead and forgotten sires. All life is one, from the flower that blows to the mind that reasons, and selective development is life's sole law and prophet.

This long excursion into the field of biology will not be without profit and pertinence to the issue upon which we are engaged—namely, the inconceivability of race experience or mental inheritance, if we learn from it the plain lesson that biology advances no theory sufficient to account finally, either for the fact or the nature of what we call heredity. To realize the truth of this statement we need only disentangle from the speculations woven into them the simple facts of the heredity problem.

Viewed in themselves apart from any effort to explain them, the facts in heredity are two: a certain amount of similarity between parent and offspring, and a certain amount of dissimilarity between both. Galton's law of ancestral inheritance furnishes a scientific presentation of these baldly stated facts.¹ Similarities and dissimilarities are, therefore, the only elements of fact in the problem. Extend the meaning of heredity as we please, to species, races, or even to the parallel between the child's prenatal and postnatal development on the

¹ "Each group of ancestry of the same grade contributes to the heritage of the average offspring double the quantity of the group of the grade above it." "Dict. of Philos. and Psych." Baldwin. Art. "Galton's Law." "Natural Inheritance." Francis Galton, N. Y. and London, 1894.

one hand, and the corresponding stages in animal development on the other, we reach no addition to these two facts of resemblance and difference. Nor can we ever fully explain these facts without admitting as their causal ground a divine world-plan which not only constitutes individuals as apt and active principles, but guides them to varying degrees of development in their respective environments. This is the real reason ultimately of that fluctuating scale of similarities and differences into which we arrange them in our reconstructive thought.

Now, the selectionist, whose aim it is to solve the mystery of all organic life from plant to man on some vague process of development by selection, approaches these facts of resembling and differing individuals from a point of view that will not stand criticism, even if the biological doctrine that all organisms have descended from a few originals be fully and freely conceded. It seems to be the persuasion of the empiricist generally that a philosophy of the world can be constructed merely by coördinating together in a mechanical way a number of observed facts; that a genetic connection of all things can be concocted out of a series of recurrent associations of pleasure and pain; that the world could have fallen into its present condition of fitness and order by dint of the mutual interaction of a few primitive elements throughout indefinite past time.

Unable to make his mechanical explanation work to suit his preconception in the short term of individual life, he appeals to the past experience of the race to secure the development and changes which the world has reached at present. In other words, he seeks to hide the defects of his working principle by an appeal to the mysterious preservation of ancestral habits of thought and action. This is only another hypothesis conjured up in support of a tottering view, yet its influence on the imagination is very great. Association of certain actions with the feeling of pleasure becomes stronger and stronger with the years, so that eventually, it is argued, it could have brought about the present uniformities of thought, belief and action just as easily as the most ordinary nervous and organic functions.

We are here concerned only with biology. The attempts to make biology the true key to the mental life of the individual we will consider in another paper. All that we contend at present is that biology does not explain the facts of organic, not to mention the so-called "mental" heredity. For in what does the explanation consist? It consists simply in regarding the similarities between parent and offspring as a real type physically enduring throughout them all, and in representing the dissimilarities as variations ramifying out from the type in the course of individual development. The whole issue is thus befogged with a metaphor. Out of resemblances, species are created; out of differences, variations from type are manufactured. These terms "species" and "type" which the mind employs because of the mental convenience which classified thought always affords to the thinker are converted into things, and the Selectionist is thence led to believe in the reality of his own figments. He then piles Pelion upon Ossa to cover the difficulties arising out of this confusion. The various hypotheses which we have rehearsed concerning the absolute identity of the germ-plasm and the unbroken continuity of the same type in individuals of common descent, show to what straits biologists are driven when, mistaking the mental units of classification for a real immortality of germ-cells, they are forced to resort to a personified class-term to explain the facts of heredity in accord with the requirements of their philosophy of chance.

It is not a fact of observation that the germ-plasm is immortal; nor that the same identical cells play their part in animals as well as in man. Because we cannot discern any marked difference in cells, is no proof of their identity, but rather of our inability to penetrate into the mystery of life, even with the aid of the microscope. How explain on any mechanical theory that a germ-cell, supposedly one and the same, turns mollusk, fish, reptile, and man to suit occasion?

Surely not by compounding a number of hypothetic ingredients so as to derive the greater from the less, the superior effect from the inferior cause. What ground are you going to assign for the excess product in the effect? The mollusk, so far from accounting for the fish, cannot even account for itself.

As an individual, it does not contain in itself the sufficient reason of whatever generic or specific qualities you choose to assign to it or analyze out of it. It is no answer to state that the entire evolutionary process is "spontaneous" from matter to life, from the supposed first dawn of consciousness in the animal's feeling of pleasure to the fullness of spiritual life in man. You cannot suppress the real differences in things so as to reach an abstract unity of all realties in some indefinite prime potential and then proceed to derive all things again out of this convenient generality. Of course you can draw upon it to the full extent of the capital you have invested in it fictitiously. But whence comes this capital originally is the real question which the Monist perpetually begs when he confounds the Actual Infinite with a Potential Indefinite.

It is futile to try to explain an organism, which is a continuous whole of perfectly subordinated functions, by supposing it to accumulate slowly through a long process of assimilation and rejection the structure and functions which it now has, unless Reason from the very beginning, either immediately, or by the aid of slowly developing agencies, brought about and constantly guided a series of causes and effects that is rational and orderly at the close. What makes a mechanical explanation appear so satisfying is very simple. Things are physically related among themselves and the thoughts we frame of them are mutually associated, in consequence. This associated character of our thoughts leads the uncritical to imagine that things exist and occur in Nature as spontaneously as thoughts exist and recall one another in Mind.

All necessity of a Productive Cause is thereby made to vanish, and Nature becomes self-sufficient when spelt with a capital letter and endowed with "spontaneity." The "functions" of all organisms are then reconstructed on a mental scale according to some common bond of association, as "a feeling of pleasure," and a number of realistic phrases—"persistence," "struggle," "survival," "selection," "accumulation"—are made to account for everything, and to establish an ascending series of beings genetically connected from the mollusk up to man. To furnish a real insight into Nature's

way of working, the Selectionist should tell us how the paradox came about that a blindly developing world succeeded to the extent it has in counterfeiting the order and harmony which human reason sees in it. Until such be done, his "types" and his laws of "adaptation" can have little meaning.

The conclusion to be drawn from all these considerations is that no view of nature can live which does not admit that nature is the realization of design. No substitution of race experience for the experience of the individual; no attempt to make man a mere recapitulation of the beings that lie below him; no persistence of early organic functions, "unconsciously selected" at first, and transformed into fixed habits afterward, can ever displace the idea of finality. We must admit that there is a purposeful something in every being, and in organized beings especially, whereby two parent-types of the same species have a natural tendency to reproduce their kind, and in addition to this, their own proper tendency as organized individuals to reproduce their own peculiarities.

These combined tendencies, natural and individual, together with the potent influence of habit and environment, will explain the persistence of species, races and ancestral traits. The offspring resembles the parents because it develops from a substance of essentially the same nature as theirs. "Characters" are inherited not so much from, as through, the parent organisms; not from any germ-plasm, identically the same, which is transferred from parent to offspring without cease, but from an immanent tendency in every living organism to beget its like in composition and structure.

Evolution of the lower organic kingdom from a few originals, even if it be admitted, in nowise diminishes the necessity of creation and design; it would only enlarge the part which the Creator allowed second causes to play, under his constant influence, in bringing about the development of a plan, the causal reason and source of which at every moment must be finally sought in His infinite power and referred to His foreseeing guidance; else, the selectionist, "in fixing his thought on the physical system of the universe," will find that he has forgotten the supreme fact in it—his own rational self. If matters were allowed to develop slowly from the nebula and to become more and more organized and disposed for the recep-

tion of a new form, that new form of life could only have come from its Eternal Source—God. No tendency to vary, or to breed true to stock, can ever show how, by a mechanical system of trial and rejection, purpose could have arisen from the purposeless. The two lie infinitely apart, and are only apparently brought together by postulating some all-containing abstraction as their early ground. There is something more behind the facts of heredity than persistent types, something more in the universe than the mechanisms we excogitate to explain it.

Cosmic philosophy is, therefore, not a mere calculus of probabilities. The world is not to be written out in biological formulas alone; neither is it a fair inference that reason should be placed at the world's end, rather than at its beginning, because such happens to be the order in embryonic development. We must read purpose into nature and out of nature, or else agree to the paradox that reality "started as a beggar and wound up as a prince." Wundt was right when he criticized natural selection as a blind philosophy which failed to take into due account that purposive something that drives all things to their appointed goals. Biologists have, without intending it, furnished matter for as solid a chapter on Final Causes as was ever written. The shadow of that eternal world-plan, in which individuals were fashioned according to ideal ends, fitted with energies to realize these ends gradually and to minister to one grand purpose finally, is cast upon their pages. Back of all "selective action," back of the fixities of species, races, and recurrent types, none of which can be lightly dismissed as mere fortuities that somehow managed to survive, stands no "race experience," but the Supreme Adjuster of all relations, who is not Chance, nor Action of Environment, but Intelligence, Will and Law, variously endowing the individuals of the cosmos with all their powers to advance to fuller and still fuller life, in a word, with all their "aptitudes to select." It is written: "All things were made by Him, and without Him was made nothing that was made." The most that man can do is to think the Maker's thoughts after Him, and to feel assured that there never was a thing which was not previously a thought in the mind of God.

EDMUND T. SHANAHAN.

AN ANCIENT SYRIAC LEXICOGRAPHER.¹

Whatever Baghdad may have been in remote antiquity, it sprang again into existence, as from a desert, when Sultan Al-Mansoor, second caliph of the Abbasside dynasty (755 A. D.), made it the seat of his empire. The new city developed rapidly, and grew to be the richest and perhaps the largest city of the civilized world. Built on the left bank of the Tigris, only seventy miles north of the ruins of Babylonia, much nearer still to the site of Seleucia and Ctesiphon, it possessed, like almost any point of the plain of Irak, all the natural requisites of an Eden. There, if anywhere in the world, the great law of labor imposed on our first parents seems to be a mere formality. Man, so to speak, has but to stoop to the earth and touch it, to see it turn into another paradise. A paradise, indeed, it became under the rule of the Abbasside dynasty, thanks above all to the wise administration of the Barmecide family, who for nigh a century supplied the Caliphs with such able ministers.

We leave it for others to fancy and to sing the material splendor of the city of the Arabian Nights. Baghdad has another and a greater claim to our attention as the home of letters and sciences. Haroon-al-Rashid's century was the golden century of Mohammedan literature, and from that standpoint it can justly be compared with the most brilliant periods of any civilization, whether in ancient or in modern times.

Nor were the sons of Islam the only ones to share in the great literary movement of that time. The true Mæcenas does not know racial or even religious boundaries. His favor extends to all genius, wherever it may appear. The Caliphs and their ministers were all such noble friends of letters. So it came to pass that among the Syrians, Jacobites and Nestorians, the ninth century marked a revival of scientific and

¹ These pages have been suggested by the completion of Prof. Rubens Duval's edition of Bar-Bahlûl's Lexicon. In a future number of *THE BULLETIN* will appear a review of that epoch-making publication. It is hardly necessary to say that we are indebted to it for most of our knowledge of Bar-Bahlûl's work.

historical studies. This is especially true of the Nestorians, who were more numerous than the adepts of the rival sect in the capital of the Caliphs. The movement originated with the famous school of medicine founded by George Bokht-Jesu at the request of Sultan al-Mansoor. Syrians had, long before, earned for themselves the reputation of excellence in medicine, and Bokht-Jesu, who was then the leading physician in the school of Gondesapor, could not fail to attract the attention of such a munificent patron of science and letters as Al-Mansoor. It would appear that Bokht-Jesu transferred his whole school to Baghdad, for while the latter began at once to flourish in a marvelous way, we hear no more of Gondesapor. Those somewhat familiar with Oriental lore need not be told that physicians were then, what every physician in the East is supposed to be—a *hakim*—that is, something but little short of a living encyclopedia, embracing grammar, natural sciences, astronomy, philosophy, history, geography—in fact, everything that comes within the range of the human mind. In all those different branches Nestorian physicians distinguished themselves, and it seems that almost every distinguished Nestorian, layman or cleric, was somewhat of a physician. At this time the Syrians acted as instructors of the Arabs, who received, through their teaching, that Greek learning which, in their turn, the Arabs were to transmit to us.

At the same time, however, they were witnessing the decline of their own language, which was being gradually superseded by the tongue of their conquerors and pupils, at least in the ordinary intercourse of life. Moreover, a flood of translations, more particularly from the Greek, had brought into scientific literature, both Arabic and Syriac, a multitude of technical terms with scarcely any change from their primitive garb. Dictionaries unknown so far, because uncalled for, became soon a necessity. Their appearance in the Syriac literature is characteristic of the tenth century. Otherwise it was a century of marked decadence for the tongue of St. Ephrem and Mar-Abha. The Arabic asserted itself more and more, even as a literary language, much to the detriment of Syriac. Writers in the old idiom of the Eastern Fathers became gradually more insignificant and farther apart, until, after

a last and brilliant manifestation of life in Ebed-Jesu (+1218) for the Nestorians, and Bar-Hebraeus (+1286) for the Jacobites, Syriac literature came to an end, not long after the fall of the Abbassidian Califate (1258), which had, at first, so powerfully contributed to its revival and then to its evolution, or rather to its survival in an Arabic dress.

In this tragic wreck of Syriac literature lies the key to the obscurity which enshrouds the life and works of most of its last representatives. Their names and a list—probably much curtailed—of their writings, quasi-miraculously preserved in the so-called “Catalogue” of Ebed-Jesu, is all we now possess of most of them. That is particularly the case with the lexicographers of the ninth and tenth centuries, with whom we are principally concerned in this monograph. A partial exception, however, is to be made for Bar-Bahlûl, whose work, happily, embraces the efforts of all his predecessors.

Bar-Bahlûl, or, as his full name reads in Arabic, Abu'l-Hassan ibn al-Bahlûl, was born of Nestorian parents, in the province Tirhan, in the village of Awânâ, not far from Tekrit, a city on the Tigris, famous in the Crusades as the birthplace of the great Saladin. We do not know exactly when Bar-Bahlûl was born nor when he died. His date is, however, approximately fixed by his rôle in the election (963) of the Catholicos Ebed-Jesu I. Nor do we know more about his life, except that he came to Baghdad, where he, very likely, did settle as a teacher in its famous school. The only work attributed to him by Ebed-Jesu is his lexicon. This is rather surprising, for Oriental writers, as a rule, are very prolific; but Ebed-Jesu lived three centuries later than Bar-Bahlûl and probably wrote his “Catalogue” a quarter of a century at least after the devastating invasion of the Mongols. At all events the lexicon is a monument, the glory of which even Ebed-Jesu or a Bar-Hebraeus might justly envy.

Bar-Bahlûl either gave no title to his work or, if he did, which is quite probable, the title has not reached us. The heading we read in the different codices is evidently from the pen of the copyists. This defect, however, is to some extent remedied by the preface, or rather prefaces, for Bar-Bahlûl wrote two of them, one in Syriac and one in Arabic, both of

them much too short, indeed, for our curiosity, and remarkable for their unassuming tone. The Syriac preface begins as follows :

"This condensed lexicon has been arranged by a miserable man, a mere school boy, as well as he possibly could in his weakness, by Hassan Bar-Bahlūl, from the many existing lexicons, and from the works of a few commentators of scientific repute, for the instruction of his children and friends, and of any one who may happen to lay his hands on that book."

Bar-Bahlūl then proceeds to say that he arranged the book according to the alphabetical order¹ of the radicals, excepting a few words, the radicals of which were rarely used in their nude shape. Then he names briefly his sources: Rabban Honain, who is his authority whenever he does not name another; Gregory of Nyssa, Bar-Dashandād, Zacharias of Merw, Shamli, the physician, who quotes Honain; John Bar-Serapion, the physician; Daniel of Beth-Garmai, bishop of Tahal; Henanisho Bar Seroshwāi, bishop of Hirta, who perfected the work of Honain, the physician; also a few other commentators and interpreters. Besides the compiler inserted, here and there, his own gleanings, according to his own judgment. Finally:

"Honain in the preface to his lexicon said: 'I have given such as I found them the locutions which are not entirely barbarous, even when they were rare and obscure, adding only a word to show my diffidence, i. e., *lam* in Syriac, and *za'ama* in Arabic.' These words I have copied in the same way, and I have dealt in like manner with similar expressions that I found."

In his Arabic preface Bar-Bahlūl says that at first he intended to give a collection of definitions that everybody would agree to pronounce paramount. He wanted also to separate the ecclesiastical words from the medical terms, and these again from the logical ones. He wanted also to give separate lists for the Hebrew, Syriac, Arabic, Greek, Nabathæan and other words. He soon perceived, however, that this plan would reduce his work to almost nothing. For most of the questions agitated between scholars referred to words of doubtful and obscure meaning or but little used. He conse-

¹Oriental lexicons are generally by order of subject-matter, being divided into books and chapters.

quently resorted to the plan of collecting all the contradictory information he could find about the various words, and giving it, when possible, with the name of their originator or upholder, leaving for the reader to weigh in each case the evidence pro and con. Thus he might decide for himself what was to be retained as genuine, and what was to be rejected as spurious. Moreover, the former plan was likely to frustrate the scope of the author, which was to render the use of his work as easy as possible. For that very reason he had adopted the alphabetical order stated in the Syriac preface. To divide the words into as many classes as, by the origin, they represented languages, would have interrupted this order all the more fatally for the fact that the reader, ignorant of the origin of the word in the Syriac form, would not know in which section of the work he should seek it. Finally, Bar-Bahlûl anticipates an objection on the part of the reader, namely, that the work contains so many words useless to him. "Know ye," says he, "that what is useless to you is useful to some one else." Besides, Bar-Bahlûl is fully conscious of having fallen short of this aim, for "Failing is common to all children of men."

A few remarks on Bar-Bahlûl's sources will help the reader to realize more fully the importance of a work so modestly prefaced by its author. We follow the order of the Syriac preface.

St. Gregory of Nyssa (died after 394) is the author of several exegetical works (Migne xliv-xlv), some of which, his *'Απολογητικὸς πέρι τῆς ἔξαημέρου*, were certainly translated into Syriac, as we see from Bar-Alî, another famous lexicographer, contemporary and rival of Bar-Bahlûl. Although Bar-Bahlûl borrowed quite a few glosses from St. Gregory of Nyssa, it seems strange to find this Father mentioned in the preface when we miss from it the name of St. Gregory Nazianzen, to whom the Nestorian lexicographer refers so much more frequently.

Rabban Honain (+ 873 A. D.), or Abû Zaid Honain ibn-Ishâg al 'Ibâdi of Hirtâ, was a famous physician of Baghdad. He had composed a lexicon, a grammar, a treatise on the equivocal words (*De aequilitteris*), a chronicle; had more-

over translated from the Greek, with which he was quite familiar, a large number of medical works, such as Dioscorides, Hippocrates, Galenus, Paul Aegyneta, and revised the translations previously made by Sergius of Reshaina (+ 536). With the assistance of his son and his nephew, Honain translated also the whole cycle of the Peripatetic philosophers.

Abraham Bar-Dashandâd, i. e., the Lame, belonged to the Nestorian school of Bashoosh, in the province of Marga, where he distinguished himself as a teacher. He was the author of different works on asceticism, polemics, etc., none of which, however, have been discovered as yet. He lived in the eighth century.

Zacharias, or Jesu, of Merw, was a lexicographer of the end of the ninth century, who had attempted to complete the lexicon of Honain. It appears that his glosses were arbitrarily classified and conflicted with those of Honain, which was the occasion of a third lexicon, the one of Bar-Ali, who was a physician and had studied under Honain.

Of Shamli we know nothing further than that he was a Nestorian physician, who seems to have written some work *ad mentem* Honain, and also translated some treatises of Aristotle and Galenus.

Bar-Serapion (ninth and tenth centuries), son of a physician, and a physician himself, is the author of two important medical works.

Daniel, Bishop of Tahal, also called Bar-Tubanitha, is not known except as a writer against Isaac of Nineveh. His appearance in Bar-Bahlûl's preface is rather surprising, as we do not find him quoted once in the whole lexicon.

Last, but not least, in the preface comes Henan-Jesu Bar-Saroshwâï, bishop of Hirta, in the tenth century. Unfortunately we know nothing of his life. Of his works Ebed-Jesu names only his questions on Scripture. But from Bahlûl we see that he had composed a lexicon in which he had perfected Honain's work. Besides, as we shall see in the course of this paper, the bishop of Hirta seems to have devoted much of his energy to the study of philosophy and logic.

These names, however, do not exhaust the original material worked by Bar-Bahlûl into his vast compilation. In the

columns of the lexicon we find an extraordinary number of other authorities, modestly alluded to in the Syria proemium as "other interpreters and commentators." Some had been consulted just for one obscure question on which their authority was paramount. Thus Abu-l Hassan Ali, who became patriarch of Antioch. Bar-Bahlûl had written to him to have his opinion on the word διαλαγμα. Others, on the contrary, occupy quite a prominent place in the work of Bar-Bahlûl. Thus Gabriel, son of Bocht-jesu, a famous physician of Baghdad, under the Calipps Haroun-al-Rashid, Amin and Mâmûn, had written an Arabic compendium of the works of Diocorides, Galenus, and Paulus Ægyneta. Bar-Bahlûl quotes him repeatedly for botanical and medical terms mostly borrowed from the Greek. As the Arabic script depends often on mere points for the distinction of several letters (t, th, b, n, and i, for instance), and, as amanuenses were very apt to overlook these points, either through carelessness or for fear of misplacing them, it happened unfortunately that when the names were transliterated into Syriac, where the same letters are widely different from one another in shape, a number of misspellings took place. This gave rise to many monstrosities, every one of which, much to our distress, found its way into the lexicon of the conscientious Bar-Bahlûl, either as a head-word, or, in the body of the article, as a synonym. Unfortunately, to this first and original defect, others, both of the same and of a different order, were added in the course of time. Why it so happened will appear more clearly from a brief account of the few known manuscripts of that precious work.

Until quite recently the three largest and choicest collections of Syriac manuscripts in Europe, viz., the Vatican Library at Rome, the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris, and the British Museum at London, had not a single copy of Bar-Bahlûl's work. The first copy that came to Europe, the one of Erpenius (+1624), now in Cambridge, England, is dated A. D. 1601. It was made from an exemplar in the Maronite monastery of St. Anthony of Quzayeh, on Mount Lebanon. The same exemplar had furnished another copy, dated 1597. It was sent to Golius from Mount Lebanon in 1650. After his death it became the property of Marshal, who bequeathed it to

the Bodleian Library. A copy of the same origin is preserved in the famous Medicean Library in Florence; it was made at Rome, in 1606, by the well-known Gabriel Sionita. Professor Duval suspects that it was made from the codex of Erpenius. Like the exemplar from which they originated, those three manuscripts are in the Carshooni script; that is, the Arabic text is written in Syriac letters. Lord Huntington obtained another copy dated 1645; it is now the property of the Bodleian Library. This fourth manuscript betrays the same origin as the preceding ones, and might be another copy from the exemplar in Quzayeh. It is true that the Arabic text appears there in Arabic letters, but there is ample evidence of its having been transliterated from the Carshooni writing. The four manuscripts therefore form one group, which may be called the Maronite group. The Maronites, however, received their first exemplar from a Jacobite source, as appears from many interpolations which are characteristic of the sect of that name.

The second group we shall call the Jacobite group proper. Its oldest representatives are the last two volumes of a copy of the Lexicon in the possession of the Borgian Museum at Rome. That copy was made up of four volumes that once belonged to two different sets, made up themselves of odd volumes. Just now we are concerned with Vols. III and IV only, dated 1214 and 1508 respectively. They were part of an original set of three volumes. By a curious chance the first volume of that set was discovered in the latter part of the nineteenth century by the late Prof. A. Socin and is now in the keeping of the German Oriental Society, in Halle. From various colophons we know that the first two volumes, one of which was dated 1214, were copied in Tur-Abdin by a Jacobite, and that those two same volumes, together with Vol. IV of the Borgian Museum, formed a set which became the property of a Nestorian priest of Diarkekirk in 1594 and was copied in 1606 1612 by a Jacobite priest named Abraham, from Qâlûq. The same Professor Socin found another copy dated 1796. It is in Carshooni and was written in a Jacobite monastery near Mardin, district of Tur-Abdin. It belongs also to the German

Oriental Society. Finally, the National Library of Paris has recently acquired a copy made in 1886; it comes also from Tur-Abdin. It is hardly necessary to remark that this second group is akin to the Maronite group. But the older manuscripts represent also an earlier stage and are free of numerous posterior insertions.

A third group, unfortunately the most poorly represented, is the Nestorian group. Of this we have Vols. I and II of the copy in the Borgian Museum. They belonged once to two different sets of four volumes each. The first volume may be as old as the thirteenth or fourteenth century; the second looks a trifle more recent; however a Latin note of uncertain origin on the cover ascribes it exactly to the year 1233-1234. Another Nestorian manuscript was brought to Europe by Professor Sachau, and belongs now to the Royal Library of Berlin. It contains old fragments of the seventeenth or possibly eighteenth century, and new ones dating from 1883. The latter are full of mistakes.

We shall dispense with the description of a fourth group, entirely made up of modern manuscripts now in the British Museum, or in the Royal Library of Berlin. They are all strongly interpolated with glosses taken from the Lexicon of Bar-Ali and are consequently out of the question.

Altogether this is certainly a poor representation, especially for a work of the Lexicon's nature, and, at first sight, it might prejudice us against the value of Bar-Bahlūl's work. But this suspicion soon vanishes when we think of the sad condition of literary affairs that has prevailed in the East since the capture of Baghdad by Hulagu. The fact that copies of Bar-Bahlūl's compilation were already in the hands of the Jacobites of the region of Tur-Abdin, as early as 1214, shows that it was appreciated even outside of his own communion, and there is little doubt that if the political condition of Western Asia had been better, the Lexicon would have had a much greater diffusion. Who can tell how many copies of that precious work lie charred and shrivelled, if not converted into ashes and dust, under the ruins of the convents of Babylonia and Mesopotamia? For blood and fire, not arts or sciences, followed in the Mongols' trail. When their savage hordes finally disappeared the sur-

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viving monks were few and far between, like the ears of corn left by the harvesters. They had other cares than the preservation of the rare and obscure expressions of a language that was no more, or the rescue from the ruins of their libraries, of the lexicographical relics of Greek philosophers or physicians.¹

If we now dip into the columns of Bar-Bahlûl's work we shall not find anything like the Dictionary of the French Academy. Bar-Bahlûl told us himself that if he had left out all the words for which he could not give a clear and indisputable explanation his work would have been reduced to a small compass. Besides, a simple glance at the book will show us that it has suffered much at the hands of copyists. From Bar-Bahlûl's preface we know that he had often been puzzled by misspellings of copyists in the documents from which he compiled his work. This was inevitable, as we have seen above, in the case of Arabic translations from the Greek, like those of Gabriel, son of Bocht-Jesu. How much more frequent such misspellings must have been under less experienced copyists, every one can easily imagine. This accounts for many enigmatic readings which often defy all plausible solutions. Moreover, new glosses, sometimes entirely new articles, were placed by erudite readers in the margin in order to perfect the lexicon; for where is the man who ever found in a dictionary all he would like to see there? Sometimes those glosses were, or may have been, gleanings from the sources already used by Bar-Bahlûl; more frequently, however, they were borrowed from sources of another origin—not unfrequently of another age. It was quite natural, for instance, for a Jacobite to quote from the books of his sect, since he wished to adapt the lexicon to the use of his own people; and we must not be surprised to find the writings of Bar-Hebræus represented in that process of evolution, although he lived three

¹ Hulagu, the destroyer of the Caliphate, was not at first as cruel to Christians as to Mohammedans. But Timur, whose armies covered the very same ground at the close of the fourteenth century, was himself a fanatic of Islam. The Syriac chronicles have preserved for us the memory of the atrocities he committed in the various Christian centers, principally in the provinces of Tur-Abdin and Diarbekir. The same horrors besides had already been more than once perpetrated by the savage Kurds, and they have been quite often repeated since, even in our own day, and with impunity, although some powers pretend to maintain a perfect order in the world.

hundred years later than Bar-Bahlûl. All those additions were crowded into the margin, as the space permitted, and without much order; then the exemplar, thus completed, was recopied, all the marginal glosses crept into the columns, as well as they possibly could, to allow space for future emendations and additions. Every time the book was copied a new edition was issued, considerably enlarged, and of course, considerably corrupted. We can follow this process of expansion in three manuscripts of the same group, viz., the two manuscripts of the German Oriental Society and the one of the National Library of Paris. The oldest one, dated 1214, wants many glosses to be found in the one dated 1796, which in its turn wants quite a number of the readings of the Parisian Codex (1886).

Undoubtedly it would be interesting to have Bar-Bahlûl's work, such as he gave it out. But this we could hardly expect. It is in the nature of a lexicon to be thus interpolated, and, after all, better by addition, as in this case, than by reduction. Glosses are interesting independently from the person who collected them, and over-enthusiastic admirers of Bar-Bahlûl, instead of uselessly protesting against posterior additions, would do better to face about and claim the merit of the whole *corpus* for their hero, for he really was the one to form the first crystal around which the others clustered; or, to use a more Oriental comparison, it is to his credit that belongs the first honeycomb that attracted the bees.

Let us, therefore, overlook details and examine the substance of the work as it appears now. We shall be surprised at the variety and thoroughness of information it contains. We find ourselves in presence not of a mere lexicon, as Bar-Bahlûl modestly calls it, but of a real encyclopædia, reflecting, in all its aspects, the state of Oriental thought at the time of the Caliphs of Bagdad. Astronomy, natural sciences, medicine, philosophy proper, grammar, history, geography, biography, biblical exegesis—everything is there, not always as systematically arranged as we would like, with sufficient clearness, however, to satisfy the mind of the truth-seeker. A number of words to which no special interest attaches are either entirely overlooked or dis-

missed with a brief explanation, sometimes a mere Arabic translation. For others, on the contrary, a whole column or more will be allowed. Strangely enough theology proper is almost entirely excluded. Under the heading JESUS we find nothing except that it is the name of the Saviour. Under CHRIST we are simply informed that the Greeks had two words for anointed, one for any kind of anointing and another, *χριστός*, which applies to the anointing of humanity with divinity. The word GOD, however, is treated quite at length, although in two different articles. The first article is brief. It begins with the Arabic translation of that word and its derivates divinity, divine, divinely, deify, atheist. Then come two definitions: "He who judges everything in his seeing knowledge," and "Lord of the world." Finally the remark that the heathens called Hermes, "the god whose name is Gain" (*κερδῶν*). Two manuscripts, however, have the following addition:

"Gregory of Nyssa: 'He who sees all.' The Blessed Interpreter-Universal, (Theodore of Mopsuestia): 'Lord and Creator,' also, 'he who judges all in his seeing knowledge.' Jesuah of Arzon: 'The judge.' Barsaumah of Tahal: 'The cause of all.'

We give the second article in full:

"According to Bar-Saroshwaï: The Eternal Being, the Spirit Living and Reasonable, the Creator of all. He is defined Eternal, because he is not subject to time and has no beginning, and stands above, and is exalted beyond, all times and imaginable ages; Spirit, because he is properly so: For God is spirit. Other beings are called spirits, but improperly; Living, because he is the true life and in him live and move all who have motion and life; Reasonable, because he gives wisdom to the wise, understanding to those who know; Creator, because there is no other creator like him. Otherwise, he is also defined as follows: The Eternal Nature, not circumscribed by space, or: the cause of all, or: he who suffices for all blessings. Those expressions are used of God, but not by way of complete definitions,—for the divine nature is above the thought and concepts of creatures,—but solely for the instruction of the reasonable beings, who without them cannot rise to his essence."

Then follows that curious gloss:

"The word God comes from the Hebrew. It is interpreted stream, meaning the stream of goodness that flows around all beings."

The article **ANGEL** may be quoted also in connection with the one on God :

“**ANGEL**.—According to Bar Saroshwāi: messenger. Again, according to the same: an angel is a body simple, reasonable, made and without organs. We define him: a body, to distinguish him from God; simple, because he does not come from carnal intercourse; reasonable, to distinguish him from the elements; made, without organs, to distinguish him from the soul which is perfected by the organs of the body for its operation. For a single note is added to the soul, namely, that it is united to a body, through which its operation is perfected. Angel is also defined: a living being, reasonable, made, acting without organs. Again: an angel is a finite spirit, reasonable and not united with anything. Angels are divided into nine orders.” . . . Follow the names of the nine orders, then. . . . “Those names, however, do not indicate the *ousias* but the operation only, for there is no *natural* name for non-corporeal beings.”

It seems as though Bar-Bahlūl had purposely eliminated all explanations that might cause friction between the different religious bodies. Under **NESTORIUS**, for instance, he simply states that it is a name of person, meaning *faster* (Bar-Sauma). But in that case it is rather surprising to see the *ecclesiastical words* mentioned first in the preface! Or is it rather that the lexicon has reached us mainly through Jacobite revisers, whose interest it was to cancel what to them was blasphemy?

By way of compensation, students interested in philosophy will find ample material for investigation in the numerous quotations from the same Bar-Saroshwāi, from whom Bar-Bahlūl seems to have borrowed, almost exclusively, his information on philosophical topics. We hope to gratify the curiosity of our readers in giving here in extenso a few specimens of that classico-oriental philosophy. With the exception of the definitions proper, which are always given both in Syriac and Arabic, the text from which we translate is exclusively in Syriac. We begin with the general article on philosophy.

“Philosophy, according to Bar-Saroshwāi, is the mother of all arts, the first and greatest (of all). It is divided into three kinds: the science of beings as they are, the foundation of rationality and the imitation of Divinity. It is the mother of all sciences; and philosophers are the parents of all doctrines.

“Philosophy, according to Bar-Saroshwaï, is the science of all beings, in what they are essentially. It is defined the science of all beings, because each art has one matter (object) and one termination (end); like medicine, whose object are the human bodies and whose end is their soundness, or like astronomy, whose object (*βλη*) are the stars, whose end are their motions and their action. And thus for all arts, each of them having but one object and one end. Philosophy, on the contrary, is not restricted to oneness in either. Its object is all being: each and every being, whether perceptible by the intelligence, or by the senses. Thus also its end is not one, for it is the science of all beings. I add ‘as they are.’ Because knowledge of things varies according to people. Some know the nature, the power, and the action of a thing; others know its power only, and are ignorant of its nature. Others, equally ignorant of its nature, know its appearance only. If, for instance, one knows what the human body is made of, and what is the nature of everyone of its humors, and what are its functions, knowing everything that belongs to it, that man verily knows the body. However, we say the same of a man who has studied but one of its functions, or even of a man who knows nothing but its external appearance. Because, therefore, the knowledge of things is not the same in all (who belong to the ordinary arts), they define Philosophy as knowing beings, as they essentially are, thus asserting that its knowledge is true, (thorough and exhaustive).

“Philosophy is (also defined) the accurate knowledge of divine and human things. ‘Accurate knowledge of things’ amounts to the same, as in the latter part of the first definition. For everything that is, is either knowable and intelligible, or visible and sensible. ‘Divine’ includes all the knowable ousias, ‘human’ all the sensible ousias, which, according to the words of the Spirit to the whole world, we usually express by the words visible and invisible,¹ temporal and external.²

“Philosophy is (also) the practice of death,³ and it is thus defined because man consists of two parts: the body which is visible, and the soul which is knowable, but not visible. And as he is composed of two parts, he, also, has two bonds, one natural and another voluntary. The natural bond is the one by which the body is united to the soul, being subject to it and perfecting it in all its faculties, according to the law of the Creator. The voluntary bond is the one which unites and ties the soul to the body, in all the appetites of the latter. For it is not in virtue of a law of God that the soul is thus submitted to the body, but it is in

¹ Coloss 1, 16.

² II Cor. iv, 18.

³ More accurately in latin: *exercitatio ad mortem.*

virtue of the will and liberty of the soul; and this is the reason why this bond is called voluntary, just as the former bond is called natural, because it rests on nature. And as there is a double binding in man there is also a double dissolution in him, one natural and another voluntary. For all bonds must be loosened. The natural dissolution takes place when the body is separated from the soul, according to the decree of God, and becomes dead, and this, which is called natural death, takes place with all men. The voluntary dissolution is when the soul detaches itself from the body and becomes dead to all its appetites. This breaking off of the soul from the appetites of the body is called voluntary death. This is not for all men, but for the wise only. Thus Philosophy is defined the practice of death; not of the natural death, for the philosophers themselves blame those who destroy and take their own life before the term appointed by God, but of the voluntary death by which men for the sake of the true knowledge destroys all the appetites of the body.

"Again, Philosophy is the secular art of obtaining the knowledge of beings; and it is granted to every one who stands correctly both in speculative and practical life.

"Others define Philosophy: the imitation of divinity, because God has two attributes: knowledge by which He is wise in everything and providence by which He sees to the needs of all beings. Similar is Philosophy; because it has also those two attributes: the knowledge of all beings, and the other by which it provides for all the necessities of such as approach it. This, however, only in so far as men can imitate divinity. For it is evident that men can not be entirely like unto God, either in science or in providence, but only in a typical and obscure way, like the shadow is to the body, and in the measure that creatures can imitate their Creator.

"Philosophy is the art of arts, the science of sciences. We define it the art of arts, because it is the mother and teacher of all sciences and arts. They all borrow from her like as many streams from one spring. Medicine receives from it the four elements, the cold, the warm, the moist and the dry, of which the body is made. Geometers receive from it the point and the line, the plane and all sorts of triangles, quadrangles and hexagons. Astronomers receive from it the course of the stars and their actions. The physician, undoubtedly occupies himself with the four elements and their proprieties, but to explain the nature and origin of each of them, if asked, does not belong to him but to the philosopher, because the latter, not the former, discovered them. Thus again, the astronomer occupies himself with the celestial sphere and the stars, but he does not know the nature of the sun, nor of the moon, nor of each individual star, for the philosopher is the only one who knows that, hav-

ing given it to the astronomer. And the intellectual arts are not the only ones that receive their foundation from Philosophy, but also the technical arts. The architect received from it the canon of proportions and the scale of dimensions; the carpenter, the line, square and compass. Therefore, because Philosophy is the inventor of all arts, it is called the art of arts and the science of sciences, in order to assert its excellence and superiority over all arts.

“There are two parts in Philosophy: theory and practice. Theory is divided into three sections: the science of divine things, the science of natural things and the science of doctrines. The science of divine things treats of all spiritual natures and, in the measure of possibility, of God. The science of natural things treats of all natures that fall under the senses. The science of doctrines treats of all the various arts. Practice is also divided into three sections. Common, particular and individual morals. Common morals teaches how a man must deal with the whole nation, particular, how he must deal with his family, and individual, how he must deal with himself, namely, according to good principles.”

For the following articles I beg leave to use the Latin idiom as so much fitter to express philosophic concepts.

“*Esse*, juxta Bar-Saroshwāi dividitur in duas species: *esse* aliquis et *esse* in aliquo. Quod attinet ad id quod est alicuius, ex eo est numeratio, ut divitiae et opes, et ex eo est persona ut sapientia, pulchritudo, et sanitas, et omnia quae quis possidet tum in corpore cum in anima; quod vero attinet ad hoc quod est in aliquo, dividitur in undecim species: tanquam in tempore, tanquam in loco, tanquam in vase, tanquam in partibus in natura, tanquam non in partibus, tanquam species (*εἶδος*) in genere (*γένος*), tanquam genus in specie, tanquam species (*εἶδος*) in materie (*ὕλη*), tanquam rectio in regenti, tanquam in integritate, tanquam accidens in substantia (*ὑδαία*).

“*ITHOUTHĀ* (essential) juxta Bar-Saroshwāi est vox in qua omnes naturae includuntur. *Ithouthā*: Vox indicativa subsistentiae quae in scholis intelligitur [oriri] ex quacumque adhaesione (relatione?) causaliter et unione generica (genitiva?) et acceptione accidentaliter. *Ithouthā* est nomen indicativum naturae; significacione communi, est quod cadit singulariter in indivisibilitate particulari.

In another gloss, the origin of which is not given, we read:

“*Ithouthā*, est *Ousia*. Hoc enim nomen *Ithouthā* derivatur ab *esse* quia (indicat quod) est . . . Si quis dicit, non determinans, qualemcumque harum vocum (scilicet: *ousiam*, *naturam*, *existentiam*, et *personam*) multa et innumerabilia quasi dicit. Si, verbi gratia, dicit *ousiam* et tacet, *omnia*

includit in hac voce, quia quidquid est vocatur ousia. Iterum, ousia, natura et existentia dicuntur tum communiter cum singulariter, persona vero communiter dici nequit, sed singulariter tantummodo."

This will suffice to give an idea of a system of philosophy which, if properly studied, may prove most useful to understand the theological discussions which form one-half of the Syriac literature.

Bar-Bahlûl's work is particularly rich in botanical, zoological and medical glosses, but those are entirely too special to be illustrated except by a specialist in these different lines. Not to dismiss, however, that section too briefly, we shall give an interesting variation of a zoological theme which occupies a prominent place in the ancient writers, namely, the enmity of the deer for snakes, as an explanation for the then proverbial thirst of that inoffensive animal. Under DEER, we read :

"We are told by the interpreters that the deer is the enemy of the snake. Wherever it finds it it rushes on it and kills it. If, however, the serpent crawls into a hole or a crevice of the earth, the deer runs to a spring of water, fills his mouth with water, and coming back pours that water into the hole or crevice where the serpent took refuge. As soon as that water, impregnated with the breath of the deer, reaches the snake, the latter, unable to stand it, comes out forthwith, then the deer catches it and kills it. If the deer finds no water in the neighborhood, he sends forth a loud and mournful cry because he cannot seize his enemy."

We find a trace of this strange theme in the Bible (Ps. xli, 2): *Quemadmodum desiderat cervus ad fontes aquarum, etc.* In Christian symbolism the deer is frequently used as a type of the catechumen longing for the regenerating water of Baptism ; also of the full-fledged Christian yearning for the Blood and Body of our Lord.

HENRY HYVERNAT.

BOOK REVIEWS.

Roman Public Life, by A. H. J. Greenidge. New York: Macmillan, 1901. 8°, pp xx + 482.

A Constitutional and Political History of Rome, from the Earliest Times to the Reign of Domitian, by T. M. Taylor. London: Methuen and Co., 1899. Pp. 507.

A History of Rome, for High Schools and Academies, by George Willis Botsford. New York: Macmillan, 1901. 8°, pp. xiv + 396.

1. The object of this work is to trace the growth of the Roman constitution, and to explain its workings during the two phases of its maturity, the developed Republic and the Principate. It touches "on all the important aspects of public life—central, municipal, and provincial—and exhibits the political genius of the Roman in connection with all the chief problems he had attempted to solve." A preliminary chapter describes the growth of the Roman City—patricians, plebeians, clients; the family; the citizens (populus, tribes, army, curiae), the monarchical constitution and the Servian constitution. Then follow two chapters on the growth of the republican constitution, the classes of the population and the constitutional theory of the state thus organized. Chapter IV deals with the idea and details of the magistracy, Chapter V with the people and its powers. In Chapter VI the senate, and in Chapter VII, the international relations of Rome and the incorporation of Italy are described. Chapter VIII deals with the organization and government of the provinces, and Chapter IX with the revolution and transition to the Principate.

Chapters X and XI are devoted to the Principate or Empire. The former treats of the power of the princeps, his titles, insignia, and honors, the creation, transmission, and abrogation of the office, the remaining powers in the Roman state—magistracy, comitia, senate, the dual control of senate and princeps, the nobility (senatorial and equestrian), the functionaries of the princeps. In this chapter are exhibited the organization of Italy under the Empire, and the organization of the provinces as well as the cultus of the emperor. An excellent select bibliography of six pages, under suitable rubrics, enhances the utility of this rarely valuable manual that must at once take rank among the best descriptions of the wonderful government of the Roman City. Though written with constant reference to the original authorities and frequent citations of the texts, the learned apparatus does not overcrowd

the pages, while it satisfies at once and whets the appetite of the genuine student for a more thorough acquaintance with the government and laws of ancient Rome.

2. It is quite the same field that is covered by the manual of Mr. Taylor. It has been prepared to give students of Roman history a short account of the growth of the Roman constitution and the problems with which it is surrounded. The doctrine is that of Mommsen, with aid drawn from Pelham, Herzog, Willems and Professor Seeley's introduction to the first book of Livy. The foot-notes are reduced to a minimum. In general, this exposé of the constitutional life of Rome is clear, succinct and graphic. It can be recommended not only to beginners, but to students considerably advanced, as a reliable modern account of the most perfect state that antiquity knew or could imagine.

3. Professor Botsford aims in this manual "to present briefly the growth of Rome, the expansion and organization of the power, the development and decline of the imperial system, and the transformation of the ancient pagan empire of the Romans into the mediaeval Christian empire of the Germans." The aim of the author is to bring out the merits of the Romans, especially in the imperial period, as organizers, administrators and builders of a great state—a task more congenial to them than war itself. Numerous maps and illustrations, all very pertinent and well done, adorn the manual. It has at the end of each chapter a brief conspectus of the original sources and the best modern works that deal with the period or topic in question. A good bibliography, a skeleton outline of the constitution of Rome, a chronology, a series of suggestive topics and an outline (pp. 335-351) of the private life of the Romans, add to the utility of the work for both teachers and students.

In general, it is one of the most serviceable manuals of Roman history, compact, accurate and sufficiently full. A Catholic historian, however, finds some defects in the otherwise temperate treatment of the relations between Christianity and the Roman state. Thus (p. 262) the author seems to think that St. Peter was not at Rome. The treatment of the persecutions (pp. 263-265) lays more stress than is just on the anti-social character of the first Christians and less than is just on the hideous falsehood and immorality of the usual Roman polytheism. It is not true (p. 281) that the Christian communities were originally independent of one another, and that their hierarchy was patterned after that of the Roman state. There are writers who maintain the same, but the oldest and most continuous form of Christianity protests against that view of its origin. A Catholic writer would be a little more favorable to Constantine (p. 282) and a little less favorable to Julian, perhaps without straining the documents. On the same page Jesus Christ is pre-

sented as having "left no system of doctrine," which is against Matthew xxviii, 20, and the testimony of the oldest historical witness on the earth—the Catholic Church. On p. 322 it is implied that the English Church became subject to the Roman Church through the failure of the Irish Church to retain its control in the seventh century. A "Romfreie" Irish Church is a myth, and the Venerable Bede furnishes all the documents needed for the original subordination of English Christianity to the Roman Church. On p. 331 the Gallican and Bismarckian thesis of a Catholic Church subordinate to the state of Charlemagne is maintained, though the falsity of this assumption has been again and again demonstrated.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

Source-Book of the History of Education for the Greek and Roman Period. Paul Monroe. New York: Macmillan, 1901. Pp. viii + 515.

In this volume Professor Monroe renders an important service to teachers and to all who are interested in educational problems. It is not a history of education, but it furnishes the best sort of an introduction to that history by presenting in an orderly arrangement the more important literary sources from which our knowledge of Greek and Roman education is derived.

The book is divided into two parts, and each part contains seven chapters. The first and somewhat longer part deals with Greek education; the second, with Roman education. The same general plan is followed in every chapter. There is a brief survey exhibiting the characteristics of educational ideas and practice during a given period, the sources and such special features as deserve attention. This sketch serves as a setting for the essential content of the chapter, the selections from the sources. The translations are taken from the Jowett editions and from the Bohn Library editions. A few explanatory foot-notes and references are given, but there is no attempt at a commentary nor discussion as to the meaning and bearing of the selected passages. The classic writers are allowed to speak for themselves, and the student is free to put his own interpretation upon the text.

The value of this Source-Book as a means of information can be readily understood. But to appreciate it fully one must read the selections themselves. It is instructive to follow, in the Republic of Plato or the Politics of Aristotle, the discussion of problems which still call for solution from our modern systems of education. And it is pleasant to recognize, in their quaint trappings of allusion and illustration, the very arguments that are nowadays arrayed on opposite sides of many questions concerning which educators disagree.

EDWARD A. PACE.

Select Documents of Constitutional English History, edited by Professor George Burton Adams and H. Morse Stephens. Macmillan, New York, 1901, 8° pp. 555.

Professors Adams and Stephens have worthily followed the excellent example set by Stubbs and Gardiner, and in this volume have made available for students the great documents that give us the key to English Constitutional History. It begins with some typical records from the reign of William the Conqueror, the earliest being of date previous to 1060, and concludes with the Reform Act of 1884. The book will be gratefully welcomed by all who appreciate the value and the importance of training students to scholarly methods in the study of history. These compilations of historical sources are characteristic of the appreciation of scholarship that marks the present-day teacher of history. Accuracy and thoroughness are the alpha and omega of scholarship, and such books as these are designed to develop these traits in the college student. The time is not so long past when the average college student felt that to be a historian was to reel off glittering sentences and be brilliantly philosophic. To-day he is being made to realize that truth and not rhetoric is the one test of history, and that works may pass for great literature, in the usual acceptation of the term, and be very poor history, whilst a volume to which the critic denies the character of literature may be an epoch-making work in history. The art of expression, literary form, brilliant presentation—these are not to be minimized, but are, of course, to be sought after in historical as in every other form of writing. But the mining of facts is the first and the greatest duty of history. Too much importance cannot be ascribed to keeping the student constantly in touch with the very basis of history. The collection and publication of these sources of history is evidence of the appreciation of this fact by our best and more enlightened teachers of history. Through these books the sources themselves are placed before the students; they are led to the clear and unpolluted fountain heads of history and bidden to drink from them. The great scholar, the master of a period or an age, can alone interpret for us the movements of that period or that age, and make us grasp their importance and significance in the procession of history; but it still seems that the key to his explanatory volume lies in the original documents of the time. It may not be too much to say that a week given to the study of the text of a great epoch-making document in English history is worth more to the student than a month given to the study of the most brilliant commentators without ever having read the documentary sources. The model system of teaching history is, of course, the use of these source books as supplements to be used steadily in conjunction with text-

books or lecture courses. But they must be recognized as indispensable supplements; or, perhaps, better called complements. No student can be considered as having enjoyed a thorough course in English history who has not been introduced to some of the source-books that the labors of scholars have made available. This volume of Professors Adams and Stephens is, for collegiate work, the best yet published, and it is likely to remain the standard one for a long time to come. Its two hundred and seventy-six selections are well chosen, and illustrate most thoroughly the growth of the English Constitution from the Norman Conquest to the last quarter of the Victorian era. The documents of the earlier periods are given in translations from original Latin or French, and the compilation is thus made suitable to the use of undergraduate students who are without the training to enable them to make ready use of the originals. The book is one that ought to be in the hands of every class that undertakes the study of English Constitutional History.

CHARLES P. NEILL.

La Littérature Syriaque, Rubens Duval. Paris: Lecoffre, 1900, pp. xvi + 444.

This is a book of general interest,¹ that answers a long-felt want. We are not surprised to see a second edition, bearing the same date as the original issue. This time the well-known professor of the "Collège de France" has placed under obligations, not, as by his former publications,² a few hard-to-please and not over-grateful specialists, but the whole large and generous body of scholars interested in the ancient Christian literatures of the Orient.

The fact that we had already a sketch of Syriac literature by such a master as the late Prof. William Wright³ does not detract from the novelty, much less from the usefulness, of Professor Duval's book. The latter's work is not only more fully developed; it is executed on a much more practical plan. Professor Wright, whether of his own initiative, or in compliance with the regulations of the editors of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, followed throughout the chronological order, with the result that the reader who wants information, not on a particular period, but,

¹This volume is the second of the *Anciennes Littératures Chrétiniennes* of the excellent *Bibliothèque de l'Enseignement de l'Histoire Ecclésiastique* (Paris, Lecoffre.)

²We are glad to give here some of the most important publications of Professor Duval—"Traité de Grammaire Syriaque," Paris, 1882.—"Histoire d'Edesse," Paris, 1892.—"Lexicon Syriacum, Auctore Hassano Bar-Bahlul," Paris, 1886-1901.

³A Short History of Syriac Literature, by the late William Wright, London, 1894. Professor Wright's sketch appeared first in the XXII Vol. of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, under the heading, "Syriac Literature." It was republished after the author's death in a separate volume.

as is generally the case, on a special branch of Syriac literature, is left to seek it for himself, as best he may throughout the lengthy study.

Professor Duval has understood the defect of this method. Realizing, nevertheless, that a chronological presentation was not devoid of usefulness for some readers, he would not exclude it entirely. So he gives us, in his volume, a twofold exposition of the Syriac literature, *viz.*, in the first part a systematic and quite developed one; in the second, a chronological, and much condensed, *conspicteus*.

The first part—*La littérature Syriaque et ses différents genres*—is divided into seventeen chapters, *viz.*: I-II. Introductory. Characteristics of Syriac Literature, Poetry. III-VIII. Biblical productions. III. Ancient Versions of the Old and New Testament; Peshitto of the Old Testament; Diatessaron of Tatian, Peshitto of the New Testament, Curetonian and Sinaitic Versions. IV. Syro-Palestinian lectionaries. V. Later Versions of the Old and New Testament: Philoxenian, Syro-Hexaplar, Heraclean. VI. Syrian Massorah. VII. Commentaries on the Bible. VIII. Apocrypha. IX. Acts of Martyrs and Lives of the Saints. X. Apologetic Writings. XI. Law, both Ecclesiastical and Civil. XIII. Historiography. XIII. Asceticism. XIV. Philosophy. XV. Sciences: Medicine; Natural Sciences; Astronomy; Cosmography, and Geography; Chemistry; Mathematics. XVI. Grammar; Lexicography; Rhetoric; Poetics. XVII. Syriac Versions from the Greek, either of theological or profane works.

The second part—*Notices sur les Ecrivains Syriaques*—is divided into three parts: I. From the beginning to the Fifth Century: St. Ephrem and his School. II. Fifth and Sixth Centuries, the Golden Age of Syriac literature; 1. Orthodox writers: Isaac of Antioch, Rabbla, etc.; 2. Nestorians: Ibās, Mari, Barsauma, Schools of Narses of Nisibis, Hannana of Adiabene, Mar Abba I., etc.; 3. Monophysites: James of Sarug, Philoxenus of Mabbogh, Simeon of Beith-Arsham, James Baradaeus, John of Asia, Sergius of Reshaïna, etc.

The work is rounded out by three useful appendixes: I. A brief bibliographical Index, that enumerates the most important sources for the study of Syriac literature. II. An alphabetical Index of authors and anonymous works. III. A list of additions to the first edition. The prefaces to both editions and a geographical map of Western Asia complete the work.

As far as it goes Professor Duval's work is nearly perfect. We may even go further and say we found it much better than we expected; not that we have the slightest doubt as to Professor Duval being one of the best qualified men to write it, but on account of our lack of information, from other points of view, concerning the vast territory over which Syriac

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literature flourished, for well nigh a thousand years. Are not Geography and History the two torches in the light of which the expounder of ancient literatures must proceed? And what does the average student know of the history and geography of Western Asia, if he be not a specialist in that line? Professor Duval seems to have understood this difficulty; here and there he imparts a little historical information, much to the satisfaction of his reader. This, however, seems hardly enough. In our opinion, the author will do well, in the next edition, to devote an introductory chapter to the general geography and history of the home of Syriac literature; and it goes without saying that the little map, for which we are exceedingly grateful, small and rudimentary as it is, will have to be enlarged and perfected. Otherwise, we have but few and unimportant remarks to make. We may say, however, that we would have liked to find the Index of authors more complete. We fail to understand why Professor Duval has excluded all non-Syrian authors. As long as he saw fit to mention all through his work the translations from the Greek Fathers (in which he most assuredly was right), it seems to us that their names should have been found in the Index, so as to make the information about them easily accessible to the reader.

From the detailed list of chapters we have given, everybody will see that two very important ones have been left entirely untouched—the chapter on Liturgy and the chapter on Theology. This, however, is not an oversight of the author. Professor Duval is a layman, and he is right in thinking that these two chapters ought to be treated by one professionally qualified for that purpose.

HENRY HYVERNAT.

Les Origines de la Renaissance, Louis Courajod. Paris: Picard, 1901. 8° pp. 687.

Renaissance Types, William Samuel Lilly. New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1901. 8° pp. 400.

L'Eglise et les Origines de la Renaissance, Jean Guiraud. Paris: Lecoffre, 1902. 8° pp. 339.

The Classical Heritage of the Middle Ages, Henry Osborn Taylor. New York: The Columbia University Press (Macmillan), 1901. 8° pp. 400.

The Triumph of the Cross, by Fra Girolamo Savonarola, translated from the Italian, edited with introduction by the V. R. Fr. John Procter, O. P. London: Sands and Co., 1901. 8° pp. xxxi + 213 (B. Herder, St. Louis).

1. Nowhere is the history of Renaissance art more seriously cultivated than in France. The names of Eugène Müntz, Léopold de Lisle, Léon de Laborde, Viollet le Duc and others, recall monumental and epoch-making

ing labors. In the volume before us we have an attempt to reproduce the famous lessons of one of the masters in this province of history—the teaching of Léon Courajod at the Ecole du Louvre from 1887 to 1896, more particularly from 1886 to 1890. The great thesis of M. Courajod is the original and independent origin of the Renaissance art of France, or rather the unbroken traditions down to the middle of the fifteenth century of the national Gothic art as carried on by the art-centers of Northern France, where numerous Flemish and Burgundian artists cherished the high mediæval traditions of the orderly, beautiful and noble that had reached their acme among a Christian people and in a Christian spirit during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. M. Courajod worked on the most modern and satisfactory lines. Original art specimens, or in their absence plaster casts and photographs, were his habitual texts. The screen was frequently in demand for projections; his teaching aroused an extraordinary enthusiasm. Deceased at an untimely age, the notes of his lectures are now presented in three volumes, covering the history of the origins of mediæval, Renaissance, and modern art. The volume before us is so suggestive, so replete with ideas, observations, indications, mostly new, often very original, that only a personal reading of it can satisfy a lover of the history of art. It will long remain a kind of "thesaurus" for the beginning of that period of transition between the world of mediæval faith and modern skepsis which is nowhere so visible as in the domain of ecclesiastical architecture and art. M. Courajod has made good use of the history of commerce—the great Italian artists, Leonardo, Michael Angelo, the Della Robbia, Cellini, Andrea del Sarto, appear in France as only the last of a long procession. Not they introduced the Renaissance of Italy to French art,—that was first done by the nameless traders and peddlers, the equally humble nameless wandering "artisti" who cross the Alps regularly from the end of the fourteenth century. France was always rich, generous and art-loving. So Padua and Venice sold their pretty bronzes in France, and other Italian cities sent thither their ivories and intarsia work. Italian miniaturists and goldsmiths worked steadily for France during the fifteenth century. The Lombard money-changers knew well the value of rare jewels, coins, medals, enamelled chalices and plate. Civil and ecclesiastical luxury sent its products to one who was now the Great King of Europe, whether he was Charles VII, or Charles VIII or Louis XI. The market grew daily more open and tempting. The French demand for new designs in furniture, for the decoration of the knight's saddle, the pommel of his sword, for crosses and coffins and fonts, for a hundred other uses of life among a rich and tasteful people, kept alive and active a multitude of Italian cinquecento artists. In the

same measure the work of the Flemish and Burgundian artists, conservative, sincerely Gothic in temper and taste, failed to command the purses of the wealthy and the powerful—the “mode d’Ytalie” grew apace. And when the house of Anjou yielded to the fascination of the South, when the great châteaux of Plessis-les-Tours, of Blois and Amboise, became centers for the Italian influences, especially in decoration and ornamentation, when the d’Estouteville and the d’Amboise cardinals gave way to unmeasured fondness for the art of Italy and turned over their castles and cathedrals to it, the old and glorious and purely Christian domestic art of mediæval France was doomed to a long eclipse. The sure and deadly poison of pagan art was at last in the veins of the sprightliest and most susceptible of the Christian nations.

2. Catholicism has not at its service many pens more brilliant, honest, and erudite than that of Mr. Lilly. He is a philosophic historian, a kind of “paysagiste,” who loves to map out an epoch, to seize on its strong dominant characters, to limn boldly its peculiar shadings of temper and ideals, the currents and movements that shaped it, and the “lointain” into which it fades away. The latest German book melts, in his hands, into a paragraph of exquisite beauty, and the latest French book gives up, through him, its animus and real value. He is a Catholic apologist—but a *sui generis* one, a lineal descendant of the great tribe of learned reviewers who have left to English literature a wealth of historico-critical appreciations that have gone far towards forming the modern mind. Within the framing of a prologue and an epilogue he offers us five grandiose portraits of the century that opens with the Invention of Printing and closes with the Confession of Augsburg. In these medallions that he entitles Michael Angelo, the Artist; Erasmus, the Man of Letters; Reuchlin, the Savant; Luther, the Revolutionist; More, the Saint, he presents, with rare skill and truth, the outlines of the period that saw the ruin of ecclesiastical unity, and as he confesses himself, the equally complete ruin of political liberty (pp. 391-392). It is impossible to review in detail, within the short space at our command, a work that, like this, is itself the “fine fleur” of a multitude of profound studies and the last of a long series of conflicting judgments on that tangled period “dont Dieu seul a le sens,” according to the happy formula of M. Nisard (*Renaissance et Réforme*, I, 44). Mr. Lilly is, intellectually, a frank and sturdy Englishman—the debased German monachism of the Reformation, and the Italian immorality and infidelity of the time, come in for a severe and merited flagellation. But the antique Catholic soul of Michael Angelo and the spirit of enlightened mediæval sanctity that flamed in the breast of Thomas More are placed before us in pages that shine like crystal. What a puissant engine of judgment is this English

tongue when it is handled by a master! Mr. Lilly dedicates his book to Lord Acton, whom he styles "the greatest living master of historical scholarship." Of himself it may be said that no living writer of English possesses in a higher degree the gift of historical imagination and the witchery of an historical style not yet surpassed by any of its English masters. When he says (p. 36) under the rubric of "The Dogma of Impartiality" that he will "endeavor to set aside altogether theological tests," he does well to state that such a complete *ἀταραξία* is impossible among men. Even Saint Thomas Aquinas, formally the coldest of writers, could not always maintain this rock-like imperturbability of feeling. And so it is rather interesting to see how the "theological tests" affect the judgments of Mr. Lilly concerning Michael Angelo. "It is abundantly clear," he says, "from the works of Condivi and Vasari that the great doctrines of the Catholic faith entered into Michael Angelo's life as simply, naturally, and unquestioned as the common truths of physical nature or the most elementary principles of civil society" (p. 99.) Unless, indeed, by "theological tests" Mr. Lilly means the opinions of the schools, fine and remote metaphysical questions—but then the words are misleading, for theology means primarily the Catholic faith. Meaner and falser senses have been given to that noble word, but by anti-Catholic partisans or by the enemies of Christianity.

3. The volume of M. Jean Guiraud is the fifth in the Library of Church History of the Maison Lecoffre at Paris. It deals with the relations of the Roman Church and Humanism in the first half of the fifteenth century. The earlier chapters are a welcome vulgarization of a series of writings on the origins of the art of the Renaissance that we owe to the pens of Faucon, Müntz, Courajod, Frothingham, and others, not to speak of the classic Crowe and Cavalcaselle. The magnificence of Boniface VIII and his family finds a rival magnificence in the Avignon popes, the *moles miranda* of whose castle offers for a century a vast workshop to all the great artists of France, and to some from Italy. Their churches, tombs, villas, libraries nourish all the elements of the full Renaissance. And if they nearly went down in the flood of Paganism that it let loose, it was because their powerful line, had so long cherished the studies and ideals of a new and lovely intellectual world that its essential insufficiency and its probable aberrations were too easily overlooked by them in the abounding consciousness of the Christian unity of Europe and their own share in forming and preserving the Christian mediæval culture. The pages devoted to Petrarch (59-75) bring out very well the manifold indebtedness of the great poet to the popes of Avignon, the new un-Christian love of glory that was beginning to turn the heads of scholars, and the yet genuinely Christian attitude of

learned men. If the Avignon popes loved splendor in architecture it was yet the Gothic architecture that they furthered. And if they cherished too fondly the site on which their fate had cast them, they did not utterly forget the principal churches of Rome. The discoveries of the fifteenth century are largely the outcome of a spirit nourished by the foreign missions to Asia and Africa sedulously kept up by these popes. The increasing love of books throughout Europe had for one of its chief sources the papal library of Avignon and the bookshops that flourished there as nowhere else in Europe. Men of letters were welcomed to their service, and of Urban V it is said that he had founded one thousand scholarships for poor students in different universities of Europe.¹

The bulk of the volume is devoted to the embellishments and improvements of the City of Rome that are owing to Martin V., Eugene IV., and Nicholas V. It is the most pleasant chapter of the Renaissance period, the innocent prelude to the tragic dénouement that M. Guiraud foreshadows and denounces in his concluding chapter, entitled "Christianity and Paganism about 1450."

4. Though this work does not belong directly to the literature of the Renaissance, it does belong to it indirectly. For it treats of the transmission to the mediæval world of the ancient classical culture. How much was handed down? By what channels? With what loss or modification of the Christian spirit and temper? From the fourth to the seventh centuries of the Christian era one world went out of existence and another rose to life. The intellectual life of Greece and Rome was eclipsed by the thoughts, ideas, and aims of Christianity. But such events do not happen without far-reaching consequences. In a remoter period the destruction of the Greek state had a far-reaching influence on the future of its victorious rival, the City of Rome. So the reign of intellectual paganism could not pass away without leaving on the new Christian society many a trace of its long career, could not pass away with equal fulness at all points, or with equal rapidity. It never entirely passed away—its literature, monuments, social and political institutions and ideals, have always been a power, more or less in evidence, within the ancient limits of the Roman State. In ten chapters Mr. Taylor undertakes to make up the debit and the credit of this long and complicated bankruptcy of classicism. They are entitled—the passing of the antique man, the phases of pagan decadence, the antique culture, pagan elements Christianized in transmission, ideals

¹ Baluze, "Vitæ paparum Avenionensium," I, 395. "Viros litteratos valde dilexit multosque ex ipsis promovit et exaltavit; et ut diret ceteris addiscendi materiam et opportunitatem, quamdiu vixit in papatu, suis expensis tenuit mille studentes in diversi studiis; ex quibus cum aliqui jam proiecti erant aut alias deficiebant, illorum loco alios continuo subrogavit. Libros necessarios tam eis quam aliis pluribus quos scivit studio esse intentos ipsisque indigere, etiam ministravit."

of knowledge, beauty and love, abandonment of pagan principles in a Christian system of life, Christian prose, Christian poetry, Christian art. The work is provided with a valuable appendix of bibliographical notes that suggest the choicest modern literature on the subjects treated. It argues extensive reading and in general a fair and correct judgment. In this province the standpoint of the author frequently affects his criticism, while neither his learning nor his honesty may be doubted. One does not need to share all of Mr. Taylor's views and opinions before saying that the book is suggestive from cover to cover. The (ninth) chapter on Christian poetry is, perhaps, the most surely and deeply felt of all. Yet the whole book is worthy of attentive perusal, and of assimilation, since it touches on a great many culture-problems and questions that the last century was busily employed in formulating, discussing and (tentatively at least) answering.

5. Savonarola was a sworn enemy of the pagan Renaissance. Its "Medici" and "Arrabiati" compassed the prophet's death amid circumstances so tragic that they will challenge forever the attention of mankind. Yet it was as an orator, as a living pleading voice, a Christian and Catholic Greatheart, that he worked out his calling—the piazza, the street, the pulpit of Santa Maria del Fiore, the garden of San Marco, were his coigns of vantage. The real charm and puissance of oratory are, by its very nature, immediate and evanescent. Demosthenes, Cicero, Peter the Hermit, won their real triumphs in the overwhelming but perishable convictions that they transfused into the hearts of their hearers. So it was with Fra Girolamo—his power lay in the burning faith and the wondrous skill that made him the born master of every Nello and Pippo and Cecco in the City of the Lilies. He left few books. Among them the "Triumphus Crucis," published originally in 1497, in Latin and Italian, has been always looked on as his religious testament, his real Credo, and the touchstone of his most intimate convictions concerning God, Christ, the Church, her history and future. It was a *vade-mecum* of Saint Philip Neri. Often reprinted in the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the first complete edition in both original texts is that of Padre Ferretti (Siena, 1899). Fr. Procter edits for us an English translation of this publication that is owing "to an anonymous but graceful as well as faithful pen," thereby presenting to us Savonarola in his own words and not in the distorted dress that he too often wears. Fr. Procter justly excoriates an English translation of the "Triumph of the Cross," published at London (1868), in which the specifically Catholic character of the great preacher's writings is wiped out, and without any warning, by omissions and mistranslations—a most reprehensible proceeding, quite akin to certain editions of the "Imitation" for non-Catholic readers.

No literary or social history of the Renaissance can afford to ignore the four little books into which this work is divided. It is an "Apology for Christianity," almost the only written and printed one at a time when the current of paganism was rising perilously close to the "holy of holies." The argument is brief but vivid and forceful, nourished on Saint Thomas and the history of the church, yet very modern and applicable—a series of theses and conclusions illuminated by pithy reasons and constantly calling to their aid that "testimony of mankind" which from Tertullian to Pascal the apologists of Catholicism have always invoked. No one can read this book and maintain that Savonarola was a "harbinger of Martin Luther." At every page he is the "contrepied" of the Reformer of Wittenberg. Nor can anyone read the work and not be struck with the ravages of the pagan Renaissance that could compel the production of such an elementary manual of Christian Apologetics at the end of the fifteenth century, beneath the shadow of the Campanile of Giotto, in the native city of Dante, in a society nursed and educated, enriched and ennobled by Catholicism—its spoiled darling. The book is a timely one, and we recommend its perusal to our clergy and cultured laity. It is not the least of the scholarly contributions to the story of Savonarola that seems so persistently to solicit our busy and materialistic world. The resurrection of certain historical problems is a curious illustration of the truth that nothing is settled among men until it is rightly settled—so powerfully works in humankind the leaven of truth and justice.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

History of England, by F. York Powell and T. F. Tout. Longmans, Green and Co., 1900. Pp. 1115.

Of the making of Histories of England there seems to be no end. Moreover, they are good histories in matter, form and tone. In matter the people, i. e., the schools, are reaping the first fruits of the labors of the earnest and expert investigators who for almost a century have been unearthing the musty records of the past. In form equal improvement—more maps, glossaries of archaic words, copious indexes, logical divisions well marked off by clear marginal and other headings, references to sources, etc. In tone we are glad to note a growing liberality, reasonableness, sympathy for the past—above all, an objective sense of justice in dealing with those delicate religious problems that make the path of an historian of England beset with pitfalls and stones of stumbling. The present history is no exception to the above. It presents some new and good features, particularly the lists of genealogical tables and the

specimens of our language at different periods of its existence. As a whole we would prefer the first part of the book, written by Mr. Powell, because he seems to have threaded his way with more success through the obstacles above mentioned, though in his treatment of the early British Church and of the relations of England and Rome in the days of the Conquest he is sometimes ambiguous. So also his view of England as feudalized before the Conquest, is sure to provoke dissent. The worst piece of work is his unfair account of the Albigensians (p. 141.)

Coming to the second part, we will give Mr. Tout full credit for a sincere desire and generally successful attempt to be fair. Many of his Protestant readers will rise with disappointment from reading his portraits of Elizabeth, Knox, James I, and some others of the Reformers. So also to many of those bred on Fox's Book of Martyrs it will be a perfect revelation to be told (p. 438) what people of culture ought to have known and acknowledged long ago, that "everybody (in the sixteenth century) agreed that to tolerate error was both a sin and a mistake. . . . Henry VIII had burnt Protestants and hung Papists. Edward VI had burnt Anabaptists and shut up Romanists in prison. Calvin was equally intolerant and Charles V equally so." Likewise, many of his Catholic readers may dislike some very distasteful truths regarding the conduct of the Catholic party in its resistance, especially under Elizabeth, James I, and James II—mistakes to which is due, in no small measure, the almost total extinction of English Catholicity. While we think Mr. Tout's general presentation of the policies of Henry VIII and Elizabeth the fairest and most correct we know of so far as popular histories by non-Catholics go, still we cannot unreservedly subscribe to each and every one of his statements. For example, what does Mr. Tout mean, on p. 406, by saying that Henry VIII sought to organize the English Church "without any change in its faith, organization or its worship." Our perplexed mind asks: "What, then, did he seek to do?" Certainly this is pushing the "via media" a little too far. On p. 400 the author avoids the customary blunder of calling an indulgence a permission to commit sin, but adds that in practice they amounted to "little better." This, at least, is highly ambiguous. Moreover, Mr. Tout need not go out of his way to use the words "Romanist," "Popery" (pp. 675, 679, 434.) They are not good form, are contemptuous epithets invented in a past age of religious warfare, and are now generally considered as insulting by all Catholics; hence decidedly bad manners. However, as a whole, the book is an advance upon its predecessors. We recommend it cordially to the mature reading public; with some corrections like those indicated above, it can safely be used in Catholic colleges.

LUCIAN JOHNSTON.

The Venetian Republic: Its Rise, its Growth, and its Fall
(421-1797), by W. Carew Hazlitt. Vol. I (421-1422), pp. xxvii + 814;
Vol. II (1423-1797), pp. xix + 815. London. Large 8°. Adam and
Charles Black. New York: Macmillan, 1900. \$12.00.

From Attila to George Washington, from the Anglo-Saxon Invasion of England to the Emperor Napoleon, what a glorious theme of human history! This is the span of the political life of Venice, and within it fall all the interests, motives, passions, all the progress, decay, and change, all the shame and glory, of European mankind for fifteen centuries. On a handful of sandy islets, salt-encrusted, overgrown with under-brush and dwarf forest, arose from century to century this loveliest dream-city of mankind, that in its very decay fascinates the traveller as no other site of human endeavor. Elsewhere great states have grown from the soil; here men must first create the soil on which they shall grow to greatness. Elsewhere men found in the fertile bosom of Mother Earth the means of subsistence; here the uncertain sea must furnish them a precarious living. Yet Venice grew while Aquileia decayed, and Padua lingered on, and Milan fell beneath many a German lord. Traditions of genuine Roman life were taken over into the lagoons by the noblemen and peasants who fled before the Huns of Attila, and the relations of Church and State once peculiar to the Theodosian house found an unexpected welcome in the amphibious capital of a fisher-community.

It is the grandson of William Hazlitt who presents us in these two thick volumes of over sixteen hundred pages the vicissitudes of the queenly city of the Adriatic—the Venetia Princeps. It is a long story, with many phases. Questions of internal government come first—the foundations of public life; then follow the needs of self-defence, the wars with Dalmatian pirates and Saracens, with Lombards and Franks, the domestic feuds, the rivalries of one fishing village with another, the ambitions of one aristocratic house after another, the dealings with Exarchs and German emperors and jealous lords of Byzantium, the alliance with the papacy against the injustice and aggression of German feudalism; finally the long, and for Venice the profitable, era of the Crusades. Badoers and Sanudi and Orseoli, Falieri and Michieli, Foscari and Morosini and Guistiniani, these makers of Venice in the first thousand years of her life, have never had their equals. In one way or another it was an oligarchy that made the state grow great, and when that oligarchy could no longer make headway against the absolute monarchies of the sixteenth century, the doom of Venice was certain. But it did not fall until it had rounded out a glorious existence—only in the Roman

Forum and beneath the Pyramids is the traveller so oppressed by the weight of history as when he glides along the Canal Grande within the shadow of the Cà d'Oro or the Fondaco de' Tedeschi.

These two volumes, greatly enlarged from the second edition of 1860, are of very unequal worth. By far the most valuable portion is the second half of the second volume that deals with the institutions and customs, the domestic and religious life of Venice, with education, printing, the fine arts, and the like. All these chapters, in spite of occasional flippancy and affectation, form a memorable picture of Venice, and will remain useful when the long political narrative has been told again by some more consummate master of the historian's profession. For it is a pity that this book should have been written without a proper critical introduction. There is no attempt made in the beginning to enumerate and describe the original authorities for the great state's history, if we except a few references in the preface and some pages devoted to the historical literature of Venice, chiefly apropos of the wonderful diaries of Marino Sanudo (1466-1536). The earliest history of Venice is narrated with an absolute confidence in chroniclers who do not date back beyond the year 1000. There is no clear and motivated exposé of the region of the legendary and possible that nearly always forms the first chapter of such ancient histories. The gradual perfection of the historiography of Venice is not brought out, nor is there any sufficient bibliography of the subject, such as is imperatively called for in a voluminous and costly work like this. Had an Edward Freeman or a James Gairdner undertaken this task, its execution would have been otherwise serviceable to future historians. More than once the style suffers from a certain Gibbonesque scurrility that is not offset by the perfect diction of that master of historical narration. Dates are sparingly given, and marginal guides, very useful in a work of such length, are wanting. The footnotes are few enough, and seldom offer the actual text of authorities that are not easily accessible to English readers. Altogether, the work is far from the perfection to which we are now accustomed by the great German and French masters of the historian's calling, and of which some good specimens exist in English. Nevertheless, it is readable and useful—despite some cheap allusions to the "ambitions" of Rome, at a period when it would take a microscope to discover them and a prophet to foresee the greatness of Venice. The misprints abound and accuse a careless proof-reading. The term "Romish," applied to the Church of Rome (II, 402), might be left to Exeter Hall—it is now beneath the dignity of any grave historian. The pages of both volumes are not devoid of general statements to which exception may easily be taken, e. g., on the slave-trade at Venice (I, 81-82). The excellent works of M. Al-

lard and the late Bishop Brownlow sufficiently prove the deep and genuine concern of the Church for the mitigation and final extinction of slavery. However, Mr. Hazlitt more than once tones down his own language, perhaps as the result of better studies in the preparation of a work that has been with him a labor of love for thirty years. All told, there is nothing to equal this work in the English language as a continuous history of the state of Venice—a history that, with the constitutional story of Switzerland and England, might well form a trilogy of historical studies for any reader who wishes to pursue the mediæval vicissitudes of political freedom.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

History of America before Columbus, according to Documents and Approved Authors, by P. De Roo. Vol. I. American Aborigines, Vol. II. European Immigrants. 8° pp. 1 + 613; xxiii + 613, Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and Co., 1900. \$6.00.

The Pre-Columbian Discovery of America by the Northmen, with translations from the Icelandic Sagas (and Rafh's Map of Vinland). B. F. De Costa. Third edition, revised. Albany: Joel Munsell's Sons. 1901. 8°, pp. 230. \$5.00.

1. Of Fr. De Roo's two fine volumes the second is certainly the more scientific, the one more likely to be frequently used by scholars when dealing with the pre-Columbian discoveries of America. In this second volume will be found a history of the island and church of Greenland. Fr. De Roo has embodied therein the best results of the older documentary collections of Northern Europe, and the later investigations made on their authority. Some will still think that Fr. De Roo is too confident in his maintenance of the genuinity of the papal letters of Gregory IV for the archiepiscopate of Hamburg (883). The discovery and conversion of Greenland, its political, economical, social and religious institutions, its relations with America, its ecclesiastical government, its episcopal succession, its tragic disappearance from the ken of continental Europe, are well told; often the narrative becomes fascinating by the mere novelty and rarity of the facts and testimonials. Most of this material has always been known to the special students of these questions. Fr. De Roo brings a goodly number of documents from the Roman Archives, chiefly the Vatican, concerning the collection in Greenland of Peter's Pence and Crusade obligations in the thirteenth and fourteenth, as well as papal provision for the See of Gardar in the fourteenth and fifteenth, centuries. Unfortunately, while these documents prove the concern of the Roman Church for the remotest settlements of Christen-

dom, they add only here and there a trait to our knowledge of the civil and ecclesiastical situation. Would that we could have in their place the letters sent from Greenland to Rome by the bishops of Gardar, with the details of the religious situation as they must have exposed it to the Holy See! Fr. De Roo collects in the same volume about all that can be said for the thesis that Irish monks discovered America in the eighth and ninth centuries. If later on, in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the Icelanders made their way to the coast of the New World, it was less by the chance of contrary winds than by the information derived from Irish clerics to whom these voyages had been a matter of frequent occurrence.¹ M. Beauvois' belief in this discovery finds an excellent champion in Fr. De Roo. Yet in the present state of the documents and monuments it can hardly be set down as more than possible, perhaps probable. It may be that when the mass of Middle-Irish documents has been worked through, some texts will be found to shed light upon this problem. Fr. De Roo has spent many years upon this work that we may truly call an important one. Its 1,226 pages are indeed "instructive and entertaining," even if one cannot always agree with his conclusions, e. g., the presence of Saint Thomas the Apostle in the New World, or if one is obliged, frequently enough, to demur from his critical method and principles, that do not always bear the hall-mark of academic exactness and severity. For this latter weakness he has been very severely judged in more than one quarter. But it remains true that this work, alone in the English language, presents us a readable and consecutive account, in popular style, yet with much scientific apparatus, of the discussions of a century concerning the relations of the Old World with the New before its discovery by Columbus. Let those interested and capable discuss, chapter by chapter, its contentions; even thus is all truly scientific progress made in the wake of some general and cursory presentation of truth.

2. Dr. De Costa offers us in this third edition of his interesting work the fruits of investigations carried on since 1868 and 1894, the dates of the two previous issues. Readers ignorant of Latin, or unable to reach the text of the papal documents concerning Greenland, will be glad to find several of them in this work. Is it not a little strange that no reference is made to the "Documenta Selecta," etc., by Mr. Heywood (Rome, 1893), or to the fact that ten of the most valuable of these documents are now easily accessible in THE BULLETIN (Oct., 1896, vol. II, pp. 503-514)? It is worth while recording the statement in the preface (pp. 7-8) that

¹ *La Découverte du Nouveau Monde par les Irlandais et les premières Traces du Christianisme en Amérique avant l'an 1000.* Nancy, 1875. Cf. also his numerous articles in the "Muséon" of Louvain.

in 1889 the historian George Bancroft withdrew, in a letter to Dr. De Costa, his objections to the historic character of the voyages recorded in the Sagas, and confessed "that he had long been in error." In the same place the author judiciously says that "in reality we fable, in a great measure, when we speak of our 'Saxon inheritance.' It is rather from the Northmen that we derived vital energy, freedom of thought, and in a measure that we do not yet suspect, our strength of speech. Yet happily the people are becoming conscious of their indebtedness; so that the time is not far distant when the Northmen may be recognized in their true social, political and literary character, and at the same time, as navigators, assume their rightful position in the Pre-Columbian Discovery of America."

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

Ireland, Historic and Picturesque, by Charles Johnston. Illustrated. Philadelphia: Henry Y. Coates and Co., 1901. 8°. Pp. 393.

Ireland and the Empire: A Review 1800-1900. T. W. Russell, M. P. (South Tyrone). New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1901. 8°. Pp. xi + 284.

1. In a sustained poetic monologue Mr. Johnston relates the story of Ireland from the earliest dawn of her history down to modern times. He is an author of the best archaeological and literary work on Ancient Ireland, and has very neatly interwoven its conclusions with his tale. The volume is in every way exquisite—poetical text, choice illustrations, excellent typography—quite a pretty gift for any lover of Ireland's history.

2. We should like to see these calm and sincere pages in the hands of all who would grasp the real gist of the grievances of Ireland. Mr. Russell is a Unionist and a Protestant; all the more eloquent and convincing are the admissions he everywhere makes of the substantial justice of the claims of Ireland to a more equitable settlement of the great financial, educational, and administrative questions that affect so intimately the daily life, the thought, the development of a race of men and women who have shown themselves pre-eminently fitted by nature to rise to the first rank in the new adjustment of the world and humanity. "O passi graviora!" we may well exclaim as we note in rapid succession the confessions of Mr. Russell. He cannot long stay away from the councils of the real Irish nation. With such views and principles he now stands too close to the sane and experienced men who represent the majority of the Irish people at Westminster. With Mr. Methuen's book on "Peace or War in South Africa," the work of Mr. Russell is a political event of much importance—both express and suggest deep underlying

currents of popular feeling that, in England, eventually sweep away all opposing interests and prejudices. The book deserves an extensive sale and a profound study, for its truthfulness, its sympathy, and the spirit of peace and conciliation that it breathes.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

Spirago's Method of Christian Doctrine. A manual for priests, teachers, and parents. Edited by the Rt. Rev. Dr. Messmer, Bishop of Green Bay. Benziger, New York, 1901. 8° Pp. 589.

This truly welcome and much-needed volume is divided into six chapters. The first treats of Christian doctrine in general, rehearses the church legislation on the subject, and analyzes the nature and dignity of the catechetical office as well as the qualities indispensable to the catechist. It is an interesting, orderly, and practical presentation.

The second chapter is concerned with the selection and arrangement of the various subject-matters according to the different classes of children to be taught or the various grades into which they are divided. The treatment is pedagogical throughout, and the detailed arrangements presented will serve to guide the catechist in making out a consistent program for the exposition of Church History, Bible History, and Liturgy. In the third chapter the qualities, forms and stages of instruction, as also the best aids to results, are duly portrayed. Excellent examples are furnished of the method of forming definitions and arguments. The catechist who masters the suggestions of this third chapter will have acquired the true art of effective teaching.

The fourth chapter deals with the pedagogical value and use of religious pictures, wall-maps, and blackboard drawings or illustrations, the qualities which a serviceable catechism should possess; the selection of suitable books for a library, and the best methods of familiarizing children with their contents. Philosophers may deal in abstractions, says Macaulay, but the majority of men want pictures. The child-mind retains the picture and the story with much more ease and interest than a colorless definition, and teachers of the young would do well to bear ever in mind the lesson of this fourth chapter. The truths of religion should be made attractive.

The educational value and qualities of prayers and sacred hymns, together with the distinct advantages to be derived from proper instruction in the sacrifice of the mass and in the sacraments, form the topics well treated in the fifth chapter. The last chapter is devoted to an historical sketch of Christian doctrine in the Messianic days, the early Christian Church, the Middle Ages, modern times, and nineteenth century. An

appendix on the catechist's library and a good topical index for purposes of reference complete a treatment that is worthy of the best commendation.

We welcome this manual, not only for its solid and useful contents, but also for its departure from the beaten path, as exemplified in the endeavor of its author to apply to religious instruction the principles of modern pedagogics. The Bishop of Green Bay, its editor, has made it especially serviceable to the needs of English-speaking people, and is to be congratulated for having thus added the qualities that make for success—among which is certainly that of suitability to American needs. To priests, seminarians, catechists, and parents, this contribution to the pedagogics of Christian doctrine must be truly welcome, not to say necessary. It will enable them to break the bread of doctrine in a manner most creditable to themselves and most advantageous to the spiritual well-being of their appointed charges. We wish it permanent and universal success.

EDMUND T. SHANAHAN.

Meditations on the Life, the Teaching, and the Passion of Jesus Christ, by Rev. A. M. Ilg, O. S. F. C. Edited by Rev. R. F. Clarke, S. J. 2 vols. 8° Pp. 561, 510. New York: Benziger, 1901.

These volumes, as the editor informs us in the preface, were principally compiled from an old book of meditations by a Capuchin monk published in the year 1712 under the title "A Mirror of the Virtues Displayed in the Life and Passion of Our Lord Jesus Christ." Father Ilg it was who first compiled therefrom a series of meditations for every day of the ecclesiastical year, suited for the use of priests and religious. But his work was not merely that of a compiler adhering slavishly to the original; he completely remodelled and recast the book, introducing many new features and apt quotations from ascetical writers. Father Clarke has ably presented in an English dress the work of his predecessors and added two convenient indexes—one suitable for retreats, the other detailing in alphabetical order the special topics to which one might have need or occasion to refer. These indexes greatly enhance the value of these two volumes.

After an introduction to mental prayer in general and to the use of these volumes in particular, follow the meditations. These are all eminently practical and generally divided into three well-defined considerations. The tone is intimate and personal, and the reflections are made easy and familiar. The word of Holy Writ abounds and a mosaic of Scripture texts helps the pious reader to live over in his own mind the many scenes and incidents of the Lord's blessed life. It is in

this wise, proceeding day by day, that the pious soul is enabled to reach a fuller and still fuller appreciation of Him who was the way, the truth, and the life. Were it only for the knowledge of Scripture and of holy maxims that these two volumes were read, the intellectual profit would be considerable. But in addition to this is the spiritual benefit which is sure to be derived from daily absorption of the significance which Christ's life has for the meditative and the "pure-minded" soul.

The index to meditations suitable for retreats is especially well prepared and the topics are so chosen as to fill the mind with noble and pious thoughts and the will with holy resolves rather than to give an "esquisse" of theological doctrines or to distract the mind with the usual pious stories. To know Jesus Christ and Him crucified is the sole purpose of these volumes.

St. Thomas says somewhere that the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity are given us as dispositions for action, while the function or office of the gifts of the Holy Ghost is to maintain us in a constant attitude of receptivity towards the Giver of these Good gifts. We may say of these volumes that a devout perusal will, to borrow the words of the author, prove useful and profitable to all who desire to lead a virtuous life and follow the Lord. We bespeak for them the attention which they deserve.

EDMUND T. SHANAHAN.

God and the Soul. A poem. By John Lancaster Spalding, Bishop of Peoria, author of "Education and the Higher Life," "Songs from the German," etc. The Grafton Press, New York, 1901. Pp. 256.

The Feast of Thalarchus. Condé Benoist Pallen. Boston: Small Maynard and Co., 1901. Pp. 73.

Words and Their Ways in English Speech. By James Bradstreet Greenough, Professor of Latin in Harvard University, and George Lyman Kittridge, Professor of English in Harvard University. New York: Macmillan, 1901. Pp. 396.

Poems and Inscriptions. Richard Watson Gilder. New York: The Century Co., 1901.

1. Bishop Spalding's new book of poems is worth the most serious consideration from all readers who have aspirations beyond the things of earth. That there are defects in the technical arrangement of the verse every student of metre will easily perceive. They are faults, however, so easily amended, that one only feels the slight irritation when there is dust on an opal—the fire is there, though for the moment slightly obscured. In "Deepening Shadows" there are two instances of carelessness as to the music which indicate where the only fault of the poet lies. In the second quatrain he writes:

"But as we onward move we surely find
 That only soul of youth this deep trust lends,
 For loss of which nothing can make amends;
 And we walk on leaving sweet joy behind."

Apart from defects in musical expression, "God and the Soul" is the noblest book devoted to the poetry of philosophy yet printed in our country. The essential thoughts of the past, the present, and the future are presented with intellectual force and a masterful clearness and power of synthesis. "The Thing Itself" is only one of the noble poems in the volume that deserve quotation. It begins:

"The mystery of faith is what repels,
 But is not mystery the bottom fact
 Of science, too, which in authentic act
 Confesses that it on the surface dwells?"

That Bishop Spalding has the lyrical quality is shown by the exquisite "Silence."

"Inaudible move day and night,
 And noiseless grows the flower;
 Silent and pulsing wings of light,
 And voiceless fleets the hour.

"The moon utters no word when she
 Walks through the heavens bare;
 The stars forever silent flee
 And songless gleams the air."

The fashionable technical poet cannot, to quote Sir Thomas More, see the wood for the trees. He loses the strength of his thought in his eagerness for details. This cannot be said of Bishop Spalding. We are in the shadow of a great, strong forest, where God and nature are august, majestic—a forest where the spirit speaks through Northern firs and pines whose forms we do not mark in listening to the resonant voices.

2. Dr. Pallen's "Feast of Thalarchus" clearly shows the influence of Dryden and Newman. And could a poet have a finer pedigree? It is a good thing in these days to read one who recognizes the splendor of the last of the Elizabethans and the purity and height of him who wrote the "Dream of Gerontius," and who, having the courage to accept both, adds deep-pondered truths to theirs in pictorial words. Dr. Pallen aims high, and you will fly with him; you know that you are with a master of the best modes of thought; but not for a moment does he touch your heart. His poem soars, as in the prayer of Simeon, in the

intervals of the chorus of demons who are fighting for the soul of Thalarchus. It glows with verbal color—sometimes a little fervid. Its verse is melodiously pleasant. It has not one moment of that higher ecstasy which comes every now and then in the compositions of Francis Thompson or the careless lines of Father Sheehan. It is correct, academic; but nowhere is the spiritualized passion of Dr. Pallen's earlier sonnets. The swing of Thais' song—

“Swifter than fire
It is love's desire,”

is musical and spontaneous, and the rhythmical phrasing of all the lyrics would be delightful, if it were not for the obviousness and carelessness of the rhymes. For instance—

“Lord of the vine,
Lord of the wine,
We are thine, we are thine,
We run and we dance,
We leap and we prance.”

This is so like the chorus of the usual comic opera libretto that it surprises all the more because the opening :

“Io! Bacche! Io!
Twi-mothered god,
With ivy-wreathed rod!
Io! Bacche! Io!”

gives promise of something better. The last speech of Thalarchus makes a fine close to this highly thoughtful, strongly dramatic poem :

“For now I know,
My soul illumined by that kindly beam,
The deep philosophy of poverty,
The wealth of having naught, the precious gain
Of self-surrender, riches infinite,
Out of the nothingness of this base earth
Transmuted in th' alembic of God's love!”

3. This is a popular book, written—and well written—by men of scientific training and methods. Even the chapters on the development of words, of which the authors appear to have some fear, seem not to be too technical for the “practical man who rides in electric cars, talks by telephone and dictates his letters to a stenographer.” The frankness of the first chapter, which might have been filled with philological diagrams, will lead the average reader to feel both gratitude and respect for

gentlemen who confess that their knowledge has some bounds. As an incentive and a stimulus to the study of words in English no better book at present exists. An excellent index makes it easy for the busy inquirer to find at a glance ready answers to questions as to the history of words which arise almost daily. This kind of "haute vulgarisation" of English philology ought to be encouraged.

4. Mr. Gilder's technique is so sure and so fine, that the lightest mood is exactly expressed and it produces the effect intended with artistic accuracy. In accordance with the progress of the art of poetical expression, Mr. Gilder gives himself more freedom than formerly. The unconventionality and simplicity of "Many the Names" is an example of his advancement from merely traditional forms:

"Many the names, the souls, the faces dear
That I have longed to frame in verse sincere ;
But one high name, sweet soul, and face of love
Seemed ever my poor art, oh far above.
Like Mary's, stricken with sorrow was that face ;
Like hers, it wore a most majestic grace."

"A Sacred Comedy in Florence" breaks, with a smile, the deep seriousness of the book. Mr. Gilder, in "Poems and Inscriptions" adds beauties and melody to the beauty and melody that have put him among the first four of our American poets. Grace, distinction, dignity, and aspiration to voice only the best, are his—and the best that can be said of this little volume is that it does not detract from his reputation.

MAURICE FRANCIS EGAN.

Sainte Thérèse (1515-1582) Henri Joly (Les Saints). Paris: Lecoffre, 1902; pp. 233 (2d ed.).

The Way of Perfection, by Saint Theresa. Edited by H. R. Waller, London: 1901. J. M. Dent and Co. (The Cloister Library). New York: Macmillan. 8°, pp. 231.

1. M. Joly has again placed us under obligations to his brilliant and facile pen, this time for an admirable life of Saint Theresa. Her reform of the religious life in Spain, her own growth in the supernatural life, her foundation of new Carmelite convents, her government of the Carmelite nuns, her wonderful writings that even yet affect profoundly every intelligent reader, her friends and opponents, her confessors and spiritual guides—all these phases of her extraordinary career are narrated, with succinctness indeed, but in a most fascinating way. The principal

materials at his command are the masterpiece of her "Life" that henceforth ranks with the "Confessions" of St. Augustine as a guide to the world of the human soul, and her correspondence (ed. Paris. 3 v. 8°. 1900). Of the many stories of her work M. Joly has selected as the best the Carmelite histories of the Spaniard P. Francis de Sancta Maria (French tr. 5 v. 4°, Abbaye de Lérins, 1896), the "Memoir" of the Paris Carmelites on the foundation, government and religious spirit of the order (2 v. 8°, Reims, 1894), the "Life" by P. Ribera (2 v. 8°, Paris: Lecoffre) the Bollandist lives of the Saint, the "Espagne Thérésienne" a photographic album of the Carmels of Spain and their souvenirs of the great mystic, and the two volumes of the "Carmelite of Caen," (Paris: Retaux). Naturally, her own works, such as the "Book of Foundations," the "Way of Perfection," the "Castle of the Soul" are the principal sources of information and the best commentary on her life. They are accessible to all in the French translation of P. Bouix (Paris, Lecoffre). M. Joly has been able to consult more than one new or unpublished document. His personal reminiscences of Avila, Salamanca and Albe de Tormés, lend freshness to the book. Perhaps its greatest charm is the psychological nicety and modernity of the pages that M. Joly devotes to the Saint's "growth in holiness." They reveal the woman as intimately as they do the Saint—to the modern mind this personal revelation is henceforth a "sine qua non" of hagiological works.

2. Messrs. Dent of London have enriched their "Cloister Library" with another dainty and attractive volume, the "Way of Perfection" of Saint Theresa. It is the seventeenth-century translation of Abraham Woodhead (4°, 1671-1675) with modernized spelling, correction of misprints, and proofs compared with the version of Rev. John Dalton (1852). Thanks to this enterprise and to translations of other Theresan writings by Mr. David Lewis and Rev. John Dalton, we have now a fairly large list of the Saint's writings in excellent English.

It is rare to find the most divergent minds agreeing on the merits of a spiritual writer. Such is the case with the great Carmelite saint. "I have not met with a single spiritual man who does not become a passionate admirer of Saint Theresa," says the old Spanish Bishop Palafax. "Her sheer power of mind is enough of itself to make her an intensely interesting study to all thinking men. No one can open her books without confessing the spell of her powerful understanding," says the Presbyterian scholar Dr. Alexander Whyte (*Saint Theresa*, 1897). "She is the geographer and hydrographer of the sinful soul. She has drawn the map of its poles, marked the latitudes of contemplation and prayer and laid out all the interior seas and lands of the human heart," says Huysmans in his fantastic work, "En Route." We are grateful to the editor

for the reprint (pp. 229-231) of Crashaw's lovely verses on Saint Theresa, the famous "Flaming Heart" (1548). The staid pages of the BULLETIN are scarcely a repository for poetry of any kind, yet we cannot refrain from reprinting the closing lines of Crashaw, so fresh and spontaneous and genuine is the spiritual note they strike:

"O, thou undaunted daughter of desires !
 By all thy dower of lights and fires,
 By all the eagle in thee, all the dove,
 By all thy lives and deaths of love,
 By thy large draughts of intellectual day,
 And by thy thirsts of love more large than they ;
 By all thy brim-filled bowls of fierce desire,
 By thy last morning's draught of liquid fire,
 By the full kingdom of that final kiss
 That seized thy parting soul and sealed thee His ;
 By all the heaven thou hast in Him,
 Fair sister of the Seraphim !
 By all of Him we have in thee,
 Leave nothing of myself in me,
 Let me so read thy life that I
 Unto all life of mine may die."

These volumes of the "Cloister Library" are among the most neat and tasty specimens of English book-making. If we except the smallness of the type, there is scarcely a fault to find with them.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

Fénelon: His Friends and His Enemies, 1651-1715, E. K. Sanders.
 Longmans, Green and Co. 1901. 8°. Pp. 426.

The very title of this book betrays its general weakness. It is not a life of Fénelon such as we would prefer and which the author is perfectly capable of writing, but rather a series of monographs upon different aspects of Fénelon's character, most of which aspects are precisely those that are of least interest to the modern reader and least beneficial to the reputation of the good archbishop. Moreover, "His Enemies" fill, it would appear, a much larger space than "His Friends," or (relatively speaking) "Fénelon" himself. This accounts largely for the tone of bitterness which runs through the whole book and occasionally mars what is otherwise a most interesting, able, and generally fair study. True! Fénelon's own stormy life is largely responsible for such treatment. He was an unlucky man in a way. Prone to politics, religious as well

as secular, he was possessed of few of those baser but firmer qualities that are so necessary in that rude game. Hence he made enemies by the wholesale, because he was too true to his friends; and his enemies pursued him ceaselessly. So much for the general design and tone of the book. Coming to particulars, we would call attention to an occasional severe judgment upon the character of the priesthood, both in general and in individuals. On page 7 we read that "it was a period of perpetual intrigue and treachery, in which there were no adepts equal to the priests." Now that smacks of amateurishness. The author will probably modify the statement at least so far as not to award the prize of treachery to priests. Also on pages 67, 68, we find some allusions to the methods of the confessional which are likely to produce an effect quite opposite from that intended. Again, the restraint upon speculation and freedom of thought produced by the priesthood (301) is rather exaggerated, as well as the supposed priestly contempt for women in general (311). The assertion on page 207 that it "seems an almost necessary part of the Roman creed" to bow down to papal authority even to the extent of "professing a belief which (he) one did not hold" is so ambiguous as to look very much like a charge of hypocrisy. Lastly, in the name of common sense, what logical connection is there between the supposed shiftiness of Innocent XII. in the matter of Fénelon's condemnation (152) and "the doctrine of papal infallibility?" The young child in a First Communion class knows that the moral character or even the private religious views of a pope do not touch upon his infallible character as head of the Church.

This brings us to a critique of the portraits furnished by the writer. His view of this same Innocent XII. does not seem demonstrated by a perusal of the evidence submitted. Because Fénelon considered the pope shifty is no proof that he was. We want more proof than the opinions of the adherents of a lost cause to warrant us in stigmatizing the judge of the same as guided chiefly by duplicity. Bossuet's character is also rather too harshly painted. The world has known for a long time that the great orator allowed his feelings to run away with his charity in that long and bitter rivalry with Fénelon, but the present book allows more importance, as a motive, to mere, petty jealousy than we would—at least judging from the evidence at hand. The whole book, in fact, is as much a case against Bossuet as it professes to be a life of Fénelon. It might not without injustice be entitled "Fénelon or Bossuet Exposed." Such is not history. The same for Louis XIV., the "watch-dog of the church" and "prop of despotism" (p. 6); the two compliments placed so near together as to suggest the suspicion that they are also very near together in the author's own mind. Other portraits are better drawn.

The Sulpitians, with whom Fénelon was so long united in friendship, come in for well-merited praise. True to the original designs of their illustrious founder, they then as now succeed because they so consistently eschew politics and attend strictly to the business of educating the diocesan clergy. Madame de Maintenon is well drawn, though the author might have exerted himself a little more to understand the very simple moral situation in which Madame de Maintenon found herself placed (p. 68) as the guardian of the royal despot's unroyal progeny. To our view, the best descriptions are those of Madame Guyon (chap. IV, Part I), and the peculiar heresy known as "Quietism," with which her name is individually connected. The reader need hardly be told that certain members of the Society of Jesus come in for no very gentle treatment. With the justice of the handling he can best judge for himself, although we imagine that he will find some difficulty in finding out just how friendly were their relations with Fénelon. All along, even down to the close of his life, Fénelon was on terms of friendly intercourse with many of the Jesuits so prominent in the controversies of the period; still it is not so clear that this intimacy was always unclouded if we can believe the statement on page 175, that they, failing of hope to save the Maxims from condemnation, "suddenly withdrew support and left him to his fate," still less in view of Fénelon's low estimate of Père La Chaise (p. 254).

Of Fénelon himself the book is likely to leave an impression somewhat at variance with the prevailing popular estimate. That estimate is due largely to the sympathy excited by his persecutions. To such it will be a mild shock to learn that he was ambitious, often hot tempered, headstrong, unwary, overconfident, sometimes jealous and not above malice, despite the untarnished purity of his character, and his devotion to his flock. "It would be false to say that Fénelon's character remained unaffected by the evil passions at work within the Church; the spirit of resentment took hold upon him in spite of his protestations to the contrary, and he showed no eagerness to shelter others in storms such as had broken over him." We might add, moreover, that the court's attraction proved even to him as to all others, powerful enough to make exile from it bitter. In truth we confess our inability to thoroughly understand Fénelon. There was in him an indefinable something not very lovable which crops out precisely just at moments when we are about to think best of him. He was, indeed, absolutely upright. But somehow or other there was about him at times a chilliness which rendered his mysticism inconsistent and an ambition which mated ill with his asceticism. He just missed being great or saintly. But withal he loved his flock with the zeal of the true pastor, as is evidenced by his solicitude for the

sick, the dying, the unfortunate of all descriptions among the peasantry of his diocese—a devotion that was generously repaid by the constant affection of all who came in contact with him. He surely must have been attractive, for which we can desire no stronger proof than that given by the writer (p. 237). "After the great decision Fénelon's position was not altered among his friends, and it is hardly an exaggeration to say that they held him sacred, although duty demanded that they should subscribe to the papal sentence. Perhaps in this lies the greatest tribute ever paid to him, distinguishing the man he was by faith and character from the ardent and bitter controversialist whom many judged by Bossuet's slanders and his own defence." It is to be regretted that more space is not given to Fénelon's rôle as a reformer in education as well as a good shepherd of his flock, for it is upon these two great facts that his fame among men must rest. As a literary genius he was a failure in so far as he did not do that which lay in him, but expended his genius in dry religious controversy, and, worse—court politics. But as an educator he can take rank with the great reformers in that line, arguing, as he did, in favor of a more rational, healthy system than that prevailing in the Jesuit schools of the day, and thereby anticipating much that is best in modern training.

Before closing this review there is one chapter to which we would call special attention—chapter II of part II on "Fénelon the Politician." The author, on page 122, says that "historically the Quietism controversy is the central point in the life of Fénelon." Historically yes, but not psychologically. The true secret of Fénelon's failure in the age of Louis XIV. is a political one. Louis knew men, and under the purple of the archbishop, in the mystic dreamer of Quietism, he instinctively recognized something which was out of all harmony with his ideas of the supremacy of kingship. A mere casual reading of *Télémaque* would have revealed this much, even if the king's own instinct had not done so before. Surely it was no pleasant thing for such a monarch to see himself covertly held up to the scorn of his suffering people by that description of the ideal king, who, from love of his people, ruled in a manner opposite to that in which Louis did. And if there were any doubts of the meaning of *Télémaque* they were very decidedly set at rest by the "An Examination for the Conscience of a King," that is, if he ever read it. Too much stress cannot be laid upon this point in Fénelon's make-up and unsuccessful career. It will explain many things left unexplained by his passing connection with Quietism. The latter is too small a peg upon which to hang the failure of such a genius as Fénelon. His democracy might explain it very well.

Of the book as a whole we should be inclined to speak well, despite the defects above noted. It shows thorough scholarship and a firm historical grasp of French court life under Louis XIV. We only regret that the author has not written a real biography, for which this collection of essays proves him capable, and that he has not devoted more space to Fénelon, the educator, the bishop. As we put it down we feel that the great Archbishop of Cambrai has sunk in our estimation. We knew him through Télémaque in our college days; now we know him through the controversies from which it cannot be said that he came forth altogether unsullied. At all events the book will surely prove most interesting in many quarters where Fénelon's "friends and foes" still live, despite the fact that the "Grand Monarque," Bossuet, Madame Guyon, the Jesuit Le Tellier, and Fénelon himself have long ago moved off the stage and handed in the account of their stewardship. All of them, we are sure, would now, if they could, blot out from history the records of the bitter and useless controversies in which they were so ceaselessly concerned. It was an age of intestine warfare in the Church, and few wars are as bitter in their methods or as lasting in their consequences as civil wars. Looking back now at those conflicts over Quietism, Jansenism, and other minor subjects we experience a feeling of uneasiness, above all an abiding regret that differences of opinion in the Church cannot be settled in a manly, open fashion, concerning which it will not be amiss to quote the observation of d'Aguesseau (p. 216): "When a question is still undecided by the Church there can be nothing more dangerous, especially when passions have become heated on the subject of the question, than to permit it to be supported and attacked; the danger is equal on either side. Because, as the Church has not defined the precise limits of such a doctrine, and as there is hardly any truth which is regarded with the same point of view by different understandings, each mixes up his own prejudices, predilections, and interests, so that it often happens that, on one side, one who supports permits too large a limit, and on the other, he who attacks it wishes to confine it within too narrow bounds; and because there is not yet any authority to arrest and unite such temperaments, each one makes up a system according to his fancy and, charging every opinion that differs from his as heresy, disturbs the peace of the Church in attempting to forestall decisions which he ought to await respectfully." In so far as these words are a plea for charity, moderation, good temper, respect for adversaries—in a word, for temperance in debate, we fully subscribe to them. A study of the book before us is well calculated to demonstrate the evil of controversy in general, still more so of a lack of the qualities which should always accompany a difference of opinion.

LUCIAN JOHNSTON.

Special Introduction to the Study of the Old Testament,

Francis E. Gigot, S. S., Professor of Sacred Scripture in St. Mary's Seminary, Baltimore, Md. Part I. The Historical Books. New York: Benziger, 1901. 381 pp.

Father Gigot has followed his General Introduction to Holy Scripture with the first half of a Special Introduction to the Old Testament. As is proper in a work on the historical books, a large part of the volume is devoted to the Hexateuch, or Genesis—Josue, as the author entitles it. The writer first gives a historical sketch of the traditional and critical views on the authorship of these books, and points out the theological aspects of the question. Following this he presents the opposing arguments with fairness and considerable length, and does not hesitate to indicate his own opinions. Each of the six books is then considered individually with reference to literary structure, contents, and historical character. Separate introductions to the remaining historical books, Samuel, Kings, Paralipomenon, Esdras, Nehemias, Tobias, Judith, Esther, and Machabees, complete the volume.

It requires no little courage for a Catholic scholar to undertake a work which involves the more or less magisterial treatment of the thorny and delicate questions belonging to an Introduction to the historical books of the Old Testament. Father Gigot's task called for especial hardihood, for a survey of his work shows that he has advanced, pioneer like, considerably beyond the lines and conclusions of other Catholic works of the same class. The author does not conceal his preference for many of the views of modern biblical criticism. The prevailing critical hypothesis for the composition of the Hexateuch finds favor in his eyes. He quotes approvingly the opinion of Professor Hoberg, the latest Catholic commentator of Genesis, that the Five Books are Mosaic only inasmuch as they are a development of Mosaic legal decisions and religious thought.

In regard to Creation, the reverend professor favors a theory intermediate between the Idealist and Concordist interpretation of the Hexaemeron. The account of the Fall is symbolical, but with a historical basis. The Flood narrative is historical in purpose, but the universality of the cataclysm is a relative one, "commensurate with the limited horizon which bounded the world at the time when the primitive tradition of the Deluge originated." No attempt is made to reconcile such a phenomenon with natural science. The author does not attempt the problem of the biblical chronology, contenting himself, after an exposition of various theories, with the remark that we are not obliged to accept the scriptural numbers as a divine revelation. In regard to the historicity of Tobias, Judith and Esther an attitude of reserve is taken. Perhaps a

greater amount of reserve in the treatment of other delicate questions would be desirable in a seminary text-book. There is in the Introduction a tone of overconfidence in the conclusions of the Graf-Wellhausen school of criticism. Doubtless the predominant system has a great cumulative strength and much to commend it, but some of its cardinal results have been challenged by critical scholars. Not to mention the archæologists, so pronounced a critic as the late Professor Dillmann refused to admit the post-exilic composition of the Priestly Code, and recently Dr. Van Hoonacker of Louvain, in his "Sacerdoce Légitime" has brought forward respectable reasons for believing that some distinctive institutions supposed by the sacerdotal code, if not the code itself, were in existence before the Exile. Father Lagrange, O. P., is of the opinion that we must put back the origin of many religious rites of the Israelites centuries before Moses, who, if he did not write the Law, was the instrument of a divine sanction of these venerable institutions.¹

This reservation made, it must be said that Father Gigot has produced another excellent manual. The style is clear and smooth, and the English—a language not native to the writer—is in general idiomatic. The author seems to have coined a convenient word in "severalfold"; the phraseology would be improved by the omission of "yea," too antique for a modern work, and the "etc." which savor too much of the classroom. Professor Gigot shows a good command of authorities, a broad acquaintance with the literature of his topics. The progressive Catholic exegete of the present day is more catholic in his erudition than his Protestant fellows. He is versed in a field neglected by Protestant biblical scholars, that is, Catholic Scriptural literature, and at the same time is awake to non-Catholic thought and learning in his department. He does not lose sight of the Fathers and catholic tradition, while keeping abreast of current research, which is always contributing something toward a juster appreciation of Holy Writ in its large aspects and its details. "Nova et vetera" find constant use and place in the work of the modern exegete, particularly if he be of the old faith.

This Special Introduction, together with its companion General Introduction, marks a distinct advance among Catholic text-books of Scripture. It is distinguished from its predecessors by a more satisfying endeavor to safeguard Catholic truth without belittling the fruits and working theories of science. Its candid recognition of the value of critical methods and results is to be commended. The book will be more widely appreciated when such a recognition ceases to be a novelty among us.

GEORGE J. REID.

¹*Revue biblique*, October, 1901.

Le Père Gratry. R. P. A. Chauvin. Paris: Blond et Barral, 1901.
Pp. vii + 480.

Une Carrière Universitaire. Jean-Félix Nourrisson. Henry Thédenat. Paris: Albert Fontemoing, 1901. Pp. vi + 362.

1. This volume, written by a member of the Oratory, is a fitting tribute to the memory of the man who had an important share in the foundation of the Oratory. It brings back to view a character full of generous enthusiasm for the truth and of gentle sympathy for all men. It shows us in detail the work of a thinker whose ideal was that which has so often prompted and which still prompts the noblest efforts—the harmonizing of religion and science. The many-sided activity of Père Gratry, both as a priest and as a writer, is carefully studied; for though the biographer's admiration is not repressed, his estimate is tempered by what may be called a kindly critical treatment of his subject.

Now that nearly thirty years have passed since Père Gratry's death (1872), it is interesting to follow his career through a period that was so eventful in the history of the church and in the development of modern thought. Curiously enough, with all his *douceur*, he took a prominent part in the polemics of his day, encountering such adversaries as Vacherot, Renan and the group whom he styled the "Sophists." But his work was constructive also. In fact, his philosophical writings are the most important of his publications. In these, too, the elements of contrast appears; a speculative tendency reaching almost to mysticism alternates with the study of those more practical problems which are now taken up in the science of Sociology. This very contrast is simply the projection of Gratry's chief qualities, his intensely spiritual view and his thoroughly human love of his fellow-men. So, what we carry away from the perusal of this book is the portrait of a man, strong in his convictions and stronger, after the severest tests, in his loyalty to the church.

2. For any one who desires to follow the career of a straightforward Christian thinker through all the intricacies woven by the intellectual activity of France in the nineteenth century, this little volume will be of interest. Nourrison was a man of faith and yet full of sympathy for the better elements of that valuable life of which his own was a part. The friend of Cousin, Gratry and Ozanam, he naturally shared the lofty spiritualistic views and ideals of these great thinkers. He sought, one might say, the prototypes of his own clear thought in Leibnitz and Bossuet. This thought was, in brief, that the human mind, under the influence of Christianity and by its own endeavor, is ever advancing, in spite of its mistakes and weaknesses, towards a clear solution of the problems which concern its nature and its destiny. His aim was to

defend the principles on which modern society, knowingly or unknowingly, is based, and to bring into clear light, by historical illustration, the spiritualistic ideas which had so long been the glory of French philosophy. Without binding himself to any system, he sought a profound knowledge of every system. For him, faith in the supernatural was above all claims of the natural order, and practical results furnished the criterion by which all theories and doctrines were to be judged.

The author has given us a charming biography by letting Nourrisson and his correspondents speak for themselves. So, in these papers, we catch glimpses of those closer, not public, relations, which unite men of different views upon a higher, more spiritual plane.

EDWARD A. PACE.

Political Economy, by Charles S. Devas. Longmans, Green and Co.,
New York, 1901. Pp. xxiv + 662.

This work is a second edition, rewritten and enlarged, of the author's volume contributed in 1891 to the Stonyhurst Series of Manuals of Catholic Philosophy. The present volume contains one hundred pages more than the earlier edition. The language and the treatment of topics has in many places been very materially changed for the better, whilst parts have had to be very much modified and revised "in view of the many changes in laws, economic conditions and prevalent opinions since the first edition was published." With the rapid changes going on about us in the economic structure of society, with the constantly growing investigation of economic phenomena and the corresponding development of economic theory, a decade is a considerable life for an edition of a text-book on economic science, and all who were favorably impressed with the first edition of this work will be grateful for this second and improved edition.

It is no easy task that the writer sets before himself who attempts a text-book on Economics. The nature and the scope of the science are themselves still matters of grave dispute, so that each author must determine for himself what he shall take as the field of his science. Professor Devas is not of those who distinguish Economics from Ethics. For him Economics is merely one subdivision of "particular Ethics," Political Science being the other. In consequence, he does not stop with the laying before his readers of economic data, or the analysis of economic phenomena, but at all points insists on the recognition and the application of ethical principles in economic life. With his view that sound ethical principles ought to be a stronger and more actual force in economic life than is at present the case, there will be few to disagree; but those most

in sympathy with this view may consistently question whether the indiscriminate mixing of economic analysis with ethical sermons aids either science or reform. However, this extreme, if it be an extreme, is at least to be preferred to that other in which not only is Economics divorced from Ethics but is set up as an unrelated and even superior study.

The importance that is assigned to the subject of consumption in this work is in keeping with the best tendencies in later economic discussions. Book IV, on Public Finance, is also a part of the science that is too often omitted from works intended for students and general readers, and the including of it in this work is an example that should be followed. The device of putting in larger type a connected treatise for the beginner or the general reader, and interpolating more extensive discussions, with references to other writers, is an excellent one, and makes the same book appeal equally to two very differently equipped classes of readers. The book is well printed, and has an excellent index.

CHARLES P. NEILL.

A Collection of Cases and Statutes on the Principles of Code Pleading, with notes, by Charles M. Hepburn, Lecturer on Code Pleading in the Law Department of the University of Cincinnati. Cincinnati: W. H. Anderson and Co., 1901. Pp. xxxvi + 651.

Readings in the Law of Real Property; an Elementary Collection of Authorities for Students. Selected and edited by George W. Kirchwey, Nash Professor of Law in Columbia University. New York: Baker, Voorhis and Co. 1900. Pp. xxix + 555.

1. The adoption of the system of Code Pleading in the majority of our American States, and the influence it has gradually exercised upon the procedure in the courts of the remaining States, have rendered inevitable the production of a new branch of legal literature, to which the work of Prof. Hepburn comes as a most valuable contribution. It contains one of the largest collections of cases for the instruction of students in this subject which has yet been published; and though it nominally covers but a portion of the entire field of Code Pleading, the doctrines incidentally illustrated in the cases leave few points of practical importance unexplained. Simple as the rules which constitute the new procedure may appear when examined in the text-books of Bliss, Maxwell, Bryant, Pomeroy, and other writers, in their practical application they have occasioned, perhaps, as much perplexity as the technical rules they were intended to improve, and it is only in the decided cases that the student meets these difficulties and discovers their solution. With a view to present and solve these in the most lucid manner possible, Prof. Hepburn confines his selection to cases discussing the "Form of Action" and the "Party-

Plaintiff," which topics necessarily bring into review the fundamental principles and theories underlying the entire system. The cases printed at length in this volume number two hundred and three, taken from twenty-two different States and Territories, while over seven hundred cases are utilized for purposes of explanation and corroboration in addition to those merely cited in the text. Naturally a large proportion of these cases are drawn from the decisions in New York, where code pleading originated, and in whose courts its intricacies have received the widest exploration. How far this selection contains the best and most useful cases for the student it is beyond the province of the reviewer to determine. Only an examination of all the decided cases by a competent instructor in the subject could result in an authoritative answer to that question. Professor Hepburn's experience as a teacher, and his familiarity with the history and development of the new procedure as evidenced by his previous publications, must be accepted as a guaranty that in this particular his work has been wisely and successfully accomplished.

That feature of his book which does, however, impress the mind of the reviewer is the excellent arrangement of the cases under the logical subdivisions of the general matter to which they refer; and the elucidation of their doctrine by analyses and comparisons of the statutes and by numerous prefatory and intercalated explanatory notes. Such a treatment was indispensable in order to render this mass of decisions capable of their intended benefit to students just approaching the subject, and its execution seems to have left nothing further to be desired.

As we consider the amount of legal learning concentrated in this volume (which concerns only one of at least twenty branches of the law, of equal magnitude, covered by the ordinary law-school course) and the time which the student must necessarily consume in gathering and appropriating it permanently to his use, the conviction forces itself with increased energy upon our minds that the day is rapidly approaching when our best schools of law, notwithstanding their three-year term of study and their demand upon the student for the devotion of his whole time to their work, will be compelled to require for his admission to their courses not merely a collegiate degree but a preliminary legal education equal to that which, thirty years ago, would have been sufficient to admit him to the bar. The introduction into the college curriculum of studies in jurisprudence and elementary law, which has recently occurred in several institutions, will render this step possible as it is certainly desirable, if not imperative, in the interest of higher legal education.

2. The chief regret the reader feels as he finishes the perusal of this volume is that its editor was compelled, by the limitations set by him to

his own design, to confine his extracts to so few authorities and to so narrow an appropriation of their respective discussions. So vast is the learning of Real Property Law, so profound its problems, so exhaustive their interpretation by the ablest jurists of all times, that a volume like this can give but a taste of the most eminent, leaving an intense unsatisfied appetite behind. Still in this book the student will find much to inform his memory and discipline his legal reason, which but for this selection he might never encounter in his studies. Bracton and Littleton, and even Coke himself, have lapsed into the past as names to be revered but no longer authors to be read, and this reproduction of their utterances concerning what, in their day, was the most important body of the law, will give the student the opportunity he needs to wrestle with their difficult terminology and catch the savor of their concentrated wisdom. These, interspersed with copious extracts from Blackstone, Digby, Kent, Leake, Williams, and from both ancient and modern English and American statutes, constitute a chain of reading in historical order on the various subdivisions of the main subject which cannot but prove helpful to both instructors and pupils. The readings are arranged under five general heads: I. The Place of Real Property in the Common Law System; II. Ownership of Real Property; III. Estates in Land; IV. Rights less than Ownership; V. The Creation and Transfer of Interests in Land. Under these heads are distributed, in fifty-four chapters, with several *addenda*, the extracts relating to the numerous topics which these chapters represent. The example set by this compilation should be followed by many other editors in other branches of the law, as the only method of presenting to the students of the future those treasures of our legal literature which, by the accumulating publications of the present day, must soon be utterly submerged.

WILLIAM C. ROBINSON.

MISCELLANEOUS.

Books on Education in the Libraries of Columbia University.

New York. 1901. Pp. vi, 435.

This is the second of the Library Bulletins issued by Columbia University. It contains over 13,500 titles, which are arranged under 41 heads. At the end of the volume there is an author and classification index. The publication of this catalogue is a benefit, not only to those students who have access to the libraries represented, but to those as well who feel the need of a practical bibliography on the subject of education.

An Introduction to English Literature. By Maurice Francis Egan, Boston : Mosher & Co., 1901. 8°. Pp. 241.

In this small octavo Dr. Egan has sought to stimulate to deeper intelligence and some personal research the students of English literature in the more advanced classes of our colleges, convents, and high schools. His appreciations of the best literary products in the long history of our tongue have more weight than their succinct form might at first suggest. Long years of teaching and direction bring a rare familiarity with the masterpieces themselves that is reflected in every judgment however brief and note-like. The treatment of Shakspere is particularly pleasing, and calculated to rouse in the youthful mind both intelligence of and reverence for the great writer who is destined to be for the men and women of English tongue that great interpreter of life which Homer was for the Greeks and Dante for the Italians. We recommend this manual to teachers and instructors—it contains, in a brief space, a good and reliable summary of the principal epochs of English literature.

A Cassock of the Pines and Other Stories, by Joseph Gordian Daley. New York : Wm. H. Young and Co., 1901, 8°, pp. 311.

These tales are admirable. Fr. Daley possesses all the qualities of a "raconteur" of the first rank, and with his pen may do genuine service for communities whose humble tragedy and comedy have long been waiting for writers who could recognize in them the same human pathos and verity that make the only charm of books with more pretence to fame. The Catholic life of New England offers many a tempting theme to those who possess insight enough to grasp firmly its peculiar phases and problems, also humor and sympathy enough to enter into contact with all its varieties. Usually such sympathy springs up only in the hearts of those born and brought up amid the surroundings they describe—only the children of a race can catch and render naturally a hundred shadings of belief, ideals, longings, habits, that escape all foreign or academic observation. There is no reason why Fr. Daley should not one day produce work of as exquisite truth and beauty as Prof. Henry Van Dyke's Canadian tales or Dr. William Drummond's "Habitants" and "Johnnie Courteau." But for that a stern and minute literary self-discipline is a prerequisite—the smaller the chef d'oeuvre the more exacting are the conditions of perfection; the more humble and common the material, the more numerous the critics capable of judging its good or bad treatment.

Echoes of St. Mary's Chimes, St. Mary's Academy, Notre Dame, Indiana. 8°. Pp. 103, 1901.

This exquisite work is not only a lovely specimen of the art of book-making; it also contains choice verse from the pens of the young ladies of St. Mary's Academy at Notre Dame. As a rule, the technique is sure and clean. The subject-matter is of a noble and elevated kind, and the thoughts are always chaste and elegant. There can be no doubt that a solid and reliable formation in the English language is one of the characteristic features of the admirable school on the banks of the St. Joseph. The evidence of this is not only in the dainty book of verse that lies before us, but in the pages of the "Chimes" that already enshrine no few essays and dissertations of superior merit.

A Life's Labyrinth, by Mary E. Mannix. The Ave Maria, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1901, 8°, pp. 304.

This reprint of Miss Mannix's pretty tale will be appreciated by all who are acquainted with the productions of her clever pen. It deserves a place in every family library.

Juvenile Round Table. Stories by the Foremost Catholic Writers, with twenty full-page illustrations. Benziger Bros., New York, 8°. Pp. 216. 1901.

This little volume might well be found on the library-table of every Catholic home. All of the stories are pure and interesting; some of them are excellently told. The child can make the acquaintance, in these pages, of a long list of devoted men and women who give their talents to the service of Catholicism, and are thereby not the least among its every-day apostles.

Hugh, Bishop of Lincoln. A Short Story of One of the Makers of Mediæval England. By Charles L. Marson. New York: Longmans, 1901. 8°, pp. 159.

The style of Mr. Marson is scarcely worthy of so noble a subject as Saint Hugh of Lincoln (1140-1200). He writes in a flippant, ultra-modern way about men and things of seven hundred years ago. It is as though one should study Roman history in a Becket's Comic History of Rome. He holds a brief against relics and miracles—the work is really disfigured by the numerous outbursts of wrath and mockery that they evoke. It is not clear why he should have chosen to write a sympathetic book about Saint Hugh, except on the principle that the latter was doing better than he knew.

Chivalry, by F. Warre Cornish. New York: Macmillan, 1901, 8°, pp. 266.

In this volume of the "Social England" series we meet with an elegant and sympathetic treatment of the great mediæval institution of Chivalry. The author treats successively of knighthood and the mediæval education of nobles, of war and tournaments and the crusades, of heraldry, ceremony and literature, of woman and religion as essential elements of chivalry, of the great military orders and the influence of chivalry on the people. The book is both tasteful and useful, and in its composition the author has consulted every work of importance from St. Palaye to Léon Gautier.

Letters of Richard Green. Edited by Leslie Stephen. New York: Macmillan, 1901. 8°, pp. 512.

These "Letters" of the author of the "Short History of the English People" are taken, mostly, from his correspondence with Edward Freeman. They reflect in a very lively way the principles and the spirit of that great teacher of history—for Green was his most illustrious, if not his most most scientific disciple. Incidentally they throw light on the development of the modern historical school in England. Green is a chatty and playful correspondent; his letters from Italy are of more than ordinary interest. Every ancient town was like a new mediæval book to this impressionable historian, and it would seem that the frequent sojourns in Italy that he was able to make, after the success of his principal works, did much to perfect his style. Home Ruler, disciple of Stubbs and Freeman and Creighton, painstaking stylist, liberal in politics and religion, Green's writings have done much to bring about a true and a saner view of the Middle Ages in England. His life was a long struggle with poverty and ill-health—the story of his death is pathetic, indeed, and recalls the last hours of the venerable Bede and Saint Columba. Like them he died on the scholars' battle-field, dictating and instructing.

Religious Education and Its Failures, by the Right Rev. James Bellard, D. D., Titular Bishop of Milevis. Revised and enlarged. The Ave Maria, Notre Dame, Indiana.

It is a pity that every Catholic teacher and parent could not read the weighty considerations that make this small brochure so interesting and useful. It is a sincere and thoroughgoing discussion of some of the causes why a system of religious education so widespread, minute, and costly as our Catholic system, is defrauded of its legitimate results. The

questions raised by the author grow more serious and alarming with every year; until they are settled practically, the religious training of our Catholic children will be too often attended with disappointment and failure.

Sermons on the Holy Ghost. By a Diocesan Priest. Catholic Library Association, 120, 50th Street, New York. 12°, pp. 235. New York. 1901.

An excellent volume of instructions on the relations of the Holy Ghost with mankind, with especial reference to the Incarnation, the Blessed Virgin Mary, the Church, and the written Word of God. The language is chaste, correct, and clear. And the doctrine—the most profound and transforming of Christian doctrines—is set forth with commendable succinctness, but also with a certain suggestiveness that tempts the reader to go farther afield in the same direction. May the booklet meet with wide diffusion! It needs a general table of contents at the beginning and a good "Index Rerum" at the end.

Idealità Buone. Per la patria, per il secolo, per le donne, per giovani, per gli operai, per la musica, per i monti, per le feste, Genova, Tipografia della Gioventù. 1901. 8°, pp. 237.

L' Eredità del Secolo. Conferenze intorno alla Questione Sociale. Rome: F. Pustet. 1900. 8°, pp. 202.

Gente che torna, gente che si muove, gente che s'avvia. Genova: Tipografia della Gioventù. 1901. 8°, pp. 44.

Un Raggio di Scienza e di Carità sull'alba del secolo. Rome: Desclées, Lefebvre et Cie. 1901. 8°, pp. 24.

Perhaps we are the first to call attention to the beneficent labors of Father Giovanni Semeria, a Barnabite monk of Genoa. He ranks among the best historians and archeologists of the newer Italy. His brochure on the Christian character of Boethius is a little gem that would not be disowned by the best German critic, and his popular lectures on primitive Christianity exhibit a mind well trained in modern research—methods and results; also a heart of the antique Christian type.

In the popular discourses that are here made known to our readers it is the modern Catholic man and citizen who speaks to his equals in a language that all can understand. No one can rise from their perusal without feeling sad that so much sense and wit, so much genuine patriotism and sure intelligence of the conditions of to-day, still more of to-morrow, should be confined to the limits of one tongue. It makes us wish for another period of the domination of a common language, so that the

sanest and shrewdest thought of Catholicism might be no longer hemmed in by Alps or Pyrenees, by the accidents of geography and history. Would that Fr. Semeria would undertake, as writer or editor, a popular history of the Catholic Church in several volumes, so that we might have a continuous and consistent story of her glorious life, done under the direction of one cognizant and respectful of the best modern method and helps, and devoted to the genuine interests of the mighty institution which is the true parent of all that is worthy and durable in the modern world!

The Jewish Encyclopædia. Vol. I. New York and London: Funk and Wagnalls, 1901.

Much to our regret, lack of space forbids us from publishing in this number of the BULLETIN a review of this book in proportion to its merits and importance. However, we wish, without further delay, to call the attention of our readers to such an epoch-making publication. Long before its appearance a place was assured it beside the most indispensable encyclopædias. We would like to see the work on the book-shelves of every student of religious and social questions, of those especially who, whether from the pulpit or from the teacher's chair, have to expound or defend Catholic truth. We therefore heartily welcome the new-comer, and wish it a speedy and extensive diffusion.

HENRY HYVERNAT.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

SCIENTIFIC AND ACADEMIC WORKS.

The French Revolution and Religious Reform, an account of ecclesiastical legislation and its influence on affairs in France from 1789 to 1804. William Milligan Sloane. New York: Scribner's, 1901. 8°, pp. xviii + 333.

Les Etapes d'un Soldat de l' Empire: Souvenirs du Capitaine Desboeufs. Charles Desboeufs. Paris: Picard, 1901. 8°, pp. 224.

Die altchristliche Litteratur und ihre Erforschung von 1884-1900. Albert Ehrhard. Friburg: Herder, 1900. 8°, pp. viii + 644.

Venticinque anni di Storia del Cristianesimo Nascente, Giovanni Semeria. Pustet. Rome: 1900. 8°, p. 393.

Les Sources de l'Histoire de France—I. Epoque primitive, Mérovingiens et Carolingiens. Auguste Molinier. Paris: Picard, 1902. 8°, pp. viii + 288.

L'Apollinarisme, Etude historique, littéraire et dogmatique, etc. (doctorate dissertation) Guillaume Voisin. Louvain: van Linthout, 1901. 8°, pp. 323.

Origen and Greek Patristic Theology. F. W. Fairweather. New York: Scribner's, 1901. 8°, pp. xiv + 268.

Patres Apostolici, Textum recensuit, etc. Franciscus Xaverius Funk. Vol. I-II. Tuebingen: H. Laupp, 1901. 8°, pp. cli + 688; lxxii + 332. (Second improved edition of Funk's text of the Apostolic Fathers).

Il Cristianesimo di Severino Boezio rivendicato, Giovanni Semeria. Rome: Propaganda, 1900. 4°, pp. 120.

Time Table of Modern History. A. D. 400-1870. Compiled and arranged by M. Morison. New York: Macmillan, 1901. Large quarto of 150 pages, with valuable index and seven colored plates, containing many historical maps.

Colonial Administration (1800-1900), with an extensive bibliography. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. 4°, 1901, pp. 1631.

Works of Edification: A Treatise of True Devotion to the Blessed Virgin, by the Blessed Grignon de Montfort, translated by Frederick William Faber, St. Charles Seminary, Sherbrooke, P. Q., 1901, 32°, pp. 341.—Forgive Us Our Trespasses, or Talks Before Confession. A book for children, by Mother M. Loyola. Edited by Father Thurston, S. J. New York: Benziger, 1901, 8°, pp. 142.—First Confession, by Mother M. Loyola. Edited by Father Thurston, S. J. 1901, 8°, pp. 63.—Jesus Living in the Priest. Considerations on the greatness and holiness of the priesthood, by P. Millet, S. J. English translation by Rt. Rev. Thomas Sebastian Byrne, D. D., Bishop of Nashville. New York: Benziger, 1901, 8°, pp. 517.—The Holy Mountain of La Salette, by Rt. Rev. Bishop Ullathorne, City Printing Co. 8°, pp. 220.—But Thy Love and Thy Grace, by Rev. Francis J. Finn, S. J. Illustrated. Benziger, 1901. 8°, pp. 138.—The Victories of Rome and the Temporal Monarchy of the Church, by Kenelm Digby Best. London: Kegan Paul, French, Teubner & Co. 32°, 1901, pp. 147.—Spiritual Letters of the Venerable Liebermann, translated into English by Rev. Chas. L. Grunenwald, C. SP., Detroit, Mich. 8°, 1901, pp. 550.—The Little Imperfections. Translated from the French, by Rev. Frederic P. Garesché, S. J. St. Louis: Herder. 1901. Pp. 251.—Lucius Flavus. Rev. Jos. Spellman, S. J. 8°, 1901, pp. 619.

FROM THE UNIVERSITY MUSEUMS.

One of the interesting features of The Catholic University of America is the number of private libraries and collections owned by some of the Professors and placed by them at the disposal of their colleagues, students and friends. The library of Dr. Bouquillon was the subject of a short monograph in The Catholic University Chronicle for December, 1897, pp. 122-124. Our readers do not forget his splendid collection of books, the achievement of over thirty-five years of tireless intellectual activity and the result of great sacrifices of time and money. This monograph, however, although sufficient to show the usefulness of one professor's library as an instrument of individual research, does not display many curious and rare prints which, having a real value apart from the utilitarian standpoint, appeal to the cultured public beyond the necessarily limited circle of the learned master's pupils.

These considerations are equally true of almost every professor in the University. Who is the scholar, really in love with his favorite study, who, hunting up in second-hand book stores at home or abroad the volumes necessary for his work of the ensuing year, did not occasionally meet with the good fortune of the cock in the fable—*escam quaerens margaritam invenit*—but who, wiser or perhaps more foolish than the king of the backyard, bought the pearl, regardless of cost, for the mere pleasure of looking at it and showing it to his friends?

The University cannot afford to spend money on curios of any kind. Still, at times, it purchases books in which usefulness and curiosity are combined. Moreover, it often receives from its friends souvenirs, relics of all description, coins, commemorative medals, manuscripts, specimens of ancient and modern art, Indian, European, or Oriental. These and hundreds of other similar objects have been collected in a room set apart for the purpose. They form the beginning of a museum which, for want of a more comprehensive name, has been called the Museum of Ethnography.

In inaugurating this new section of THE BULLETIN it is our intention to describe, and, if necessary, to publish, the most important objects in the Museum, just as opportunity or fancy will lead us, without placing any restriction upon ourselves as regards time, order or style. Our notes may run regularly for some time and then become intermittent. The reader will understand that, until we become richer in curios and in leisure, it cannot be otherwise. The order will be progressive, by which we mean that every article in the Museum, whether a coin, a manuscript, an Indian calumet, a Fidji island full-dress skirt, an ancient Armenian shield, or an autograph of Abd-el-Kader, will be the subject of a notice or receive a number by which it will be known and referred to in the future. We hope thereby not only to open a new field of interest to some of our readers, but also to offer a material sign of recognition to the generous friends who, from time to time, confide to our keeping valuable and rare objects.

I.—THE MEXICAN CODEX FEJÉRVÁRY-MAYER.

The University has received from its generous benefactor, His Excellency the Duke de Loubat, a copy of his photochromographic reproduction of an ancient Aztec manuscript known as the Codex Fejérváry-Mayer, the only pre-Columbian Mexican Codex in the Free Public Museums of Liverpool.¹ This codex was reproduced for the first time by Lord Kingsborough in the third volume of his "Mexican Antiquities," under the title, "Fac-Simile of an original Mexican painting in the possession of M. de Fejérváry, at Pess, Hungary."² It is to be regretted that Lord Kingsborough did not give either the history or the interpretation of this interesting manuscript. In the notice accompanying his own edition, the Duke de Loubat informs us that Dr. E. Seler, of the University of Berlin, has undertaken a thorough study of the history and contents of this valuable document. It will be sufficient to give a description of the new copy of the codex and point out the importance of such Mexican codices from a linguistic standpoint.

¹ Codex Fejérváry-Mayer Manuscrit Mexicain précolombien des Free Public Museums de Liverpool (M 12/14), publié en chromophotographie par le Duc de Loubat, Président de la société des Américanistes de Paris, etc. Paris, MDCCCI.

² The Kingsborough reproduction is very inferior to the new edition as regards color and design. Its arrangement of the pages is different from that of the original.

The new copy of the Codex Fejérvary-Mayer gives us a very good idea of the peculiar make-up of ancient Mexican manuscripts. It reproduces the original in almost every detail. It is divided into six sections, consisting of thick white paper. The sections are 6½ in. high. The first five are of equal length, 27 in., the sixth is only 20 in. long. This last section contains 3 leaves, the others have 4 leaves each, so that the leaves form perfect squares, 6½x6½ in. The first section is fastened to leaf 5, the second to leaf 9, the third to leaf 13, the fourth to leaf 17, and the fifth to leaf 21, which begins the last section. The fastenings are made of strips of white paper. In the original codices the sections are usually joined together by means of some gummy material. The copy folds like a screen, and when spread out has a total length of 155 inches. All the leaves, except the first and last, are written on both sides. The back of the first and last leaves is left in blank, because these two leaves are to receive the covers or binding of the manuscript. There are 23 leaves in all, and consequently 44 paintings or drawings, because the first and last leaves have only one drawing each, for the reason already given. On account of the way in which the copy is folded, the binding has no back. Hence, remarks F. Del Paso y Troncoso (The Manuscripts of Anahuac, p. 7), arises the difficulty of determining which is the beginning of an Indian book, a difficulty which is increased when the cover is absent. The imperfect arrangement of the leaves in the Kingsborough edition of the Codex Fejérvary-Mayer and of other Mexican Codices must have been caused by some difficulty of this kind. Thus the first page in the Kingsborough edition of the present Codex is the last one in the original¹.

The Codex, the copy of which we have just described, belongs to a class of Mexican Codices known as Nahuac or Aztec manuscripts. These are very important for the linguist and the archæologist. Before the Spanish conquest there were two hieroglyphic systems of writing in Central America, the calculiform and the Aztec. Both are represented by numerous inscriptions and a few manuscripts. The calculiform system, which is by far the more perfect of the two, was used specially by the Mayas of Yucatan. It takes its name from the word calculus (stone), because its hieroglyphics consist of small stones of uniform size, upon which were carved different pictures or designs. These stones, being arranged in the proper order and fixed to the walls, constituted inscrip-

¹In the notice to the present edition the Duke de Loubat gives a concordance showing the differences between his reproductions and those of Kingsborough for the Codex Fejérvary-Mayer and five others, viz., the Codex Vaticanus, No. 3778, the Codex Borgia (ex-Velletri), the Codex de Bologne (Cospiano), the Codex Telleriano-Remensis, and the Codex Vaticanus, No. 3738 (de los Rios). Cf. BULLETIN, Oct. 1888, pp. 538-39, and April, 1901, pp. 252-254.

tions which have the appearance of rough mosaics (cf. Brasseur de Bourbourg, *Anciens Monuments Mexicains*, Palenqué, plates 34-37).

The Aztec system, used by the Nahuac tribes which overran Mexico from the North—Toltecs, Chichimecs, Aztecs—is a sort of pictorial script, which is hieroglyphic in character and consists of various pictures or designs of different sizes. The Codex Fejérváry Mayer is a beautiful specimen of this kind of script. The importance of this Codex and of the other Nahuac codices of the same kind lies in this, that they represent an interesting step in the development of the art of writing. While some hieroglyphic systems like the Egyptian reached the alphabetic stage, in which the hieroglyph may sometime stand, not for the object which it depicts to the eye, but for a single letter, the Aztec system did not go beyond the syllabic stage in which the hieroglyph stands sometimes for a syllable. Not all its hieroglyphs, however, are syllabic; some of them are mere ideograms, that is, represent the object they picture, and those which are syllabic seems to be restricted to the translation of proper names. The principle underlying the use of these Aztec syllabic hieroglyphs is, as Berger points out,¹ the principle of the rebus. According to this principle, words are expressed by signs which recall the sound or pronunciation of the words, but which have no necessary connection with the meaning of the words themselves. Thus, in some Aztec manuscripts, the name of the fourth king of Mexico, Itzcoatl (literally the obsidian serpent), is translated by a group of signs, consisting of an obsidian arrow (itzil, root itz), of a vase (comitl, root eo), and of the sign for water (atl). In other manuscripts this same proper name is written ideographically by the combined pictures of a serpent (coatl) and the obsidian arrow (itzil). Only a few hieroglyphs, both of the calculiform and Aztec types, have been deciphered. However, much work has been done recently in that direction by such scholars as Brasseur de Bourbourg, Léon de Rosny, Dr. E. T. Hamy, of Paris, and Dr. E. Seler, of Berlin. It is acknowledged on all sides that the difficulties attending the interpretation of Mexican pictorial script are considerable.

In this field of study the student has no bilingual tests like the Rosetta Stone for the Egyptian and the Behistun inscriptions for the Assyrian to give him a clue to the meaning of the hieroglyphs. The scanty indications and explanations written in Mexican or Spanish, which, in some Aztec Codices like the Codex Telleriano-Remensis, accompany the Mexican text, are often obscure and inaccurate. Besides, the material at hand is not abundant. It cannot compare in richness

¹ *Histoire de l' Ecriture dans l' antiquité*, Paris, 1901, p. 25.

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with the papyri of Egypt and the cuneiform tablets of Assyria, which supply the Orientalist with a large number of texts treating of a great variety of topics. The task, however, has been greatly facilitated by the generosity of the Duke de Loubat, who, at considerable expense, has undertaken the reproduction of the principal Mexican manuscripts,¹ thus placing within easy reach of all those venerable monuments of ancient Mexican civilization. May these strange Aztec and calculiform hieroglyphics, which doubtless contain much valuable and interesting information, soon find a Champollion or a Grottenfend! May we witness, in the field of American linguistics, the complete realization of the Scriptural words which the Duke de Loubat has chosen as the motto of his preface to the edition of the Codex Fejérváry-Mayer, "Cherchez et vous trouverez!"

ARTHUR VASCHALDE.

¹The list of the Mexican publications of the Duke de Loubat, includes, besides the Codex Fejérváry-Mayer, the following manuscripts: Codex Vaticanus, No. 373 (17898); Codex Borgia (ex-Velletri) (1898); the work of Don Ignacio Borunda "Clave generale de jeroglíficos Americanos" (hitherto unedited) (1898; Codex de Bologne (Cospiano) (1899); Codex Telleriano Remensis (1899); Codex Vaticanus, No. 3738 (de los Ríos) (1900); the Toulamatl Aubin (hitherto unpublished) (1900). Cf BULLETIN April, 1901, pp. 252-254, for the titles in full. The University Library is constantly indebted to His Excellency, the Duke de Loubat, for copies of all his Mexican publications. In this he shows himself a generous and enlightened Mæcenas.

THE EPISCOPAL CONSECRATION OF THE RIGHT REVEREND RECTOR.

Our Rt. Rev. Rector, Mgr. Thomas J. Conaty, D. D., was consecrated Titular-Bishop of Samos, on Sunday, November 24th, in the Cathedral at Baltimore, by his Eminence James Cardinal Gibbons, Chancellor of the University. The consecrator was assisted by Rt. Rev. Camillus P. Maes, D. D., Bishop of Covington, Secretary of the Board of Trustees of The Catholic University, and by Rt. Rev. Thomas D. Beaven, D. D., Bishop of Springfield, the diocese to which Mgr. Conaty belonged. Very Rev. Dr. A. L. Magnien, President of St. Mary's Seminary, was archpriest. The deacons of honor were Rt. Rev. Mgr. Thomas Griffin, Worcester, Mass., and Rt. Rev. Mgr. Thomas Magennis, Boston. Rt. Rev. Mgr. Lynch, Utica, N. Y., was deacon of the Mass, and Rev. P. B. Phelan, Holyoke, Mass., was subdeacon. Rev. Dr. W. A. Fletcher, Rector of the Cathedral, was master of ceremonies. He was assisted by Mr. George Harrington, of St. Mary's Seminary.

In the sanctuary were seated many members of the hierarchy: Most Rev. John J. Williams, D. D., Archbishop of Boston, attended by the Revs. John Flatley, Cambridge, Mass., and William P. McQuaid, Boston, Mass.; Most Rev. M. A. Corrigan, D. D., Archbishop of New York, attended by the Revs. E. R. Dyer, S. S. D. D., President of St. Joseph's Seminary, Dunwoodie, N. Y., and M. J. Lavelle, the Cathedral, New York; Most Rev. W. H. Elder, D. D., Archbishop of Cincinnati, attended by the Rev. J. W. Cummings, Arlington, Ill., and the Very Rev. V. Huber, O. S. B., Peru, Ill.; Most Rev. Patrick J. Ryan, D. D., Archbishop of Philadelphia, attended by the Revs. Morgan M. Sheedy, Altoona, Pa., and J. H. O'Neill, Philadelphia, Pa.; Most Rev. John Ireland, D. D., Archbishop of St. Paul, attended by the Revs. Hugh McGuire, Chicago, Ill., and E. J. Conaty, Grand Forks, N. D.; Most Rev. F. X. Katzer, D. D., Archbishop of Milwaukee, attended by the Very Rev. J. Amrhein, C. P., Baltimore, and the Rev. J. J. O'Keefe, Clinton, Mass.; Most Rev. J. J. Kain, D. D., Archbishop of St. Louis, attended by the Revs. P. S. O'Reilly, Whitinsville, Mass., and J. F. Clarke, New Bedford, Mass.; Most Rev. John J. Keane, D. D., Archbishop of Dubuque, attended by the Revs. B. M. O'Boylan, Newark, O., and D. F. Cronin, Hinsdale, Mass.; Most Rev. Alexander Christie, D. D., Archbishop of Portland, attended by the Revs. H. M. Chapuis, S. S., Washington, D. C., and J. F. Redican, Leicester, Mass.; Rt. Rev. Mathew Harkins, D. D., Bishop of Providence, R. I.,

attended by the Revs. William Stang, D. D., Providence, R. I., and Thomas P. Grace, Providence, R. I.; Rt. Rev. Maurice F. Burke, D. D., Bishop of St. Joseph, Mo., attended by the Revs. T. J. Campbell, S. J., New York, and William E. Foley, Worcester, Mass.; Rt. Rev. John S. Foley, D. D., Bishop of Detroit, attended by the Very Rev. F. A. O'Brien, Kalamazoo, Mich., and the Rev. Stephen Hallissey, Hudson, Mich.; Rt. Rev. A. Van de Vyver, D. D., Bishop of Richmond, attended by the Very Rev. J. J. Fedigan, O. S. A., Bryn Mawr, and the Rev. J. Hanselmann, S. J., Worcester, Mass.; Rt. Rev. Charles McDonnell, D. D., Bishop of Brooklyn, attended by the Very Rev. C. H. McKenna, O. P., New York, and the Rev. Thomas J. O'Brien, Brooklyn; Rt. Rev. Henry Gabrels, D. D., Bishop of Ogdensburg, attended by the Revs. J. Brouillet, Worcester, Mass., and William Duckett, S. S., Montreal, Canada; Rev. Michael Tierney, D. D., Bishop of Hartford, attended by the Rev. P. Kennedy, New Haven, Conn., the Rev. J. J. Quinn, Collinsville, Conn.; Rt. Rev. M. J. Hoban, D. D., Bishop of Scranton, Pa., attended by the Revs. R. McAndrews, Wilkesbarre, Pa., and D. F. McGrath, Holyoke, Mass.; Rt. Rev. Thomas O'Gorman, D. D., Bishop of Sioux Falls, S. D., attended by the Very Rev. L. F. Dumont, S. S., D. D., Catholic University, Washington, D. C., and the Rev. T. J. Driscoll, Fonda, N. Y.; Rt. Rev. J. E. Fitzmaurice, D. D., Bishop of Erie, Pa., attended by the Very Rev. George Deshon, C. S. P., New York City, and the Very Rev. James A. Burns, C. S. C., President of Holy Cross College, Washington, D. C.

The Monsignori included the Rt. Rev. Mgrs. Thomas Griffin, D. D., Worcester; Denis O'Callaghan, D. D., P. R., Boston; G. Brochu, Southbridge, Mass.; James Lynch, D. D., Utica, N. Y.; George H. Doane, Newark, N. J.; Thomas Magennis, Boston, Mass.; John J. Kennedy, V. G., Syracuse, N. Y.

There were also present the heads of several religious orders and institutes, and many representatives of the diocesan clergy. Among them were the following: The Very Revs. J. A. Fedigan, O. S. A., Provincial of the Augustinians; John J. Gannon, S. J., Provincial of the Jesuits; C. Emory, O. M. I., President Ottawa University, Ottawa, Canada; George Deshon, C. S. P., Superior General of the Paulists, New York City; Stephen Kealy, C. P., Provincial of the Passionists, Cincinnati; A. L. Magnien, D. D., S. S., President of St. Mary's Seminary, Baltimore; William Stang, D. D., Providence, R. I.; Frank A. O'Brien, Kalamazoo, Mich.; Joseph F. Hanselmann, S. J., President of Holy Cross College, Worcester, Mass.; W. A. Hehir, C. S. S., President Holy Ghost College, Pittsburgh, Pa.; E. R. Dyer, S. S., D. D., President St. Joseph's Seminary, Dunwoodie, N. Y.; James F. Driscoll, S. S., D. D., President St. Austin's College, Washington, D. C.; James A. Burns, C. S. C., Pres-

ident Holy Cross College, Washington, D. C.; Walter Elliot, C. S. P., President St. Thomas' College, Washington, D. C.; W. L. O'Hara, A. M., President Mount St. Mary's College, Emmitsburg, Md.; Vincent Huber, O. S. B., President St. Bede's College, Peru, Ill.; the Revs. Joseph Amrhein, O. P., Baltimore; Timothy Brosnahan, S. J., Woodstock, Md.; Revs. George F. Brown, Newark, N. J.; M. P. Cassidy, Valley Falls, R. I.; James F. Clark, New Bedford, Mass.; John E. Cronley, Hopkinton, Mass.; P. J. Daly, Boston, Mass.; J. J. Fallon, Ware, Mass.; W. J. Fitzgerald, Millville, N. J.; W. A. Fletcher, D. D., Baltimore, Md.; J. H. Gavin, Amherst, Mass.; John Harty, Pawtucket, R. I.; P. P. Keating, Norfolk, Conn.; James J. Keegan, Woburn, Mass.; P. M. Kennedy, New Haven, Conn.; M. J. Lavelle, New York; John F. Leahy, S. J., Woodstock, Md.; C. H. McKenna, O. P., New York; Fidelis Stone, C. P., West Hoboken, N. J.; A. P. Doyle, C. S. P., New York; Thomas McMillan, C. S. P., New York; Maurice J. Dorney, Chicago, Ill.; John Kenny, Northampton, Mass.; Thomas W. Wallace, Lewiston, Me.; John T. Madden, Webster, Mass.; M. J. Masterson, Peabody, Mass.; James F. X. Mulvaney, S. J., Washington, D. C.; John J. Murray, Sparrow's Point, Md.; Bernard S. Conaty, Worcester, Mass.; William E. Foley Worcester, Mass.; E. J. Conaty, Grand Forks, N. D.; P. D. Stone, Chicopee, Mass.; R. Neagle, P. R., Malden, Mass.; B. M. O'Boylan, Newark, Ohio; John O'Brien, Chicago, Ill.; Thomas J. O'Brien, Brooklyn; Louis O'Donovan, Baltimore; J. J. O'Keeffe, Clinton, Mass.; Father Tormey, Brookfield, Mo.; M. Hassett, Harrisburg, Pa.; M. O'Brien, Chicago; W. H. Rogers, Hartford, Conn.; W. Kieran, Philadelphia; P. J. O'Donnell, Boston, Mass.; René J. Holaind, S. J., Washington, T. Smyth, Springfield, Mass.; P. E. Gill, Chicago; F. Ward, C. P., Louisville; J. O'Doherty, Haverhill, Mass.; D. Duehmig, Avilla, Ind.; B. F. McCahill, Fall River, Mass.; J. T. O'Reilly, O. S. A., Lawrence, Mass.; F. Donahue, Baltimore; J. J. McCoy, Chicopee, Mass.; D. F. Feehan, Fitchburg, Mass.; Gabriel Healy, New York; D. F. McGillicuddy, Worcester; Fred Rhoeder, Toronto, Canada; E. X. Fink, S. J., Washington, D. C.; John A. Conway, S. J., Washington, D. C.; the Rev. John W. McDermott, Clinton, N. Y.; P. H. Phelan, P. R., Holyoke, Mass.; J. J. Quinn, Collinsville, Mass.; J. F. Redican, Leicester, Mass.; James N. Supple, Charlestown, Mass.; J. P. Tuite, Worcester, Mass.; James Fitzsimmon, Yonkers, N. Y.; John B. Daly, Springfield, Mass.; Joseph F. Foley, Baltimore; M. F. Foley, Baltimore; J. J. Healy, Gloucester, Mass.; Michael T. McManus, Brookline, Mass.; M. J. Whelan, Ottawa, Canada; J. F. O'Keefe, Philadelphia; John F. Dolphin, St. Paul, Minn.; Joseph Brouillet, Worcester, Mass.; Thomas F. Carroll, Providence, R. I.; J. S. Cullen, Watertown, Mass.; J. W. Cummings, Arlington, Ill.; J. A. Cunningham, Baltimore;

George W. Devine, Baltimore; J. A. Donnelly, North Adams, Mass.; J. C. Kent, O. P., Washington, D. C.; H. J. Lynch, Danbury, Conn.; J. F. Mackin, Washington, D. C.; A. Murphy, Rome, N. Y.; P. S. O'Reilly, Whitinsville, Mass.; W. A. Ryan, Utica, N. Y.; R. F. Walshe, Easthampton, Mass.; F. H. Wall, D. D., New York; J. P. Fagan, S. J., New York; M. Dolan, Newton; J. J. Tyrrell, Florence, Mass.; P. H. McClean, Milford, Conn.; Hugh McGuire, Chicago; Michael O'Brien, Chicago; O. F. Clarke, Providence; P. Griffith, Washington, D. C.; D. J. Stafford, Washington, D. C.; M. C. McEnroe, Philadelphia; D. F. Cronin, Hinsdale, Mass.; J. T. Driscoll, Fonda, N. Y.; J. S. Colbert, Boston; P. P. Conaty, Yonkers, N. Y.; C. Crevier, Holyoke, Mass.; W. H. Ketcham, Washington, D. C.; E. McSweeney, Bangor, Me.; W. A. Reardon, Baltimore; J. T. Sheehan, Ware, Mass.; W. Duckett, S. S., Montreal, Canada; P. J. Dooley, S. J., Baltimore; J. F. Hallissey, Hudson, Mich.; M. J. Cooke, Fall River, Mass.; L. S. Walsh, Salem, Mass.; C. F. Kelly, S. J., Philadelphia; J. P. Bodfish, Canton, Mass.; J. E. Millerick, Wakefield, Mass.; J. H. O'Neill, Philadelphia; J. C. McGovern, Emmitsburg, Md.; J. T. Canavan, Milford, Mass.; J. Donohoe, Westfield, Mass.; J. J. Donlon, Brooklyn; E. S. Fitzgerald, Springfield, Mass.; W. Maher, D. D., South Norwalk, Conn.; R. A. McAndrews, Wilkesbarre, Pa.; J. O'Connell, Attleboro, Mass.; H. J. Shandelle, S. J., Washington, D. C.; H. R. O'Donnell, East Boston, Mass.; T. P. Grace, Providence, R. I.; J. F. Mullaney, LL. D., Syracuse, N. Y.; J. Lefevre, S. S., Montreal, Can.; C. Emory, O. M. I., President Ottawa University; J. Dougherty, New York.

The professors of the various faculties of the University assisted in their academic robes. The students of the University, both clerical and lay, were also present, as well as the authorities of the affiliated colleges, and many of their students.

Besides the venerable father of the new Bishop there were present several members of his family and near relatives. From the city of Washington there came to the ceremony several distinguished gentlemen and ladies, as follows :

Senor and Madame Aspiroz, of the Mexican Embassy; Senator and Mrs. Carter, Mr. and Mrs. T. P. Moran, Miss Ella Loraine Dorsey, Mr. W. J. Hughes, of the Department of Justice; Hon. Terence V. Powderly, United States Immigration Commissioner; Hon. Maurice D. O'Connell, Solicitor of the Treasury, and Mrs. O'Connell, Mr. P. J. Haltigan, Mr. Richard Campbell, Mr. and Mrs. R. E. Sullivan, Dr. and Mrs. Wm. J. Byrne, the Misses Roach, Mr. and Mrs. Peter C. Treanor, Professor and Mrs. Frank E. Cameron, Mrs. Maurice Francis Egan, Mrs. Adele Douglas Hillyer, and a delegation of fifteen young lady students from Trinity College in the neighborhood of the University.

From the new Bishop's former parish in Worcester, Mass., were noticed Mr. and Mrs. M. B. Lamb, Mr. and Mrs. Richard Healy, Dr. Mary V. O'Callaghan, Dr. Clara Fitzgerald, Mr. Francis P. McKeon, Mr. Frank Carr, Miss M. Rourke, Miss Teresa Timon, Miss Catherine Redican, Miss Mary Purcell.

Other special friends of the new Bishop were Major John and Miss E. M. Byrne, New York; the Hon. and Mrs. Martin Glynn, Albany; Mr. and Mrs. James P. Bree, New Haven, Conn.; Judge Joseph D. Fallon, of Boston; Dr. and Mrs. James E. Sullivan, of Providence; John H. and Mrs. Lynch, Albany; Mr. and Mrs. Frank Sullivan Smith, Miss Birmingham and Miss Murray, New York; Mr. Frank C. Travers, New York; Mr. and Mrs. James Clarke, New York; Miss Katherine E. Conway, Boston; Warren E. Mosher, New York; Mr. and Mrs. Jeremiah Dunlevy, Pittsburg; Mrs. Mary and Miss Nellie Conaty, of Springfield; Miss Mary Magennis, Boston; Mrs. K. Powers, Philadelphia; Miss Phelan, Holyoke, Mass.; Mrs. Burns, Minneapolis.

At the conclusion of the ceremony the new Bishop gave a dinner at St. Mary's Seminary, to which all the numerous clergy present were invited. His Eminence Cardinal Gibbons presided, having Bishop Conaty on his right hand. Cardinal Gibbons made a brief address, dwelling on the dignity just bestowed on Bishop Conaty as a proof of the Holy Father's favor alike to him and to the great institution which he has governed so well. His Eminence expressed his prayerful hope that Pope Leo XIII. might be spared to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of his Pontificate.

In reply, Bishop Conaty spoke in grateful acknowledgment of all greetings and good wishes, but chiefly of the momentous work of The Catholic University.

The sermon was preached by the Very Rev. Dr. Thomas J. Shahan, Professor of Church History. The text was I. Tim. v, 17, "Let the priests that rule well be esteemed worthy of double honor; especially they who labor in the word and doctrine." The discourse bore chiefly "On the Great Need of a Catholic University."

The Rt. Rev. Bishop Conaty spent the eve of his consecration with the Sulpitian Fathers at St. Mary's Seminary, Baltimore, as the guest of the President, the Very Rev. Dr. Magnien. An entertainment in honor of the Bishop-elect was given by the seminarians. Musical and literary selections were rendered and a congratulatory address was delivered by Mr. Patrick Burke, a seminarian from the Diocese of Springfield, Mass., to which Monsignor Conaty has belonged for a number of years. Dr. Magnien presided.

The gratitude of the Right Reverend Rector and the University is

owing to His Eminence the Chancellor for all the noble courtesies extended during the preparation for this important event. It goes out likewise to all those numerous prelates of our hierarchy who graced the occasion with their presence and to all the others who signified to the Right Reverend Rector their sincere satisfaction with this gracious favor of our Holy Father, Leo XIII. The religious orders and communities present by their representatives, and the large body of the diocesan clergy, have placed the Right Reverend Rector and the University under life-long obligations for the good-will and sympathy that their presence manifested. Similarly thanks are due to the Reverend Rector of the Cathedral and his assistants for their willing co-operation in all that pertained to the ceremony. The reverend gentlemen of St. Sulpice added to many others a new title of gratitude for their kindness in entertaining the visiting clergy and their affectionate welcome of the new bishop. Nowhere is the genuine ancient hospitality of the Catholic faith more steadily observed than in the oldest of our theological seminaries. A word of praise is due to the Cathedral choir for the exquisite music which added so much to the pleasure of the occasion.

On the day of the consecration a telegram of congratulation was received from Cardinal Rampolla, couched in the following terms:

ROME, Nov. 24, 1901.

MONSEIGNEUR CONATY, Recteur de l'Université Catholique de Washington, U. S.

En ce jour où le Saint Esprit descend sur vous pour vous sacrer évêque le Saint Père agréé l' hommage renouvelé par votre lettre du 12 courant et vous envoie de coeur sa bénédiction Apostolique.

M. CARD. RAMPOLLA.

UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

The Sulpitian College of St. Austin.—The Sulpitian Fathers have opened a house of studies in the vicinity of the University to be known as St. Austin's College. The aim of this establishment is the training, in special lines, of priests who are preparing for the work of the seminary. At present the Sulpitians have charge of the seminaries in Baltimore, New York, Boston, San Francisco and Montreal. For more than two centuries, they have rendered excellent service to the Church in Canada and the United States. Their new foundation, which brings them more closely in touch with the work of the University, is a noteworthy advance in the direction of thorough and systematic education for those who aspire to the priesthood.

The college is post-graduate in character and is affiliated with the University. Very Rev. James Driscoll, D. D., S. S., formerly a professor at St. Joseph's Seminary, Dunwoodie, New York, is its first president. We wish the new enterprise all the success that the Fathers of Saint Sulpice have a right to look for from its students in the years to come.

The Patronal Feast of the University.—The Feast of the Immaculate Conception was duly observed at the University. Pontifical Mass was celebrated by the Rt. Rev. Rector and the sermon was preached by Rev. Austin Dowling, of Providence, a former student of the University.

Reception to the New Bishop.—Several well attended receptions were tendered to the Right Reverend Rector since his consecration, by the University Club, the University itself, the Carroll Institute, and the young ladies of Trinity College.

Schools of Law.—The Schools of Law opened on the first Tuesday of October, 1901, with 32 students, 15 in the University School and 17 in the Professional School. The allotment to the Faculty of two additional rooms in McMahon Hall has made it practicable to organize the work of the students on an improved basis and require from them better results than have heretofore been possible. Each class now has its own academy, equipped with all the books necessary for its current work, where every student is expected to spend a minimum of thirty hours per week in legal research along lines laid down by his instructors, exclusive of the hours occupied by his class exercises. The courses thus far given during the present year in the Professional School are those of

Dr. W. C. Robinson on Real Property, of Rev. Dr. Rooker on Natural Law, and of Dr. A. J. Robinson on Elementary Law, Jurisprudence, and Elementary Conveyancing. In the University School two graduate students are preparing their dissertations for the degree of Doctor of Civil Law, several others are following research courses in Corporations, Admiralty, etc., with Dr. W. C. Robinson, and still others in Commercial Law with Dr. A. J. Robinson. Although smaller in numbers than during some previous years, the tone of the schools is excellent; all the students are apparently devoted to their work and bid fair to maintain the high reputation which these schools have already acquired.

During the summer vacation two of the former instructors (Dr. E. B. Briggs and Mr. C. H. Goddard) received appointments from the Federal Government in the educational department at Manila and started for their future field of labor. Their places in the Law Schools have not yet been filled, but a distribution of their work among those remaining has been made, awaiting the advent of their successors.

At the session of the Plattsburg Summer School in July and August, 1901, Dr. W. C. Robinson delivered three lectures,—on "Prehistoric Law," "Religion as a Social Force," and "Capital Punishment."

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